Book Review: Start Up Campus: How UC Berkeley Became An Unexpected Leader in Entrepreneurship and Startups

I’ve meant to write about this book for some time, but I’ve been chasing squirrels on other hills.  I’ve decided today to finally get it done.  The University of California, Berkeley, Innovation and Entrepreneurship Council, has published Startup Campus: How UC Berkeley Became an Unexpected Leader in Entrepreneurship and Startups in 2025--a helpful book.  The book is a collection of information concerning UC Berkeley’s development of an ecosystem to foster the creation of startups.  There is historical information concerning the various technical advances by Berkeley researchers and the companies they created in fields including microprocessors, personal computers, biotechnology, structural and earthquake engineering software, relational databased, networked computing, electronic design automation, quantitative investing, energy bars, data storage and networking controller market, internet search and content delivery market, and enterprise software for learning and talent management.  The book also describes some of the process of the university involving most if not all of the academic units in entrepreneurship which seems to “grease the wheels” politically of the continuation and deepening of industry involvement and the development of practical applications and direction for research, including commercialization. The book concludes with insights and advice for replicating Berkeley's success. There is also an accompanying website to the book at Startup Campus: How UC Berkeley Became an Unexpected Leader in Entrepreneurship and Startups | Innovation & Entrepreneurship.  And, it’s (apparently) available for free! A very helpful book and you can't beat the price.  

Cyberhacking Indictment Unsealed Involving Alleged Theft of University IP

On August 18, 2026, the US Department of Justice unsealed an indictment concerning cyberhacking campaigns conducted against universities around the world, governmental entities and companies by an Iranian hacking group.  The press release states, in part:  

Mabna Institute Hackers Attacked Systems Belonging to Hundreds of Universities, Companies, and Other Victims to Steal Research, Academic and Proprietary Data, and Intellectual Property

A 14-count superseding (S2) indictment was unsealed today charging 17 members of the Mabna Institute, an Iran-based company that, since at least 2013, has conducted a coordinated campaign of cyber intrusions into computer systems for 144 U.S.-based universities, 178 foreign universities, at least 42 U.S.-based private sector companies, at least 11 foreign private sector companies, at least five U.S. federal and state government agencies, and at least two non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Mabna Institute stole more than 31 terabytes of academic data and intellectual property from these universities, as well as the email accounts of employees at the private sector companies, government agencies, and NGOs. The defendants conducted many of these intrusions on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), one of several entities within the government of Iran responsible for gathering intelligence, as well as other Iranian government and university clients. Nine of the 17 defendants charged in the S2 indictment were previously charged in a 7-count indictment announced in March 2018. The case is assigned to U.S. District Judge Jesse M. Furman.

“The superseding indictment alleges that, at the behest of entities including the IRGC, these defendants hacked into universities and other research institutions worldwide, including the United States, stealing at least 31 terabytes of information and intellectual property of untold value,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg. “The National Security Division is committed to protecting the United States from such predators and will pursue those who perpetrate such crimes for as long as it takes to bring them to justice.”

“Today’s charges, which include eight additional defendants, reveal the broader network allegedly behind a sweeping, state-sponsored campaign to steal research and intellectual property from American universities, businesses, and government institutions,” said U.S. Attorney Jamie McDonald for the Southern District of New York. “More than eight years after making the original indictment public, these charges make clear that the passage of time will not deter us from identifying and pursuing those who target the United States from abroad. Cyber operations have become a central instrument of national power, and attacks on American and allied institutions carry direct consequences for our security and economic strength. This office and our partners will continue to protect American innovation and pursue accountability for the individuals behind these attacks.”

“These defendants allegedly built and profited from a sprawling hacking-for-hire operation that targeted the intellectual property of American and allied universities, companies, and government agencies for the benefit of the Iranian government,” said Assistant Director Brett Leatherman of the FBI’s Cyber Division. “Today’s charges make clear to cyber adversaries everywhere: the FBI’s memory is long, and time will not blunt our resolve to pursue justice. The FBI will continue working with law enforcement and private sector partners to identify malicious cyber actors, disrupt their operations, and impose real cost on them, wherever they operate.”

