Showing posts with label antitrust division. Show all posts
Showing posts with label antitrust division. Show all posts

Friday, 15 January 2021

US DOJ Antitrust Division Releases Review Letter Concerning University Patent Pool

The United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, (DOJ) has recently released a statement concerning the potential anticompetitive impact of a patent pool involving universities concerning patents involving “autonomous vehicles, the “Internet of Things,” and “Big Data.”  The DOJ finds that the pool is “unlikely to harm competition.”  The Press Release states:

The Justice  Department’s Antitrust Division announced today that it has completed its review of a proposed joint patent licensing pool known as the University Technology Licensing Program (UTLP).  UTLP is a proposal by participating universities to offer licenses to their physical science patents relating to specified emerging technologies.

As part of its review, the division interviewed potential participants and considered its prior guidance on patent pools.  The department has concluded that, on balance, and based on the representations in UTLP’s letter request, the proposed joint patent licensing program is unlikely to harm competition. 

“University research is a key driver of innovation,” said Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Michael Murray for the Antitrust Division.  “In the physical science area, however, some university research may never be commercialized due to the costs associated with negotiating multiple licenses and combining the complementary university patents that may be necessary for cutting-edge implementations.  To the extent that UTLP makes it easier for universities to commercialize inventions that may be currently unlicensed and under-utilized, industry participants, university researchers, and ultimately the public can benefit.” 

Currently 15 participating universities intend to cooperate in licensing certain complementary patents through UTLP, which will be organized into curated portfolios relating to specific technology applications for autonomous vehicles, the “Internet of Things,” and “Big Data.”  The overarching goal of UTLP is to centralize the administrative costs associated with commercializing university research and help participating universities to overcome the budget, institutional relationship, and other constraints that make licensing in these areas particularly challenging for them. 

UTLP has incorporated a number of safeguards into its program to help protect competition, including admitting only non-substitutable patents, with a “safety valve” if a patent to accomplish a particular task is inadvertently included in a portfolio with another, substitutable patent.  The program also will allow potential sublicensees to choose an individual patent, a group of patents, or UTLP’s entire portfolio, thereby mitigating the risk that a licensee will be required to license more technology than it needs.  The department’s letter notes that UTLP is a mechanism that is intended to address licensing inefficiencies and institutional challenges unique to universities in the physical science context, and makes no assessment about whether this mechanism if set up in another context would have similar procompetitive benefits.

Under the Department of Justice’s business review procedure, an organization may submit a proposed action to the Antitrust Division and receive a statement as to whether the Antitrust Division currently intends to challenge the action under the antitrust laws based on the information provided.  The department’s conclusions in this business review apply only to UTLP.  They are not applicable to any other agreements or initiatives relating to patent licensing by universities or other entities.  The department reserves the right to challenge the proposed action under the antitrust laws if the actual operation of the proposed conduct proves to be anticompetitive in purpose or effect.

Copies of the business review request and the department’s response are available on the Antitrust Division’s website at https://www.justice.gov/atr/business-review-letters-and-request-letters, as well as in a file maintained by the Antitrust Documents Group of the Antitrust Division. 

The DOJ Business Review Letter is available, here.  The universities' request letter for review is available, here.  

Wednesday, 16 September 2020

Curing contagion and harm from previous changes in IP policy and law for SEP licensing

Following IEEE’s purported “clarification” and “update” of its Patent Policy in 2015, with a non-objecting Business Review Letter from the U.S. Department of Justice at that time, the Department has now “supplement[ed], update[d] and amend[ed]” its 2015 BRL with a new BRL.

The Department complains in its new BRL that its 2015 BRL was “frequently and incorrectly” cited as “an endorsement of the IEEE Policy.” The new BRL emphatically and with mettle renounces Standard Setting Organization patent policy changes that were proposed by the former head of the Department’s Antitrust Division, Assistant Attorney General, Renate Hesse, together with those that were detailed in IEEE’s 2015 Patent Policy.

