The FTC, Competition, Political Viewpoint, Misinformation and Digital Advertising

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has released a notice concerning an order agreed to by certain advertising agencies concerning digital advertising and anticompetitive conduct.  The court needs to approve the order.  The complaint is linked to below and is a fascinating read.  The Press Release states:

The Federal Trade Commission, along with a coalition of states, took decisive action today to stop collusion between the nation’s largest advertising agencies that distorted America’s modern public square.

Starting in 2018, major U.S. advertising agencies WPP, Publicis and Dentsu—who buy digital ad inventory on behalf of advertisers—unlawfully colluded to impose common “brand safety” standards across the digital advertising industry, according to the FTC’s complaint. The ad agencies, together with their primary competitors Omnicom and IPG, operated through trade associations to establish a common “Brand Safety Floor” to target “misinformation.”

The complaint alleges firms like NewsGuard and the Global Disinformation Index used this misinformation designation as a means to promote the demonetization of disfavored political viewpoints. In a competitive market, ad agencies compete for advertisers’ business by offering brand-safety tools that provide the best quality at the lowest cost. The brand safety agreement displaced competition by insulating the ad agencies from these competitive conditions, according to the complaint.

To resolve the FTC’s charges, the ad agencies have agreed to a proposed order that will stop the alleged coordinated conduct and prevent similar conduct from occurring in the future.

“The ad agencies’ brand-safety conspiracy turned competition in the market for ad-buying services on its head,” said Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson. “The antitrust laws guarantee participation in a market free from conduct, such as economic boycotts, that distort the fundamental competitive pressures that promote lower prices, higher quality products and increased innovation.

“As we explain in our complaint, the brand-safety agreement limited competition in the market for ad-buying services and deprived advertisers of the benefits of differentiated brand-safety standards that could be tailored to their unique advertising inventory,” he continued. “This unlawful collusion not only damaged our marketplace, but also distorted the marketplace of ideas by discriminating against speech and ideas that fell below the unlawfully agreed-upon floor. The proposed order remedies the dangers inherent to collusive practices and restores competition to the digital news ecosystem.”

As the complaint alleges, the ad agencies operated through their trade associations—specifically, the World Federation of Advertisers’ Global Alliance for Responsible Media (“GARM”) and the American Association of Advertising Agencies’ Advertiser Protection Bureau (“APB”)—to establish their common brand-safety standards. Under the agencies’ brand-safety agreement, websites that included so-called “misinformation” were deemed to fall below the brand safety floor and thus risked becoming categorically ineligible for advertising revenue.

If approved by a federal judge, the order will ensure that each of the biggest U.S. advertising agencies are prevented from engaging in agreements that would set common brand safety standards or restrict advertising based on biased and politically motivated criteria.

Omnicom and IPG are subject to a similar FTC order.

The Commission vote to issue the complaint and final order was 1-0-1, with Commissioner Meador recused. The FTC’s complaint and final order were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Joining the complaint are Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, Texas, Utah and West Virginia.

 

US FTC Sends Letter to Data Brokers concerning Disclosing Sensitive Data to Foreign Adversaries

The Federal Trade Commission has sent a warning letter to Data Brokers about violating the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act of 2024.  The FTC Press Release states, in part:

The Federal Trade Commission sent letters to 13 data brokers warning them of their responsibility to comply with the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act of 2024 (PADFAA).

PADFAA prohibits data brokers from selling, releasing, disclosing, or providing access to personally identifiable sensitive data about Americans to any foreign adversary, which include North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran, or any entity controlled by those countries. The law defines personally identifiable sensitive data to include health, financial, genetic, biometric, geolocation, and sexual behavior information as well as account or device log-in credentials and government-issued identifiers such as Social Security, passport, or driver’s license numbers.

“The FTC is committed to enforcing PADFAA and ensuring companies are complying with its requirements,” said Christopher Mufarrige, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “These letters should send a message to all data brokers to be aware of the law’s requirements and ensure they are not engaging in practices that violate it.”

The letters note that the agency has identified instances in which some of the letter’s recipients have “offered solutions and insights involving the status of an individual as a member of the Armed Forces. Such information is subject to PADFAA’s requirements.”

The letters warn the companies to conduct a comprehensive review of their business practices to ensure they comply with PADFAA, adding that a violation of the act may result in an enforcement action by the FTC, which could include civil penalties of up to $53,088 per violation.

Teva Pharmaceuticals will remove over 200 improper patent listings from the Orange Book

On December 10, 2025, the FTC announced that Teva Pharmaceuticals will “[r]emove. . .  Over 200 Improper Patent Listings” to improve generic competition.  The Press Release states:

FTC investigation prompts Teva request for removal of patents from Orange Book, paving the way for generic competition

After a challenge from the Federal Trade Commission, Teva Pharmaceuticals has requested that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) remove more than 200 improper patent listings from the FDA’s Orange Book. The FTC sent a series of warning letters in May 2025 to Teva and several other pharmaceutical companies, which have also withdrawn most of the disputed listings.

These challenges are part of the FTC’s broader efforts to promote competition and lower drug prices in keeping with President Trump’s Executive Order on Lowering Drug Prices. Improper patent listings can limit competition by preventing generic alternatives from entering the market. This can keep drug prices artificially high and prevent patients from accessing lower-cost alternatives. The removals of more than 200 improper listings will pave the way for greater competition for generic alternatives for more than 30 asthma, diabetes, and COPD drugs and epinephrine autoinjectors.

“President Trump has promised Americans access to prescription drugs at lower costs. The FTC is fighting to help deliver on that promise,” said FTC Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson. “When improper patent listings limit competition from generic alternatives, it hurts Americans’ bank accounts and more importantly, it can endanger their health. The Trump-Vance FTC is working hard to ensure that Americans have access to the affordable prescription drugs they need.”

The FTC’s 2025 challenges followed a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision that affirmed that Teva’s patents were improperly listed, consistent with an amicus brief filed by the FTC. The FTC will continue to monitor the pharmaceutical industry for other improper listings and anticompetitive conduct.

The Federal Trade Commission works to promote competition, and to protect and educate consumers. The FTC will never demand money, make threats, tell you to transfer money, or promise you a prize. You can learn more about how competition benefits consumers, file an antitrust complaint, or comment on a proposed merger. For the latest news and resources, follow the FTC on social media, subscribe to press releases, and read our blog.

Reducing Anticompetitive U.S. Regulations Process Continues

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust are continuing their work to address anticompetitive regulations across the U.S. government.  The FTC press release states:

Today, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division issued a joint letter directing the heads of agencies across the federal government to create a list of anticompetitive regulations that reduce competition, entrepreneurship, and innovation.

FTC Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson and Assistant Attorney General Abigail Slater of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division issued the letter, which advances President Trump’s Executive Order on Reducing Anticompetitive Regulatory Barriers.

The Executive Order directs all agency heads to provide a list identifying anticompetitive regulations within their agency’s rulemaking authority to the FTC and DOJ. Along with each regulation identified, the agency must include a recommendation for deletion; a recommendation for specific modifications; or a justification for the potential anticompetitive effects.

The joint letter follows a recent Request for Information launched by the FTC inviting members of the public to comment on how federal regulations can harm competition in the American economy.