. . . University Hacking Campaign

The Mabna Institute, through the activities of the defendants, targeted more than 100,000 accounts of professors around the world. They successfully compromised approximately 8,000 professor email accounts across 144 U.S.-based universities, and 178 universities located in foreign countries, including Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The campaign started in approximately 2013, continued through at least December 2017, and broadly targeted all types of academic data and intellectual property from the systems of compromised universities. Through the course of the conspiracy, U.S.-based universities spent more than approximately $3.4 billion to procure and access such data and intellectual property.

The members of the conspiracy used stolen account credentials to obtain unauthorized access to victim professor accounts, which they used to steal research, and other academic data and documents, including, among other things, academic journals, theses, dissertations, and electronic books. The defendants targeted data across all fields of research and academic disciplines, including science and technology, engineering, social sciences, medical, and other professional fields. The defendants stole at least approximately 31.5 terabytes of academic data and intellectual property, which they exfiltrated to servers outside the United States that were under the control of members of the conspiracy.

In addition to stealing academic data and login credentials for the benefit of the Government of Iran, the defendants also sold the stolen data through two websites, Megapaper.ir (Megapaper) and Gigapaper.ir (Gigapaper). Megapaper was operated by Falinoos Company, a company controlled by Abdollah Karima, and Gigapaper was also affiliated with Karima. Megapaper sold stolen academic resources to customers within Iran, including Iran-based public universities and institutions, and Gigapaper sold a service to customers within Iran whereby purchasing customers could use compromised university professor accounts to directly access the online library systems of particular U.S.-based and foreign universities.

Private Sector and Governmental and Non-Governmental Organization Hacking Campaigns

In addition to targeting and compromising universities, the defendants targeted and compromised and exfiltrated employee email accounts for at least five U.S. federal and state government agencies, at least 42 U.S. based private sector companies, at least approximately 11 foreign companies based in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and various governmental and non-governmental organizations within the U.S., including the U.S. Department of Labor, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the State of Hawaii, the State of Indiana, the United Nations, and the United Nations Children’s Fund.

United States Moving Forward with Privateering Against Cybercrime

On August 12, 2026, President Trump issued a Presidential Memoranda essentially providing the groundwork for a government program sanctioning private industry to pursue international cyber criminals engaged in hacking.  The Presidential Memoranda is available, here.  The Memoranda states, in part:

The American private sector is the most innovative and technologically advanced in the world, and its scale, speed, and capacity secure a critical offensive cyber advantage for the United States.  Yet, American businesses’ innovative capabilities have historically been underutilized in efforts to identify and disrupt criminal networks operating in cyberspace.  Thus, it is the policy of the United States to use all instruments of national power, including the innovative capabilities of the private sector, to combat cybercrime.  By partnering with vetted United States companies subject to the direction and oversight of the Federal Government, we will enhance our ability to counter TCO threats and combat transnational cybercrime, fraud, and other predatory schemes against American citizens.

FRAND licensing needs a taxonomy: valuation absent context is misvaluation

The World Intellectual Property Organization's recent report on SEP valuation methodologies provides a useful overview of comparable licences, bottom-up valuation and top-down approaches. However, in my view, the most important issue in FRAND valuation remains underexplored: the need to distinguish between fundamentally different categories of licensing and commercial arrangements.

This article argues that much FRAND analysis suffers from false commensurability. Bilateral licences, cross-licences, collective licensing platforms, patent pools, paid-up lump-sum settlements and royalty-free regimes are frequently converted into common metrics such as ad valorem rates or dollar-per-unit royalties and then treated as directly comparable. In the process, critical commercial context can be lost in translation.

Using examples including Nokia's agreements with Apple and Microsoft, Avanci's $32-per-vehicle automotive licensing model, public licensing programmes from Qualcomm and InterDigital, and recent FRAND decisions including Samsung v ZTE, Optis v Apple and InterDigital v Lenovo, I examine how royalty metrics, payment structures, bargaining conditions and strategic objectives can materially affect negotiated outcomes.