This Patent Policy change was damaging to IP owners and their incentives to contribute to the standard setting and development process. Misinterpretation of the BRL, including by foreign authorities, has resulted in harmful policy developments and legal overreach in Standard-Essential Patent disputes.

As also requested by the Department most recently, it is about time IEEE re-reconsidered its Patent Policy given adverse developments at this SSO and with changes in US law and policy with respect to SEPs since 2015.

A low watermark for developers and contributors of SEPs

The former AAG, publicly beckoned SSOs to weaken patent owners’ rights with her disregard for considerations of patent “hold out.” In a 2012 speech entitled Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch she suggested that SSOs include terms in patent policies that make injunctions harder to obtain, restrict cross-licensing and “explore setting guidelines for what constitutes a F/RAND rate.” She also encouraged SSOs to overcome any concerns they might have about antitrust actions against their revised patent policies by “seek[ing] ex ante review through [the Department’s] business review procedures.” This was presumably to reassure any SSOs that might adopt her proposals would not find adverse antitrust actions being formulated against them subsequently.

A couple of years later, IEEE-SA (responsible for the 802.11 WiFi standard among many others) changed its Patent Policy in 2015, touting it as “clarification” and an ”update,” but it actually set out various wholly new terms that are restrictive and harmful to patent owners. In the face of significant resistance by IEEE members who were technology contributors, and via a highly controversial and secretive process, the new patent policy significantly restricted flexibility in the Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory commitment with the following conditions:
  • SEP holders must waive their rights to seek any injunctions until they have successfully-litigated claims against unlicensed implementers to conclusion in a court of appeals;
  • Reciprocal cross-licensing cannot be required, except for patents reading on the same standard;
  • Royalty charges “should” be calculated based on the “smallest saleable” implementation of any portion of the standard and comport with a reasonable aggregate royalty burden of the relevant standard; and
  • Only licenses for which SEP holders have relinquished the right to seek, enforce, or even threaten, an injunction can qualify as “comparable licenses” for determining RAND royalties.

The Patent Policy “update” also obliged patent holders to be bound by the IEEE RAND commitment to license their patent to any “Compliant Implementation,” meaning that a patent holder making such a commitment cannot opt to license its patents for using the IEEE standards at only certain levels of production (e.g. entire end product device, as opposed to chip or module).

The cause’s harmful effects

Following my in-depth empirical analysis on the effects of this patent policy change, published in September 2017—which showed that the standardization process was being jeopardized given the widespread unwillingness of technology developers to pledge their patents to the new Patent Policy—in a review of IP policy developments in December 2017 I also wrote:

“[Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim], the new head of the US DoJ antitrust division is reinforcing a trend that shifts the balance between IP rights and antitrust restrictions.[1] But significant harm has already also been done internationally with contagion from prospective or actual policy positions that were previously more hostile or equivocal on IP owners’ rights. For example, some Asian antitrust agencies have welcomed, for reasons of industrial or protectionist policy, previous attempts in the ‘West’ to weaken rights of SEP owners. Actions have included seeking to reduce royalty returns, imposing chip-based licensing and reducing the availability of injunctions. Getting the Asian authorities also to reverse their positions in IP policy, for example, on antitrust enforcement, is a daunting task.”

I, among various others, unwittingly, incorrectly, yet unsurprisingly misinterpreted the extent of what the Department had stated in its 2015 BRL. This BRL purported a patent “hold up” problem that the "Update" to IEEE’s Patent Policy “may further help to mitigate.” And it was a cunning sleight of hand by the former AAG to propose more in her aforementioned speech than could be legally defended as “endorsed” by the Department’s BRL.