Following public feedback and the lists of anticompetitive regulations from agency heads, the FTC and DOJ will provide the Director of the Office of Management and Budget a consolidated list of regulations that should be rescinded or modified, along with recommended modifications.

U.S. DOJ and FTC Release Merger Guidelines

U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission issued Merger Guidelines on December 18, 2023.  The Press Release states, in part:

Today, the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jointly issued the 2023 Merger Guidelines, which describe factors and frameworks the agencies utilize when reviewing mergers and acquisitions. The 2023 Merger Guidelines are the culmination of a nearly two-year process of public engagement and reflect modern market realities, advances in economics and law, and the lived experiences of a diverse array of market participants.

“These finalized Guidelines provide transparency into how the Justice Department is protecting the American people from the ways in which unlawful, anticompetitive practices manifest themselves in our modern economy,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “Since releasing the Draft Merger Guidelines earlier this summer, we have engaged with stakeholders across the country, and the Guidelines are stronger as a result. The Justice Department will continue to vigorously enforce the laws that safeguard competition and protect all Americans.”

. . . The 2023 Merger Guidelines released today modify the Draft Merger Guidelines, released on July 19, to address comments from the public, including extensive engagement from attorneys, economists, academics, enforcers, and other policymakers at the agencies’ three Merger Guidelines Workshops. They emphasize the dynamic and complex nature of competition ranging from price competition to competition for the terms and conditions of employment, to platform competition. This approach enables the agencies to assess the commercial realities of the United States’ modern economy when making enforcement decisions and ensures that merger enforcement protects competition in all its forms.

. . . The robust process to develop the 2023 Merger Guidelines began in January 2022. The agencies announced an initiative to evaluate possible revisions to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines and published a Request for Information on Merger Enforcement, which sought public comment on modernizing merger enforcement. The agencies received more than 5,000 comments. Commenters highlighted excessive market consolidation across industries and overwhelmingly urged the agencies to strengthen their approach to merger enforcement. At the agencies’ four listening sessions, business owners, workers, and other advocates similarly highlighted the potential for mergers and acquisitions to undermine open, vibrant, and competitive markets, in industries ranging from food and agriculture to health care. 

Informed by this feedback, agency experience and expertise, as well as developments in the market, law, and economics, the agencies drafted and jointly released a proposed version of the 2023 Merger Guidelines for public comment in July 2023 and received more than 30,000 comments reflecting the views of consumers, workers, academics, interest organizations, attorneys, enforcers, and many others across various sectors of the American economy. The agencies also held three Merger Guidelines Workshops to discuss the draft Merger Guidelines. This engagement informed an in-depth revision process culminating in today’s release of the 2023 Merger Guidelines.

Like the prior horizontal and vertical merger guidelines they replace, the 2023 Merger Guidelines are not themselves legally binding, but provide transparency into the agencies’ decision-making process.   

The 2023 Merger Guidelines do not predetermine enforcement action by the agencies. Although the Merger Guidelines identify the factors and frameworks the agencies consider when investigating mergers, the agencies’ enforcement decisions will necessarily depend on the facts in any case and will continue to require prosecutorial discretion and judgment.

The Merger Guidelines discuss the issue of nascent technology:

2.6.A. Entrenching a Dominant Position Raising Barriers to Entry or Competition. . . .

· Increasing Switching Costs

· Interfering With the Use of Competitive Alternatives. . . .

· Depriving Rivals of Scale Economies or Network Effects. . . .

Eliminating a Nascent Competitive Threat. A merger may involve a dominant firm acquiring a nascent competitive threat—namely, a firm that could grow into a significant rival, facilitate other rivals’ growth, or otherwise lead to a reduction in its power.  In some cases, the nascent threat may be a firm that provides a product or service similar to the acquiring firm that does not substantially constrain the acquiring firm at the time of the merger but has the potential to grow into a more significant rival in the future. In other cases, factors such as network effects, scale economies, or switching costs may make it extremely difficult for a new entrant to offer all of the product features or services at comparable quality and terms that an incumbent offers. The most likely successful threats in these situations can be firms that initially avoid directly entering the dominant firm’s market, instead specializing in (a) serving a narrow customer segment, (b) offering services that only partially overlap with those of the incumbent, or (c) serving an overlapping customer segment with distinct products or services.

Firms with niche or only partially overlapping products or customers can grow into longer-term threats to a dominant firm. Once established in its niche, a nascent threat may be able to add features or serve additional customer segments, growing into greater overlap of customer segments or features over time, thereby intensifying competition with the dominant firm. A nascent threat may also facilitate customers aggregating additional products and services from multiple providers that serve as a partial alternative to the incumbent’s offering. Thus, the success and independence of the nascent threat may both provide for a direct threat of competition by the niche or nascent firm and may facilitate competition or encourage entry by other, potentially complementary providers that may provide a partial competitive constraint. In this way, the nascent threat supports what may be referred to as “ecosystem” competition. In this context, ecosystem competition refers to a situation where an incumbent firm that offers a wide array of products and services may be partially constrained by other combinations of products and services from one or more providers, even if the business model of those competing services is different.

Nascent threats may be particularly likely to emerge during technological transitions. Technological transitions can render existing entry barriers less relevant, temporarily making incumbents susceptible to competitive threats. For example, technological transitions can create temporary opportunities for entrants to differentiate or expand their offerings based on their alignment with new technologies, enabling them to capture network effects that otherwise insulate incumbents from competition. A merger in this context may lessen competition by preventing or delaying any such beneficial shift or by shaping it so that the incumbent retains its dominant position. For example, a dominant firm might seek to acquire firms to help it reinforce or recreate entry barriers so that its dominance endures past the technological transition. Or it might seek to acquire nascent threats that might otherwise gain sufficient customers to overcome entry barriers. In evaluating the potential for entrenching dominance, the Agencies take particular care to preserve opportunities for more competitive markets to emerge during such technological shifts. Separate from and in addition to its Section 7 analysis, the Agencies will consider whether the merger violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act. For example, under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a firm that may challenge a monopolist may be characterized as a “nascent threat” even if the impending threat is uncertain and may take several years to materialize. The Agencies assess whether the merger is reasonably capable of contributing significantly to the preservation of monopoly power in violation of Section 2, which turns on whether the acquired firm is a nascent competitive threat. (footnotes omitted).

Guideline 9 is titled, “When a Merger Involves a Multi-Sided Platform, the Agencies Examine Competition Between Platforms, on a Platform, or to Displace a Platform.”  That Guideline provides, in part:

Platforms provide different products or services to two or more different groups or “sides” who may benefit from each other’s participation. Mergers involving platforms can threaten competition, even when a platform merges with a firm that is neither a direct competitor nor in a traditional vertical relationship with the platform. When evaluating a merger involving a platform, the Agencies apply Guidelines 1-6 while accounting for market realities associated with platform competition. Specifically, the Agencies consider competition between platforms, competition on a platform, and competition to displace the platform.

Multi-sided platforms generally have several attributes in common, though they can also vary in important ways. Some of these attributes include:

· Platforms have multiple sides. On each side of a platform, platform participants provide or use distinct products and services. Participants can provide or use different types of products or services on each side.

· A platform operator provides the core services that enable the platform to connect participant groups across multiple sides. The platform operator controls other participants’ access to the platform and can influence how interactions among platform participants play out.