I also discuss the risks associated with cross-licence unpacking, portfolio-strength-ratio methodologies, patent counting, manufactured comparables, and the tendency to treat complex licensing agreements as if they can be translated mechanically into equivalent royalty rates.

My central thesis is simple:

The first question in FRAND valuation should not be "Which methodology should we use?" but "What exactly are we trying to value?"

The resulting rates may appear objective and comparable, but instead still reflect the bargaining asymmetries, strategic objectives, risk allocations and other distortions that shaped the original deal.

Download the full article from SSRN, here.

US Department of Justice Remarks Regarding IP and Global Competition

On July 8, 2026, the US Department of Justice issued a press release containing the remarks of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Dina Kallay at the Hudson Institute Forum for Intellectual Property.  The remarks describe the US Department of Justice’s position on numerous cases in which the Department has filed a statement of interest.  Notably, the remarks also address IP and global competition:

Intellectual Property Enforcement Strengthens Global Competition

Now that we have discussed an example of our domestic IP dance, I want to turn to an international example which demonstrates that strong protection of IP rights benefits robust market competition worldwide.

Each year the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) issues a Special 301 Report, as required by Congress, which is a review of the global state of IP rights protection and enforcement.[29] Internationally, failure to enforce IP laws as required under the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights[30] (“WTO TRIPS Agreement”) creates barriers to trade that negatively impact U.S. companies and consumers. Without robust IP protection and enforcement globally, American innovators cannot “defend their rights when their IP is stolen or infringed” and, consequently, the benefits of that IP cannot flow back to the United States economy.[31] Effectively, failure to enforce IP laws creates a non-tariff barrier to trade, as it can subsidize domestic industry or increase costs on foreign industry.

The recently issued 2026 Special 301 Report, highlighted several “emerging global trends [that] have the potential to improperly and unfairly harm U.S. innovators” related to patents and standards.  The Intellectual Property and Standards section of the report[32] underscores the importance of IP protection to U.S. leadership in developing next-generation technologies, and states unequivocally that “American innovation leadership, economic competitiveness, and national security are threatened by proposals or actions that undermine the effective enforcement of patent rights.” The Report went on to identify three emerging global trends that improperly harms U.S. innovators:

• Court rulings called “anti-suit injunctions” that bar U.S. companies from enforcing their patents anywhere else in the world; 
• Judicial or administrative procedures that compel innovators to grant, without their consent, global licenses to patented technologies on terms set by the court or the government; and
• Judicial or legislative efforts to prohibit the seeking or availability of injunctions against patent infringement, the core remedy that allows patent holders to enforce their rights. 

The Report’s findings dovetail with the antitrust policy principles I highlighted earlier, including the importance of robust intellectual property protection both domestically and globally; an unfettered intellectual property marketplace; and the unhindered availability of injunctions and other remedies against infringement. They are also consistent with globally recognized WTO treaty obligations.[33] So it’s a case where, while arriving from different angles, antitrust and international trade policies converge around the same principles.   

The full remarks are available, here. 

Join Online: 14th Intellectual Property and Competition Forum The Global Patent Chess Game: International Patent Strategy in a Fragmented World Order 23–24 June 2026 | Munich & Online

 

The 14th IP & Competition Forum offers a series of highly topical online sessions on the changing architecture of global patent litigation, enforcement, licensing and competition policy.