The new BRL clarifies and underlines the Department’s position by stating that “[b]ased on our analysis in 2015, we indicated there was no intention at that time to challenge the proposed policy—nothing more. Any representation by IEEE—or other stakeholders, government enforcers, or commentators—that the Department has endorsed the Policy is wrong, causes confusion, and must stop.” (all BRL citations omitted here and elsewhere.) So, while I argued from the outset against such a Patent Policy change—given the adverse effects it would have on patent holders, the standard development process and how it would contaminate policy making and licensing enforcement abroad—with my perceptions prejudiced by separate public statements from the former AAG and from analysis in the 2015 BRL, I also incorrectly inferred at least an implicit “endorsement” of the Patent Policy change by the Department in its issuance of the 2015 BRL:

Curing and reversing the contagion

The detrimental effect of the patent policy change and supporting BRL is possibly even more severe outside of IEEE standards in some jurisdictions. The 2015 IEEE patent policy change, endorsed by a BRL from the previous DoJ antitrust head, is dangerously serving as a template for antitrust enforcers worldwide – not only with respect to IEEE standards, but also for other standards such as 3GPP’s mobile communications standards. This is like pushing at an open door in nations where antitrust enforcement is being used as an instrument of industrial or protectionist policy to support manufacturing-oriented companies who would like to pay less for the IP they are reliant upon that is developed in other nations, significantly including the US and Europe.

Contributing technology to standardisation efforts and making a FRAND commitment is voluntary. If antitrust agencies construe IEEE’s patent policy as only a “clarification,” and therefore impose it on holders of SEPs to various [SSO’s] standards the effects could be severe. They might bind patent holders to new conditions that they were never willing and never agreed to accept— for IEEE standards and for other standards. The latter would include standards such as 3GPP’s where some technology developers’ business models, development of standards and their success are much more dependent on payment of royalties than with IEEE standards. 3GPP standards account for much more in total royalties than IEEE standards. Delrahim rightly states that “[w]e should not transform commitments to license on FRAND terms into a compulsory licensing scheme.”

Antitrust agencies including NDRC (China), KFTC (Korea) and TFTC (Taiwan), as well as many other organisations and individuals have been swayed by or receptive to policy positions of US and European government agencies that were against or ambivalent about upholding patent rights in interoperability technology standards including those of many [SSOs] including IEEE, 3GPP (including regional partners such as ETSI).’

The new BRL also notes that:

“the misinterpretation of the 2015 Letter appears to extend around the world and may have influenced foreign enforcement activity. Over the last several years, some foreign competition authorities have misapplied the 2015 Letter in support of enforcement actions against essential patent holders that have no basis under U.S law, raising the prospect that the business review process could be subject to intentional manipulation abroad. For instance, in 2017 a major economy’s competition agency claimed the Department expressed support for IEEE’s injunctive relief provisions in connection with a liability decision penalizing an essential patent owner. And, more recently, a policy report authored for another jurisdiction incorrectly characterized the 2015 Letter and other Department letters as “soft precedent” to guide SSOs in designing IPR policies. 

IEEE’s advocacy may have informed the broad misinterpretation of the 2015 Letter and led to mistaken reliance on it as guidance for foreign enforcement activity. The potential negative impact to global enforcement policy from such a misunderstanding is extensive, commensurate with the wide proliferation of antitrust agencies around the world and the scope of remedies sometimes sought by jurisdictions.”

However, I also noted in 2017 that IEEE remained alone in unfairly manipulating its patent policy to the detriment of patent owners, with other [SSOs] resisting such harmful change:

‘Except for IEEE, [SSOs] have reaffirmed longstanding IP policies that uphold the rights of patent owners. For example, major European [SSOs] CEN and CENELEC state that [SSOs] should not provide guidance on, or impose compliance with, FRAND pricing, valuation, and rate-setting methodologies, and they “firmly believe that pricing should be determined by patent holders and implementers outside of SSOs in the context of bilateral negotiations.”’