· Each side of a platform includes platform participants. Their participation might be as simple as using the platform to find other participants, or as involved as building platform services that enable other participants to connect in new ways and allow new participants to join the platform.

· Network effects occur when platform participants contribute to the value of the platform for other participants and the operator. The value for groups of participants on one side may depend on the number of participants either on the same side (direct network effects) or on the other side(s) (indirect network effects). Network effects can create a tendency toward concentration in platform industries. Indirect network effects can be asymmetric and heterogeneous; for example, one side of the market or segment of participants may place relatively greater value on the other side(s).

· A conflict of interest can arise when a platform operator is also a platform participant. The Agencies refer to a “conflict of interest” as the divergence that can arise between the operator’s incentives to operate the platform as a forum for competition and its incentive to operate as a competitor on the platform itself. As discussed below, a conflict of interest sometimes exacerbates competitive concerns from mergers. Consistent with the Clayton Act’s protection of competition “in any line of commerce,” the Agencies will seek to prohibit a merger that harms competition within a relevant market for any product or service offered on a platform to any group of participants—i.e., around one side of the platform (see Section 4.3).

The Agencies protect competition between platforms by preventing the acquisition or exclusion of other platform operators that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. This scenario can arise from various types of mergers:

A. Mergers involving two platform operators eliminate the competition between them. In a market with a platform, entry or growth by smaller competing platforms can be particularly challenging because of network effects. A common strategy for smaller platforms is to specialize, providing distinctive features. Thus, dominant platforms can lessen competition and entrench their position by systematically acquiring firms competing with one or more sides of a multi-sided platform while they are in their infancy. The Agencies seek to stop these trends in their incipiency.

B. A platform operator may acquire a platform participant, which can entrench the operator’s position by depriving rivals of participants and, in turn, depriving them of network effects. For example, acquiring a major seller on a platform may make it harder for rival platforms to recruit buyers. The long-run benefits to a platform operator of denying network effects to rival platforms create a powerful incentive to withhold or degrade those rivals’ access to platform participants that the operator acquires. The more powerful the platform operator, the greater the threat to competition presented by mergers that may weaken rival operators or increase barriers to entry and expansion.

C. Acquisitions of firms that provide services that facilitate participation on multiple platforms can deprive rivals of platform participants. Many services can facilitate such participation, such as tools that help shoppers compare prices across platforms, applications that help sellers manage listings on multiple platforms, or software that helps users switch among platforms.

D. Mergers that involve firms that provide other important inputs to platform services can enable the platform operator to deny rivals the benefits of those inputs. For example, acquiring data that helps facilitate matching, sorting, or prediction services may enable the platform to weaken rival platforms by denying them that data.

The Agencies protect competition on a platform in any markets that interact with the platform. When a merger involves a platform operator and platform participants, the Agencies carefully examine whether the merger would create conflicts of interest that would harm competition. A platform operator that is also a platform participant may have a conflict of interest whereby it has an incentive to give its own products and services an advantage over other participants competing on the platform. Platform operators must often choose between making it easy for users to access their preferred products and directing those users to products that instead provide greater benefit to the platform operator. Merging with a firm that makes a product offered on the platform may change how the platform operator balances these competing interests. For example, the platform operator may find it is more profitable to give its own product greater prominence even if that product is inferior or is offered on worse terms after the merger—and even if some participants leave the platform as a result. This can harm competition in the product market for the advantaged product, where the harm to competition may be experienced both on the platform and in other channels.

The Agencies protect competition to displace the platform or any of its services. For example, new technologies or services may create an important opportunity for firms to replace one or more services the incumbent platform operator provides, shifting some participants to partially or fully meet their needs in different ways or through different channels. Similarly, a non-platform service can lessen dependence on the platform by providing an alternative to one or more functions provided by the platform operators. When platform owners are dominant, the Agencies seek to prevent even relatively small accretions of power from inhibiting the prospects for displacing the platform or for decreasing dependency on the platform.

In addition, a platform operator that advantages its own products that compete on the platform can lessen competition between platforms and to displace the platform, as the operator may both advantage its own product or service, and also deprive rival platforms of access to it, limiting those rivals’ network effects. (emphasis in original and footnotes omitted).

US FTC to Ban Noncompete Agreements?

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has proposed a rule which would essentially bar noncompete agreements.  The FTC’s press release states:

The Federal Trade Commission proposed a new rule that would ban employers from imposing noncompetes on their workers, a widespread and often exploitative practice that suppresses wages, hampers innovation, and blocks entrepreneurs from starting new businesses. By stopping this practice, the agency estimates that the new proposed rule could increase wages by nearly $300 billion per year and expand career opportunities for about 30 million Americans.

The FTC is seeking public comment on the proposed rule, which is based on a preliminary finding that noncompetes constitute an unfair method of competition and therefore violate Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

“The freedom to change jobs is core to economic liberty and to a competitive, thriving economy,” said Chair Lina M. Khan. “Noncompetes block workers from freely switching jobs, depriving them of higher wages and better working conditions, and depriving businesses of a talent pool that they need to build and expand. By ending this practice, the FTC’s proposed rule would promote greater dynamism, innovation, and healthy competition.”

Companies use noncompetes for workers across industries and job levels, from hairstylists and warehouse workers to doctors and business executives. In many cases, employers use their outsized bargaining power to coerce workers into signing these contracts. Noncompetes harm competition in U.S. labor markets by blocking workers from pursuing better opportunities and by preventing employers from hiring the best available talent.

“Research shows that employers’ use of noncompetes to restrict workers’ mobility significantly suppresses workers’ wages—even for those not subject to noncompetes, or subject to noncompetes that are unenforceable under state law," said Elizabeth Wilkins, Director of the Office of Policy Planning. “The proposed rule would ensure that employers can’t exploit their outsized bargaining power to limit workers’ opportunities and stifle competition.”

The evidence shows that noncompete clauses also hinder innovation and business dynamism in multiple ways—from preventing would-be entrepreneurs from forming competing businesses, to inhibiting workers from bringing innovative ideas to new companies. This ultimately harms consumers; in markets with fewer new entrants and greater concentration, consumers can face higher prices—as seen in the health care sector.

To address these problems, the FTC’s proposed rule would generally prohibit employers from using noncompete clauses. Specifically, the FTC’s new rule would make it illegal for an employer to:

• enter into or attempt to enter into a noncompete with a worker;
• maintain a noncompete with a worker; or
• represent to a worker, under certain circumstances, that the worker is subject to a noncompete.

The proposed rule would apply to independent contractors and anyone who works for an employer, whether paid or unpaid. It would also require employers to rescind existing noncompetes and actively inform workers that they are no longer in effect.

The proposed rule would generally not apply to other types of employment restrictions, like non-disclosure agreements. However, other types of employment restrictions could be subject to the rule if they are so broad in scope that they function as noncompetes.

This NPRM aligns with the FTC’s recent statement to reinvigorate Section 5 of the FTC Act, which bans unfair methods of competition. The FTC recently used its Section 5 authority to ban companies from imposing onerous noncompetes on their workers. In one complaint, the FTC took action against a Michigan-based security guard company and its key executives for using coercive noncompetes on low-wage employees. The Commission also ordered two of the largest U.S. glass container manufacturers to stop imposing noncompetes on their workers because they obstruct competition and impede new companies from hiring the talent needed to enter the market. This NPRM and recent enforcement actions make progress on the agency’s broader initiative to use all of its tools and authorities to promote fair competition in labor markets.

The Commission voted 3-1 to publish the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which is the first step in the FTC’s rulemaking process. Chair Khan, Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Commissioner Alvaro Bedoya issued a statement. Commissioner Slaughter, joined by Commissioner Bedoya, issued an additional statement. Commissioner Christine S. Wilson voted no and also issued a statement.

The NPRM invites the public to submit comments on the proposed rule. The FTC will review the comments and may make changes, in a final rule, based on the comments and on the FTC’s further analysis of this issue. Comments will be due 60 days after the Federal Register publishes the proposed rule. The public comment period will be open soon.

The proposed rule states [I’ve modified this post to include the entire rule.]:

910.1 Definitions

(a) Business entity means a partnership, corporation, association, limited liability company, or other legal entity, or a division or subsidiary thereof.

(b) Non-compete clause.

(1) Non-compete clause means a contractual term between an employer and a worker that prevents the worker from seeking or accepting employment with a person, or operating a business, after the conclusion of the worker’s employment with the employer.

(2) Functional test for whether a contractual term is a non-compete clause. The term non-compete clause includes a contractual term that is a de facto non-compete clause because it has the effect of prohibiting the worker from seeking or accepting employment with a person or operating a business after the conclusion of the worker’s employment with the employer. For example, the following types of contractual terms, among others, may be de facto non-compete clauses:

i. A non-disclosure agreement between an employer and a worker that is written so broadly that it effectively precludes the worker from working in the same field after the conclusion of the worker’s employment with the employer.

ii. A contractual term between an employer and a worker that requires the worker to pay the employer or a third-party entity for training costs if the worker’s employment terminates within a specified time period, where the required payment is not reasonably related to the costs the employer incurred for training the worker.

(c) Employer means a person, as defined in 15 U.S.C. 57b-1(a)(6), that hires or contracts with a worker to work for the person.

(d) Employment means work for an employer, as the term employer is defined in paragraph (c) of this section.

(e) Substantial owner, substantial member, and substantial partner mean an owner, member, or partner holding at least a 25 percent ownership interest in a business entity.

(f) Worker means a natural person who works, whether paid or unpaid, for an employer. The term includes, without limitation, an employee, individual classified as an independent contractor, extern, intern, volunteer, apprentice, or sole proprietor who provides a service to a client or customer. The term worker does not include a franchisee in the context of a franchisee-franchisor relationship; however, the term worker includes a natural person who works for the franchisee or franchisor. Non-compete clauses between franchisors and franchisees would remain subject to Federal antitrust law as well as all other applicable law.

910.2 Unfair Methods of Competition

(a) Unfair methods of competition. It is an unfair method of competition for an employer to enter into or attempt to enter into a non-compete clause with a worker; maintain with a worker a non-compete clause; or represent to a worker that the worker is subject to a non-compete clause where the employer has no good faith basis to believe that the worker is subject to an enforceable non-compete clause.

(b) Existing non-compete clauses.

(1) Rescission requirement. To comply with paragraph (a) of this section, which states that it is an unfair method of competition for an employer to maintain with a worker a non-compete clause, an employer that entered into a non-compete clause with a worker prior to the compliance date must rescind the non-compete clause no later than the compliance date.

(2) Notice requirement.

(A) An employer that rescinds a non-compete clause pursuant to paragraph (b)(1) of this section must provide notice to the worker that the worker’s non-compete clause is no longer in effect and may not be enforced against the worker. The employer must provide the notice to the worker in an individualized communication. The employer must provide the notice on paper or in a digital format such as, for example, an email or text message. The employer must provide the notice to the worker within 45 days of rescinding the non-compete clause.

(B) The employer must provide the notice to a worker who currently works for the employer. The employer must also provide the notice to a worker who formerly worked for the employer, provided that the employer has the worker’s contact information readily available.

(C) The following model language constitutes notice to the worker that the worker’s non-compete clause is no longer in effect and may not be enforced against the worker, for purposes of paragraph (b)(2)(A) of this section. An employer may also use different language, provided that the notice communicates to the worker that the worker’s non-compete clause is no longer in effect and may not be enforced against the worker.

A new rule enforced by the Federal Trade Commission makes it unlawful for us to maintain a non-compete clause in your employment contract. As of [DATE 180 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION OF THE FINAL RULE], the non-compete clause in your contract is no longer in effect. This means that once you stop working for [EMPLOYER NAME]:

• You may seek or accept a job with any company or any person—even if they compete with [EMPLOYER NAME].
• You may run your own business—even if it competes with [EMPLOYER NAME].
• You may compete with [EMPLOYER NAME] at any time following your employment with [EMPLOYER NAME].

The FTC’s new rule does not affect any other terms of your employment contract. For more information about the rule, visit https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/federal-register-notices/non-compete-clause-rulemaking.

(3) Safe harbor. An employer complies with the rescission requirement in paragraph (b)(1) of this section where it provides notice to a worker pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section.

910.3 Exception

The requirements of this Part 910 shall not apply to a non-compete clause that is entered into by a person who is selling a business entity or otherwise disposing of all of the person’s ownership interest in the business entity, or by a person who is selling all or substantially all of a business entity’s operating assets, when the person restricted by the non-compete clause is a substantial owner of, or substantial member or substantial partner in, the business entity at the time the person enters into the non-compete clause. Non-compete clauses covered by this exception would remain subject to Federal antitrust law as well as all other applicable law.

910.4 Relation to State Laws

This Part 910 shall supersede any State statute, regulation, order, or interpretation to the extent that such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation is inconsistent with this Part 910. A State statute, regulation, order, or interpretation is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Part 910 if the protection such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation affords any worker is greater than the protection provided under this Part 910.

The proposed rule itself is interesting because of its breadth.  It does not make a distinction based on the reasonableness of the restriction, such as taking into account time, geographic scope or level of employment of the worker, such as an executive or researcher.  It does not make a distinction between types of businesses, such as research intensive industries.  It also seems to leave a number of questions open concerning the protection of trade secrets and other valuable know-how.  In some ways the rule is a double-edged sword—a company may lose employees, but may also gain them.  It does seem that it may favor companies with the resources to lure employees of competitors away.  The question of competition between countries and the protection of trade secrets is fascinating as well.  Interestingly, the noncompete rule seems to include agreements for additional consideration such as payment for the agreement not to compete. 

FTC Hits Vonage with $100 million Hammer for "Dark Patterns"

On November 3, 2022, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission fined Vonage $100 million for “dark patterns” to be paid to consumers. The tricky issue has been defining what exactly is a "dark pattern."  The FTC Press Release describes the "dark patterns" as:

• Eliminating cancellation options: Despite allowing its customers to sign up for services online, over the phone, and through other venues, the complaint alleges that starting in 2017, Vonage made the decision to force customers to cancel only by speaking to a live “retention agent” on the phone. The complaint notes that this practice runs counter to Vonage’s own advice to its clients not to “frustrate customers by requiring them to contact you for support that should be available on a self-service basis” and that “[i]t should be just as easy to return your product as it is to buy it.”