Backspin

Recent developments in policy and law indicate that the undermining of fundamental patent rights and fixed, formulaic prescriptions for determining royalties outside and inside of court are out of favour

In its attempts to limit damage and effect reversal in the direction of policy change, the new BRL states that “[t]he Department urges IEEE to ensure that neither it nor its members characterize the 2015 Letter as an endorsement of IEEE’s Policy.” And it indicates “the Department’s concern about mischaracterization of the Letter is also animated in large part by recent changes to US law and policy that render aspects of the 2015 Letter inaccurate.” Therefore, “[t]he Policy limits the basket of rights available to an essential patent owner such that it may undercut current US law and policy.”

The Department highlights in its new BRL:
  • “serious harm to innovation that could arise from limiting injunctive relief.” This is because “injunctive relief is a critical enforcement mechanism and bargaining tool—subject to traditional principles of equity —that may allow a patent holder (including an essential patent holder) to obtain the appropriate value for its invention when a licensee is unwilling to negotiate reasonable terms.”
  • “key risk in relying solely on the smallest saleable unit method, to the exclusion of others, is that real-world licenses often set royalties based on end-product revenue. Parties should not be discouraged from relying on these licenses—particularly since this sort of market-based evidence is often “the most effective method of estimating [an] asserted patent’s value.”

The heart of the matter

A major policy contention over many years is the extent to which efficient FRAND licensing can be disrupted, unfairly distorted or prevented by patent “hold up” by patent owners seeking excessive royalties or by patent “hold out" by implementers seeking sub-FRAND royalties, or to delay payment or avoid it altogether. According to the new BRL, ‘The 2015 Letter focused on the risk of so-called “hold up” by patent-holders without considering the possibility of “hold out” by patent implementers or the Policy’s effect on patent holders’ innovation incentives.’ It also states that ‘The 2015 Letter has proven incorrect, however, in anticipating that “hold-up” would be a competitive problem. Rather, concerns over hold-up as a real-world competition problem have largely dissipated.’ The Department notes that “studies and analyses conducted in the intervening years about hold out have confirmed that these are serious concerns, as well.” In my analysis and opinion, while purported concerns about patent “hold up” have never been factually substantiated, patent “hold out” is a pervasive problem. Accordingly, ‘The Department since has recognized that “[c]ondemning [hold up], in isolation, as an antitrust violation, while ignoring equal incentives of implementers to ‘hold out,’ risks creating ‘false positive’ errors of over-enforcement that would discourage valuable innovation.”’

The Department now urges SSOs “to promote balanced representation in decisional bodies so that diverse interests are represented and [SSO] decisions do not shift bargaining leverage in favor of one set of economic interests, including the interests of either implementers or patent holders.”

Making amends

The new BRL seeks to limit the damage caused at home and abroad by remarks made by the previous AAG, by what was described in the 2015 BRL and by what was incorrectly inferred to be Department policy at that time. While absence of evidence in support of patent “hold up” theory would have made it indefensible for the Department to “endorse” IEEE’s 2015 patent policy with advocacy in the 2015 BRL, non-objection to that patent policy in that BRL and these other statements have had adverse effects at home and abroad. While the new BRL will help arrest and reverse harmful change beyond IEEE in the US and elsewhere, I will watch with interest to what effect this and other recent developments in law and policy might have on patent policy at IEEE.


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[1] The new trend was already being set by other actions including: (i) dissenting statements of US FTC Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen in the matters of (a) Robert Bosch, (b) Motorola Mobility and Google and (c) Qualcomm; (ii) the CJEU’s judgement in Huawei v ZTE establishing obligations applying to both sides of an SEP-licensing agreement. The European court also stated that the FRAND commitment “cannot negate the substance of the rights guaranteed to the proprietors by Art. 17(2) of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.”