• Making cancellation process difficult: In addition to forcing customers into one cancellation method, it made that method difficult. The company created significant cancellation hurdles, including by making it difficult to find the phone number on the company website, not consistently transferring customers to that number from the normal customer service number, offering reduced hours the line was available and failing to provide promised callbacks. The complaint cites one internal Vonage email saying customers were “sent in a circle when they want to downgrade or remove the service.”

• Surprising customers with expensive junk fees when they tried to cancel: In many cases, customers who are able to access the cancellation line are told they will have to pay an unexpected early termination fee that was not clearly disclosed when they signed up for Vonage service. In some cases, these fees were in the hundreds of dollars.

• Continuing to charge customers even after they canceled: Customers who managed to speak to an agent and request cancellation often found that their accounts continued to be charged. Even when they contacted Vonage to complain, they received only partial refunds of the money they were charged without authorization.

FTC "Dark Patterns" Privacy Report Released

The FTC has released a report concerning the perhaps poorly named “Dark Patterns.”  Dark patterns are generally deceptive, confusing or misleading systems, tactics and procedures used by website or software developers or operators which may harm consumer privacy interests.  The Press Release for the Report states:

The Federal Trade Commission released a report today showing how companies are increasingly using sophisticated design practices known as “dark patterns” that can trick or manipulate consumers into buying products or services or giving up their privacy. The dark pattern tactics detailed in the report include disguising ads to look like independent content, making it difficult for consumers to cancel subscriptions or charges, burying key terms or junk fees, and tricking consumers into sharing their data. The report highlighted the FTC’s efforts to combat the use of dark patterns in the marketplace and reiterated the agency’s commitment to taking action against tactics designed to trick and trap consumers.

“Our report shows how more and more companies are using digital dark patterns to trick people into buying products and giving away their personal information,” said Samuel Levine, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “This report—and our cases—send a clear message that these traps will not be tolerated.”

For years, unscrupulous direct-mail and brick-and-mortar retailers have used design tricks and psychological tactics such as pre-checked boxes, hard-to-find-and read disclosures, and confusing cancellation policies, to get consumers to give up their money or data. As more commerce has moved online, dark patterns have grown in scale and sophistication, allowing companies to develop complex analytical techniques, collect more personal data, and experiment with dark patterns to exploit the most effective ones. The staff report, which stems from a workshop the FTC held in April 2021, examined how dark patterns can obscure, subvert, or impair consumer choice and decision-making and may violate the law.

The report, Bringing Dark Patterns to Light, found dark patterns used in a variety of industries and contexts, including e-commerce, cookie consent banners, children’s apps, and subscription sales. The report focuses on four common dark pattern tactics:

• Misleading Consumers and Disguising Ads: These tactics include advertisements designed to look like independent, editorial content; comparison shopping sites that claim to be neutral but really rank companies based on compensation; and countdown timers designed to make consumers believe they only have a limited time to purchase a product or service when the offer is not actually time-limited. For example, the FTC took action against the operators of a work-from-home scheme for allegedly sending unsolicited emails to consumers that included “from” lines that falsely claimed they were coming from news organizations like CNN or Fox News. The body of these emails included links that sent consumers to additional fake online news stories, and then eventually routed consumers to sales websites that pitched the company’s work-from-home schemes.

• Making it difficult to cancel subscriptions or charges: Another common dark pattern involves tricking someone into paying for goods or services without consent. For example, deceptive subscription sellers may saddle consumers with recurring payments for products and services they never intended to purchase or that they do not wish to continue purchasing. For example, in its case against ABCmouse, the FTC alleged the online learning site made it extremely difficult to cancel free trials and subscription plans despite promising “Easy Cancellation.” Consumers who wanted to cancel their subscriptions were often forced to navigate a difficult-to-find, lengthy, and confusing cancellation path on the company’s website and click through several pages of promotions and links that, when clicked, directed consumers away from the cancellation path. 
• Burying key terms and junk fees: Some dark patterns operate by hiding or obscuring material information from consumers, such as burying key limitations of the product or service in dense terms of service documents that consumers don’t see before purchase. This tactic also includes burying junk fees. Companies advertise only part of a product’s total price to lure consumers in, and do not mention other mandatory charges until late in the buying process. In its case against LendingClub, the FTC alleged that the online lender used prominent visuals to falsely promise loan applicants that they would receive a specific loan amount and pay “no hidden fees” but hid mention of fees behind tooltip buttons and in between more prominent text.

• Tricking consumers into sharing data: These dark patterns are often presented as giving consumers choices about privacy settings or sharing data but are designed to intentionally steer consumers toward the option that gives away the most personal information. The FTC alleged that smart-TV maker Vizio enabled default settings allowing the company to collect and share consumers’ viewing activity with third parties, only providing a brief notice to some consumers that could easily be missed.

As detailed in the report, the FTC has worked to keep pace with the evolving types of dark patterns used in the marketplace. The Commission has sued companies for requiring users to navigate a maze of screens in order to cancel recurring subscriptions, sneaking unwanted products into consumers’ online shopping carts without their knowledge, and experimenting with deceptive marketing designs. 

The Commission voted 5-0 at an open meeting to authorize the release of the staff report.

U.S. Federal Trade Commission Releases New Safeguards Rule for Non-Banking Financial Institutions

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the United States has changed the regulations concerning the Safeguards Rule relating to cybersecurity standards for non-banking financial institutions.  Essentially, the new Safeguards Rule contains additional specificity regarding what is required to comply with the contextual administrative, physical and technical standards for a compliant information security program.  The new Safeguards Rule will be effective a year from publication in the Federal Register. Notably, the new Safeguards Rule contains significant new definitions. The FTC press release states, in relevant part:  

The FTC’s updated Safeguards Rule requires non-banking financial institutions, such as mortgage brokers, motor vehicle dealers, and payday lenders, to develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive security system to keep their customers’ information safe.

“Financial institutions and other entities that collect sensitive consumer data have a responsibility to protect it,” said Samuel Levine, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “The updates adopted by the Commission to the Safeguards Rule detail common-sense steps that these institutions must implement to protect consumer data from cyberattacks and other threats.”

The changes adopted by the Commission to the Safeguards Rule include more specific criteria for what safeguards financial institutions must implement as part of their information security program such as limiting who can access consumer data and using encryption to secure the data. Under the updated Safeguards Rule, institutions must also explain their information sharing practices, specifically the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards the financial institutions use to access, collect, distribute, process, protect, store, use, transmit, dispose of, or otherwise handle customers’ secure information. In addition, financial institutions will be required to designate a single qualified individual to oversee their information security program and report periodically to an organization’s board of directors, or a senior officer in charge of information security.

The Safeguards Rule was mandated by Congress under the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Today’s updates are the result of years of public input. In 2019, the FTC sought comment on proposed changes to the Safeguards Rule and, in 2020 held a public workshop on the Safeguards Rule.

In addition to the updates, the FTC is seeking comment on whether to make an additional change to the Safeguards Rule to require financial institutions to report certain data breaches and other security events to the Commission. The FTC is issuing a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, which will be published in the Federal Register shortly. The public will have 60 days after the notice is published in the Federal Register to submit a comment.

The new Safeguards Rule is available, here. Notably, there is legislation before the U.S. Congress to massively increase the budget of the FTC to deal, in part, with privacy and cybersecurity issues. 

US FTC and DOJ, Antitrust Division Modify Antitrust Procedures in Light of Coronavirus

The Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division have modified procedures for antitrust review and provided direction for businesses addressing the coronavirus.  The Press Release from the FTC states, in part: 

The Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division today issued joint statement detailing an expedited antitrust procedure and providing guidance for collaborations of businesses working to protect the health and safety of Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The expedited procedure notes, for example, that health care facilities may need to work together in providing resources and services to assist patients, consumers, and communities affected by the pandemic and its aftermath. Other businesses may need to temporarily combine production, distribution, or service networks to facilitate production and distribution of COVID-19-related supplies.

Under the expedited procedure for COVID-19 public health projects, the agencies will respond to all COVID-19-related requests, and resolve those addressing public health and safety, within seven calendar days of receiving all information necessary to vet these proposals. The statement sets out the instructions for businesses wishing to take advantage of this procedure.

The expedited COVID-19 procedure offers quicker review than existing FTC and Justice Department programs that are designed to provide guidance to businesses concerned about the legality of proposed conduct under the antitrust laws. The FTC’s “Staff Advisory Opinion” procedure and DOJ’s “Business Review Letter” procedure allow any firm, individual, or group of firms or individuals to submit a proposal to the agencies and to receive a statement advising whether the agencies would challenge the proposed activity under the antitrust laws.

“Under these extraordinary circumstances, we understand that businesses collaborating on public health initiatives may need an expedited response from U.S. antitrust authorities,” said FTC Chairman Joe Simons. “We are committed to doing everything we can to help with these efforts, while continuing to aggressively enforce the antitrust laws.”

“The Antitrust Division recognizes the importance of providing clarity expeditious clarity on any antitrust obligations in this challenging time,” said Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. “Our expedited Business Review Letter procedure will help facilitate businesses that want to work quickly to address the urgent public health and economic needs associated with COVID 19.”

The antitrust laws accommodate procompetitive collaborations among competitors. In their joint statement, the FTC and the Department of Justice listed several types of collaborative activities designed to improve the health and safety response to the pandemic that would likely be consistent with the antitrust laws.

At the same time, the agencies also stressed that they will not hesitate to hold accountable those who try to use the pandemic to engage in antitrust violations. In addition, the Department of Justice will criminally prosecute conduct such as price-fixing, bid-rigging, or market allocation.

The expedited procedure requires that an applicant provide the FTC or Justice Department a written description of the proposal, including the parties that would be involved in the effort or activity, and the name and contact information of a person from whom the agencies could obtain additional information. This expedited procedure is for use solely for coronavirus-related public health efforts and may be invoked at the option of the requestor, in lieu of the agencies’ standard procedures for handling requests for advice.

The agencies also committed to expedite requests under the National Cooperative Research and Production Act for flexible treatment of certain standard development organizations and joint ventures. 

The statement also notes that the FTC and the Justice Department are addressing actions by individuals and businesses to take advantage of COVID-19 through other fraudulent and illegal schemes. Anyone with information or concerns about this sort of conduct, or other COVID-19-related complaints, should contact the FTC’s Consumer Response Center at 1-877-382-4357 or the National Center for Disaster Fraud Hotline (1-866-720-5721) or e-mail (disaster@leo.gov). More information on the FTC’s guidance on potential fraud, deceptive practices, and scams is available here, and to report a complaint go to www.ftc.gov/complaint.

How innovative, competitive and well adopted was 4G LTE in mobile communications— implications for outlook in 5G?

LTE's introduction a decade ago and its development as the definitive 4G mobile communications standard which predominates in smartphones is an outstanding accomplishment. Competition has served technology innovators, manufacturers, mobile network operators (MNOs), over-the-top service providers and end-users extremely well.  Markets have functioned and advanced superbly with a vibrant supply ecosystem and providing 4.1 billion LTE connections out of 9.4 billion in total worldwide. In the U.S., 63 percent of the nation’s 479 million mobile connections use LTE.

Despite overwhelming evidence of this extraordinary and widespread success, some allege that illegal and anticompetitive practices have caused significant harms including suppressed innovation, market exclusion and excessive pricing. While legal arguments and economic theories are extensively articulated by the parties and their amici in the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s antitrust action against Qualcomm—with this case still on appeal following the Northern California District Court’s ruling against the latter—my analysis here focuses on market and economic facts and figures in innovation, competition and consumer welfare over the last decade with LTE. While there is no evidence of those negative effects, there is proof of commercial failure by the alleged principal injured party, Intel, due to its poor strategic judgment and inability to keep up with the exacting technical pace of a most fiercely competitive marketplace in smartphone chips.

Antitrust law is to ensure competitive processes are preserved, not that competitors are protected. High prices are not per se illegal because they provide incentive for increased competition, such as from new market entrants and lower-cost innovations. Suppliers that are inefficient in terms of costs, quality or speed-to-market versus competitors should not be protected from their failings.

Every new decade, a new G

A new generation of mobile technology is introduced approximately every 10 years. As the new decade turns, it is most opportune to assess how well LTE has exceeded all expectations, and what has made this possible, since its first introduction around the turn of the previous decade.  Were concerns about introduction of yet another new G—including the need to invest in a network overlay, more spectrum, replace devices and pay additional patent license fees—well founded or needless?

Many MNOs, particularly in Europe, were very disappointed with their transitions to 3G in the early 2000s, due to high spectrum costs and initially disappointing demand for new data services. Conversely, in the US, AT&T waited until availability of mobile broadband with HSDPA in 2005 and deployed this on its existing spectrum. With exclusivity over iPhones in the US, its network became overloaded and in dire need of capacity expansion by around the end of the decade.

The very first commercial launches of LTE were in Scandinavia by TeliaSonera in late 2009. Following several more launches in 2010, the new standard was most significantly established with its introduction by Verizon at the end of that year and by AT&T in 2011. Both of those MNOs largely deployed LTE initially in new spectrum at 700MHz. It provided great coverage, together with much improved data speeds and network capacity. That was just the beginning for LTE.

Consumer demand surges with smartphones and LTE

While press and consumer attention in the smartphone and mobile broadband revolution over the last decade or so is mostly with device original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) including Apple and Samsung, the increases in communications performance have largely been down to others in their technology development and through chip component and network equipment supply, together with network deployments by the MNOs.

While mobile broadband data initially grew from a low base at a fast rate using 3G technologies CDMA EV-DO and HSDPA from the mid 2000s—with most demand from PC data cards and dongles— that exponential trajectory has been maintained with data growth compounding at around 60 percent or more annually for the last decade.

Mobile broadband data consumption has grown enormously in recent years

This was significantly due to the rapid adoption of smartphones following the introduction of the iPhone 3G and the first Android operating system device in 2008. Smartphones embodied a variety of innovative new technologies including applications processing, displays and sensors. Improved communications with LTE, in conjunction with an increasing supply of licensed spectrum for mobile, were perfectly placed to accommodate demand growth. The first Android smartphone with LTE was launched in 2010 and Apple’s first LTE smartphone was the iPhone 5 in 2012. It took less than a decade for smartphones to overwhelmingly substitute for feature phones.

Smartphones predominate in U.S. handset purchases since 2011

Market dominance and concentration in supply

Other measures commonly used to assess economic efficiency in antitrust investigations also indicate that mobile technology markets are healthy and dynamic.