Thursday, 9 July 2020

US FTC and DOJ, Antitrust Division, Release Vertical Merger Guidelines

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, have released updated vertical merger guidelines.  The Press Release concerning the guidelines states, in relevant part: 


Vertical mergers combine two or more companies that operate at different levels in the same supply chain. A primary goal of the new Vertical Merger Guidelines is to help the agencies identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary interference with mergers that either are competitively beneficial or likely will have no competitive impact on the marketplace. To accomplish this, the guidelines detail the techniques and main types of evidence the agencies typically use to predict whether vertical mergers may substantially lessen competition. The Guidelines will help businesses, antitrust practitioners and other interested persons by increasing transparency into the agencies’ principal analytical techniques, practices, and enforcement policies for evaluating vertical transactions.

The new Vertical Merger Guidelines reflect the agencies’ analysis of vertical mergers. The revised guidelines:

  • Explain that mergers often present both horizontal and vertical elements, and the agencies may apply both the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the Vertical Merger Guidelines in their evaluation of a transaction, as part of a fact-specific process that involves a variety of tools to determine whether a merger may substantially lessen competition.
  • Clarify that its analytical techniques, practices, and enforcement policies apply to a range of non-horizontal transactions, including strictly vertical mergers, “diagonal” mergers, and vertical issues that can arise in mergers of complement.
  • Clarify that when the agencies identify a potential competitive concern in a relevant market, they will also specify one or more related products. A related product is a product or service that is supplied or controlled by the merged firm and is positioned vertically or is complementary to the products and services in the relevant market.
  • Provide detailed discussions, including multiple diverse examples, of the “raising rivals’ costs” and “foreclosure” theories of harm. In recent decades, these theories of harm have been the principle theories investigated in merger reviews.
  • Identify conditions under which a vertical merger would not require an extensive investigation, because the merger does not create or enhance the merged firm’s incentive or ability to harm rivals.
  • Emphasize that analyzing efficiencies is an important part of reviewing vertical mergers.
  • Explain in detail the analysis of the elimination of double marginalization (“EDM”), which economists emphasize is a frequent procompetitive result of vertical transactions.

The guidelines address the usage of confidential information in vertical mergers: 


b. Access to Competitively Sensitive Information

In a vertical merger, the transaction may give the combined firm access to and control of sensitive business information about its upstream or downstream rivals that was unavailable to it before the merger. For example, a downstream rival to the merged firm may have been a premerger customer of the upstream firm. Post-merger, the downstream component of the merged firm could now have access to its rival’s sensitive business information. In some circumstances, the merged firm can use access to a rival’s competitively sensitive information to moderate its competitive response to its rival’s competitive actions. For example, it may preempt or react quickly to a rival’s procompetitive business actions. Under such conditions, rivals may see less competitive value in taking procompetitive actions. Relatedly, rivals may refrain from doing business with the merged firm rather than risk that the merged firm would use their competitively sensitive business information as described above. They may become less effective competitors if they must rely on less preferred trading partners, or if they pay higher prices because they have fewer competing options.

The guidelines are available, here

Saturday, 28 March 2020

US FTC and DOJ, Antitrust Division Modify Antitrust Procedures in Light of Coronavirus


The Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division have modified procedures for antitrust review and provided direction for businesses addressing the coronavirus.  The Press Release from the FTC states, in part: 


The Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division today issued joint statement detailing an expedited antitrust procedure and providing guidance for collaborations of businesses working to protect the health and safety of Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The expedited procedure notes, for example, that health care facilities may need to work together in providing resources and services to assist patients, consumers, and communities affected by the pandemic and its aftermath. Other businesses may need to temporarily combine production, distribution, or service networks to facilitate production and distribution of COVID-19-related supplies.

Under the expedited procedure for COVID-19 public health projects, the agencies will respond to all COVID-19-related requests, and resolve those addressing public health and safety, within seven calendar days of receiving all information necessary to vet these proposals. The statement sets out the instructions for businesses wishing to take advantage of this procedure.

The expedited COVID-19 procedure offers quicker review than existing FTC and Justice Department programs that are designed to provide guidance to businesses concerned about the legality of proposed conduct under the antitrust laws. The FTC’s “Staff Advisory Opinion” procedure and DOJ’s “Business Review Letter” procedure allow any firm, individual, or group of firms or individuals to submit a proposal to the agencies and to receive a statement advising whether the agencies would challenge the proposed activity under the antitrust laws.