Some industries are inherently and necessarily highly concentrated. For example, Boeing and Airbus have a duopoly in supply of large commercial aircraft. The number of suppliers and the relative positions among them reflect industry economies of scale, barriers to entry, strategic focus and competitive strengths in execution with customers purchasing largely based on technical specifications, cost and delivery performance. Trends in market concentration over several years are very informative about how market competition is developing.

The supply of mobile handsets including smartphones has remained unconcentrated for many years because merchant supply of highly standardized components and open standards in cellular technologies have reduced barriers to market entry to low levels. In the 2000s, Nokia dominated with a vertically integrated supply chain, up to 40 percent market share in handsets and even higher in the high-end devices that were precursors to modern smartphones. Since smartphones became mainstream in the 2010s, there have been many new market entrant OEMs and the positions of some leading incumbents including Nokia and BlackBerry have collapsed due to competition.

Concentration is inevitably rather higher in digital baseband modem chips than in mobile phones, because supply is rather different than in handsets including much higher barriers to entry with R&D requirements and economies of scale in product design and production. While some modem chip vendors have exited the marketplace in the last decade, MediaTek’s share of LTE modem chip sales rose to 24 percent in 2016 before falling with significantly rising shares for vertically integrated suppliers Samsung and Huawei with its HiSilicon division. Large shifts in market share away from leaders and rapid reductions in concentration indicate intense competition.

The extent of concentration in supply can be quantified by reference to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a widely accepted measure of market concentration in competition analysis. The HHI is calculated by summing the squared market shares of all firms in any given market. U.S. antitrust authorities generally classify markets into three types: Unconcentrated (HHI < 1,500), Moderately Concentrated (1,500 < HHI < 2,500), and Highly Concentrated (HHI > 2,500).

High concentration in LTE modem chip supply was very transient. Concentration in new market segments is likely to be high as the first few suppliers enter. Between 2013 to 2016, LTE modem chip supply concentration trended down to lower levels than in the 3G UMTS, 2G GSM/GPRS and 3G CDMA modem chip segments. LTE supply concentration has fallen to a Moderately Concentrated level and Qualcomm now accounts for less than 40 percent share. In contrast, UMTS (i.e. WCDMA/HSDPA) and GSM/GPRS/EDGE modem chip supply concentration has increased as MediaTek’s shares have grown to exceed 50 percent in each of these market segments while Qualcomm’s shares have diminished to only a few percent in UMTS and zero percent in GSM/GPRS/EDGE. While the FTC also alleges that Qualcomm has illegally dominated CDMA chip supply, since 2017 it is VIA Telecom (acquired by Intel in 2015) that has the highest share of this market segment and largely accounts for the high and increasing HHI in this market segment.

Market concentration in supply of baseband modem chips and handsets including smartphones

Qualcomm has excelled in bringing the latest advanced features to market most rapidly, as has MediaTek with mid-range, low-cost solutions and VIA Telecom has focused on CDMA.

A lot more bang for your buck

Meanwhile, consumer prices—measured in dollars or whatever currency prevails nationally per gigabyte of data—have fallen dramatically to a small fraction of levels around the turn of the last decade, as is evident in the US. This has been due to the low costs of LTE technology and fierce competition throughout the value chain.

Source: Qualcomm’s Opening Statement presentation, p29, at trial on April 16, 2019. In Re: Qualcomm litigation Case No. 3:17cv0108-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal.)

“I skate to where the puck is going to be, not where it has been”—Wayne Gretzky

Surviving, let alone winning in industry sectors with rapid technological change and major investment requirements is not easy. Sound strategic and commercial judgment as well as a modicum of good luck are as important as technical competence. Intel’s various incoherent forays in cellular chips make a pertinent case study in strategic failure, not of abuse by a much smaller company.

Each generation of mobile technology is commonly portrayed and perceived—particularly in hindsight—as a single entity. However, with a new 3GPP standard release every year or two, LTE was first specified in Release 8 (2009) and then improved with increased functionality and performance six times before 5G was first standardized in Release 15. Whereas LTE and 4G are now universally regarded synonymous, it was only with Release 10 (2011) that LTE became compliant with International Telecommunication Union’s IMT Advanced specifications which are generally regarded as defining 4G. LTE Advanced Pro in Release 13 (2016) was another significant performance upgrade milestone.

Numerous technological improvements in LTE’s introduction and continuous development have increased spectral efficiency, spectrum reuse, data speeds, network capacity, reduced latency and also provided entirely new capabilities. Improvements include the OFDMA waveform, carrier aggregation, MIMO, advanced channel coding, higher order modulation, use of unlicensed spectrum and improved positioning technologies.

Standards setting organizations (SSOs) map out, for all to see, which new features will be introduced in each new standard release. That is very helpful for product developers, but so much resulting from the collaboration among SSO participants and appearing in the standards means chip and network equipment vendors are chasing multiple moving targets. The general direction of travel might seem obvious in hindsight, but fast pace and good judgment with selection and commitment to the most important improvements are essential. Some features turn out to be much more important than others. While device OEMs design and manufacture smartphones, it is largely the modem chip vendors and network equipment OEMs that have developed and supplied the technologies and products that implement or enable MNOs and users to benefit from latest standard-based improvements.

Leaders must not only be the fastest to invent and bring to market, they must also know where and when to place their big bets. Those that make the wrong call will suffer significant adverse consequences with exacting requirements from OEMs and their MNO customers.

Self-harm

While Intel its portrayed as the major injured party in the FTC’s case against Qualcomm, Intel failed in modems for several significant reasons at Apple and elsewhere, despite its deep pockets, position as a leading semiconductor chip designer and silicon fabricator. It even squandered the advantages of its incumbency as the sole modem chip supplier to Apple for iPhones and iPads from 2007 until 2011, while also being, in that period and continuing to be ever since, Apple’s sole supplier of CPUs for its Mac computers.

Intel failed to recognize the (mis)match between what it was pushing and what OEMs wanted.  It foreclosed itself from all but a relatively small proportion of the LTE modem chip market segment. Most smartphones include chips that integrate the baseband modem processor with an application processor that is based on the ARM instruction set and architecture. There was never a distinct “thin modem” market—in the sense of defining a relevant market for competition purposes. Modem suppliers need to address the entire market segment of modem supply—including thin and integrated modems—to be efficient in development and production of technologies and products. The proportion of thin versus integrated modems in smartphones has fallen from around 40 percent in 2011, when most smartphone OEMs were just getting started, to only teens of percent in the last few years.

Intel has offered no ARM-based application processor since it sold its XScale business to Marvell in 2006. It failed in its alternative strategy with attempts to get its “Intel Architecture-based [X.86] processors” adopted in smartphones and tablets. Its x.86-based Atom application processor was uncompetitive for many reasons including higher power consumption and its inferior supply ecosystem with higher costs for the associated components needed to support the chip. Intel fared poorly despite spending billions on subsidies in its attempts to build a mobile device beachhead in tablets. It never achieved any more than a small share of supply to tablet OEMs and no more than a trivial share of supply to smartphone OEMs.

Intel captured Apple, as Apple’s sole 3G modem supplier for iPhones, when Intel re-entered the market with its acquisition on Infineon’s cellular chip division in August 2010.  However, Infineon would have known by then— as Intel should have also known through its acquisition due diligence, if that had been carried out thoroughly and competently—that modem business was about to be lost with the upcoming February 2011 launch of an iPhone 4 model based on a Qualcomm chip. Intel’s other 3G thin modem customers included Samsung and Huawei that subsequently have significantly switched to vertically integrated supply. Apple aside, Intel’s share in LTE supply was never more than a percent or two. Bad luck or poor market intelligence, judgment and execution?

Intel was too late in finding its voice

Having been ejected from Apple in 3G, Intel was very anxious to get back in there with LTE. But it failed to keep up with the pace of standard-based developments in LTE. Intel was late with LTE-Advanced (i.e. actual 4G) improvements and was at least two years late in being able to offer voice over LTE (VoLTE). LTE had no voice capability before VoLTE was standardized. Leading mobile operators—including AT&T and Verizon in the US—demand certain features in devices to exacting schedules.  For example, with major operators including T-Mobile US and Verizon launching VoLTE services by 2014, they were insisting on VoLTE in new phone models beforehand. This was significantly driven by their desires to seed the market for use of the new service and so that they could shut down older-generation networks, such Verizon’s 3G CDMA network by the end of 2019. Despite the above efforts, this date has slipped to 2020 to avoid leaving customers with phones that cannot make phone calls.

Many devices are used on networks for more than five years following new model introduction. Popular models are commonly sold for more than three years before being withdrawn from sale. For example, Verizon is still selling the iPhone 6s (2015) and Galaxy S7 (2016). The last of those sold are likely to be used for another few years before being retired.

It was not until 2016, with chip supply for launch of the iPhone 7 in September that year, that Intel could meet voice specification requirements of Apple and its MNO customers in LTE. In contrast, Metro PCS launched VoLTE with the LGE Connect 4G in January 2012 and VoLTE was incorporated in the iPhone 6 (September 2014). Qualcomm LTE modems were included in both devices.

What was he smoking?

In addition to strategic conflicts, Intel also suffered from delusions at the highest level. For example, despite Intel not being able even to do voice in LTE, in 2016, former Intel CEO Brian Krzanich proclaimed that Intel was the leader in 5G, including in modem technology. This was way off the mark. In fact, the main reason Intel exited modem supply, announced by replacement CEO Bob Swan in April 2019, and why Apple settled all its litigation with Qualcomm the very same day, was that Intel could not keep up the required pace and schedule in its 5G technology developments. Apple was clearly fearful it would not be ready to introduce 5G iPhone devices in 2020 without switching back to Qualcomm’s supply.

While the period of Qualcomm’s alleged misconduct is only to 2016, the FTC regurgitates the Court’s contention that Qualcomm will remain dominant in the transition to 5G, but without explicitly alleging any abuse there. Qualcomm has clearly competed on the merits in establishing itself as the leader in 5G modem chips. With a new air interface and addition of mmWave bands (i.e. with high-band frequencies at 24 GHz and abo)  its astute competitive strategy has included unmatched technology development in modems and acquisition in RF front-end components.

Voodoo economics II

The FTC’s most significant but hotly contested theory of harm, and that the district court has accepted, is that Qualcomm’s royalty charges to OEMs impose a “surcharge” on chip competitors that limits their ability to invest in R&D and makes them unable to compete on the merits such as in technical performance. Why the royalty charge is any different to any other necessary input cost—such as that for the display or battery components—is a mystery. OEMs are charged royalties non-discriminately regardless of modem supplier. According to the FTC’s allegations, and despite evidence to the contrary, Qualcomm’s royalty charges are excessive and are only paid because it supplies “must have” chips and has a “no license, no chips policy.”

That theory suggests that elimination of the alleged surcharge should enable a chip vendor to become competitive. However, Intel still failed despite that supposed relief. It commenced LTE modem chip supply to Apple for the iPhone 7 in 2016 and was the sole modem supplier to Apple for all subsequently launched models, including the iPhone X (2018) and iPhone 11 (2019). By April 2017, royalties paid to Qualcomm on Apple products, including those with Intel’s chips, had ceased and were not resumed until April 2019.

Rather than capitalizing on this window of opportunity, Intel failed on the merits, as indicated by its chip market exit, despite this non-payment of any royalties including the alleged surcharge to Qualcomm. While Intel’s dollar expenditures on R&D had been increased, R&D decreased as a percentage of its rising sales (i.e. including new sales of modems to Apple): $12.7 billion (21.4 percent) in 2016, $13.0 billion (20.8 percent) in 2017 and $13.5 (19.1 percent) in 2018. Based on the FTC’s economic theory, Intel supplying Apple should have had lower costs than other chip suppliers whose customers were still paying Qualcomm royalties. LTE modem chip market segment shares for Huawei (HiSilicon) and Samsung, that also buy Qualcomm chips and pay it licensing fees, have continued to increase since 2016.

Be careful what you wish for and be grateful for what you have

There will always be prophets of doom and self-serving interests who predict harms such as market failures if changes are not made. The kinds of accusation made by the FTC about Qualcomm in LTE echo those made against Qualcomm in UMTS, just before mobile broadband with HSDPA took off and before those charges were dropped  by the European antitrust authorities.

Prior to the introduction of LTE and for several years subsequently it was alleged that royalty stacking would make the technology prohibitively costly, particularly since LTE royalties would stack on those that had to be paid in multimode equipment including 2G and 3G.

A royalty stack never appeared in 3G and in never appeared in 4G. The only harms are the contentions over patent royalties that are costing a lot in legal fees and are enabling implementers including Apple and others to “efficiently infringe” by holding out from payment while enjoying the benefits of rich standard-based technologies.

As I explained here last month and previously, with patent licensing fees paid less than five percent of handset prices, such costs are dwarfed in comparison with the value that has been created with annual revenues of around half a trillion dollars in handsets, more than a trillion in operator services plus huge revenues to the over-the-top players that have flourished over the last decade in the smartphone and mobile broadband revolution with LTE.

Uber, Instagram, FaceTime and Netflix all launched in 2010 and have, among many other OTT providers, significantly benefitted from LTE’s mobile broadband capabilities. For example, Netflix has enjoyed a 4,000 percent stock rally with its streaming services significantly used on mobile devices. Smartphone OEMs have benefitted from these services because users want devices that can best access these services. Mobile operators benefit because they generate mobile broadband service revenues even from “free” services that are delivered on top. These services are transforming the way we work and play with daily hours of smartphone usage even exceeding TV watching.

Significant ongoing development has been required since introduction of LTE and the first 4G technologies. Whereas coverage and capacity were easily established with the deployment of additional spectrum at 2 GHz and below, there is nowhere near enough spectrum available there to satisfy escalating mobile broadband capacity demands. New technologies including Massive MIMO antenna arrays and HPUE to increase device uplink radio transmission performance in the latter LTE releases and in 5G are expanding capacity by better exploiting frequencies above 2 GHz. 5G has been designed to access mmWave bands with orders of magnitude more bandwidth than is accessible with previous generations of technology. All this, yet alone what is yet to come with URLCC and mMTC in the Internet of Things, would not be possible without major ongoing R&D investments. These should not be taken for granted—particularly in the race to establish and maintain global leadership and national security in 5G.

This article was originally published in RCR Wireless in a very similar form on 7th January 2020.

Keith Mallinson is a leading industry analyst, commercial consultant and testifying expert witness. Solving business problems in wireless and mobile communications, he founded consulting firm WiseHarbor in 2007.