“Under these extraordinary circumstances, we understand that businesses collaborating on public health initiatives may need an expedited response from U.S. antitrust authorities,” said FTC Chairman Joe Simons. “We are committed to doing everything we can to help with these efforts, while continuing to aggressively enforce the antitrust laws.”

“The Antitrust Division recognizes the importance of providing clarity expeditious clarity on any antitrust obligations in this challenging time,” said Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. “Our expedited Business Review Letter procedure will help facilitate businesses that want to work quickly to address the urgent public health and economic needs associated with COVID 19.”

The antitrust laws accommodate procompetitive collaborations among competitors. In their joint statement, the FTC and the Department of Justice listed several types of collaborative activities designed to improve the health and safety response to the pandemic that would likely be consistent with the antitrust laws.

At the same time, the agencies also stressed that they will not hesitate to hold accountable those who try to use the pandemic to engage in antitrust violations. In addition, the Department of Justice will criminally prosecute conduct such as price-fixing, bid-rigging, or market allocation.

The expedited procedure requires that an applicant provide the FTC or Justice Department a written description of the proposal, including the parties that would be involved in the effort or activity, and the name and contact information of a person from whom the agencies could obtain additional information. This expedited procedure is for use solely for coronavirus-related public health efforts and may be invoked at the option of the requestor, in lieu of the agencies’ standard procedures for handling requests for advice.

The agencies also committed to expedite requests under the National Cooperative Research and Production Act for flexible treatment of certain standard development organizations and joint ventures. 

The statement also notes that the FTC and the Justice Department are addressing actions by individuals and businesses to take advantage of COVID-19 through other fraudulent and illegal schemes. Anyone with information or concerns about this sort of conduct, or other COVID-19-related complaints, should contact the FTC’s Consumer Response Center at 1-877-382-4357 or the National Center for Disaster Fraud Hotline (1-866-720-5721) or e-mail (disaster@leo.gov). More information on the FTC’s guidance on potential fraud, deceptive practices, and scams is available here, and to report a complaint go to www.ftc.gov/complaint.

Thursday, 2 January 2020

U.S. Agencies Release Policy Statement Concerning Remedies and SEPs

The United States Patent and Trademark Office, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, (collectively, the agencies) have issued a policy statement concerning remedies and standard essential patents.  Importantly, the agencies have rejected the prior 2013 policy statement in favor of a policy statement that expressly recognizes that all remedies, including injunctive relief and exclusion orders at the International Trade Commission, are available for infringement of a standard essential patent.  Notably, the agencies primarily rely on U.S. case law to support its decision and OMB Circular A-119.  The policy statement provides, in part: 


Of course, the particular F/RAND commitment made by a patent owner, the SDO’s intellectual property policies, and the individual circumstances of licensing negotiations between patent owners and implementers all may be relevant in determining remedies for infringing a standards-essential patent, depending on the circumstances of each case.  Further, individual parties may voluntarily contract for or agree to specific dispute resolution mechanisms. 

In the Agencies’ view, courts, the U.S. International Trade Commission, and other decision makers in their discretion should continue to consider all relevant facts, including the conduct of the parties, when evaluating the general principles of law applicable to their remedy determinations involving standards-essential patents, such as the factors enumerated in eBay or 19 U.S.C. § 1337, as appropriate. The courts are “more than capable of considering these factual issues” when deciding whether to award remedies for infringement.20 In the Agencies’ view, courts—and other relevant neutral decision makers—should continue to determine remedies for infringement of standards-essential patents subject to F/RAND licensing commitments pursuant

to the general laws. A balanced, fact-based analysis, taking into account all available remedies, will facilitate, and help to preserve competition and incentives for innovation and for continued participation in voluntary, consensus-based, standards-setting activity.

The policy statement is available, here