Register for ALL ONLINE sessions here:
https://www.oxfora.org/webinar-14th-forum-live/

 

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Injunctions at the Centre of Gravity in Global Patent Strategy
23 June 2026 | 08:30 London time

Moderator
Otto Licks, Founding Partner, Licks Attorneys

Speakers
Dr Thomas Dreiser, Chief IP Litigation Counsel, EMEA, Huawei
Chris Longman, Vice President, Legal Counsel, Qualcomm
Tom Brown, Head of IP Litigation, Dell
Lara Rogers, Head of IP Disputes, Amazon

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Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Patent Disputes after BSH Hausgeräte v. Electrolux
23 June 2026 | 09:30 London time

Moderator
Dr Constanze Krenz, Partner, DLA Piper

Speakers
Dr Corin Gittinger, Partner, Freshfields
Alessandro Orsi, VP Legal, Associate General Counsel IP, HP
Dr Clemens Heusch, VP, Head of Global Litigation and Disputes, Nokia
Gerhard Tschiedel, IP Transactions Manager, Giesecke+Devrient

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Competition Perspectives, LNGs, Standards & Patent Licensing
23 June 2026 | 15:00 London time

Moderator
Le Chen, Senior Director, IP Policy & Dispute Resolution

Speakers
Paul Bridgeland, Policy Officer, DG Competition, European Commission
Dr Felix Engelsing, Director, Bundeskartellamt
Dr Thomas Buchholz, Senior Expert Digital IP, BSH Hausgeräte GmbH
Alexander Prenter, Policy Director, Fair Standards Alliance
Collette Rawnsley, VP, IP Policy & Advocacy, Nokia

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China: Litigation, Licensing & Global Influence
24 June 2026 | 07:30 London time

Keynote
Dr Juan He — Judge, Intellectual Property Court, Supreme People’s Court of China

Moderator
Jing Xu, Partner, King & Wood

Speakers
Na Wei, GM of Corporate Business Development & IP Strategy, Xiaomi
Vivienne Li, Head of Patent Licensing, ByteDance
Collette Rawnsley, VP, IP Policy & Advocacy, Nokia
Dylan Li, Head of European IPR Department, Huawei

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Courts & Rate Setting
24 June 2026 | 11:00 London time

Keynote
Fabian Hoffmann — Judge, German Supreme Court

Moderator
Jeffrey Blumenfeld, Competition and Policy Counsel, Access Advance

Speakers
Shuang Cheng, Cellular Licensing Lead, Xiaomi
Michele Baccelli, Partner, Hoffmann Eitle

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UPC and EPO Case Law: Convergence, Divergence and Practical Consequences — Novelty, Inventive Step & Added Matter
24 June 2026 | 14:00 London time

Practitioner Speakers
Dr Natalia Wegner, Partner, Carpmaels & Ransford
Bernhard Thum, Partner, Thum & Partner

Judge Speakers
Dr Stefan Wilhelm — Judge, Unified Patent Court
Dr Christoph Schober — Judge, Unified Patent Court
Dr Kemal Bengi — Chair of the Board of Appeal 3.5.05, European Patent Office

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Judges’ Perspectives on International Understanding in Patent Disputes
24 June 2026 | 15:45 London time

Speakers
Prof. Peter Meier-Beck — Presiding Judge (ret.) & UPC Advisory Committee, German Supreme Court / Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Judge Victor Torres — Judge, Court of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Dr Juan He — Judge, Intellectual Property Court, Supreme People’s Court of China

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These sessions address some of the most important questions in international patent enforcement today: injunctions as tools of global leverage, cross-border patent enforcement, long-arm jurisdiction, forum strategy, SEPs, FRAND, standards, patent licensing, competition policy, China’s growing influence, rate setting, UPC and EPO case law, and international judicial understanding in patent disputes.

The Forum brings together judicial perspectives from the German Supreme Court, the Unified Patent Court, the European Patent Office Boards of Appeal, the Supreme People’s Court of China, the Court of Rio de Janeiro and the Landgericht Munich, alongside leading voices from industry, patent offices, competition authorities, private practice and academia.

Patrons include: Licks Attorneys, Hogan Lovells, Nokia, RPX, Freshfields and Vossius Brinkhof.

More information: https://www.oxfora.org
Contact: info@oxfirst.com

FRAND commitments include no right to a platform licence

In my recent article, Are patent pool royalty rates FRAND?, I argued that patent pool and platform rates are structurally unsuited to serve as benchmarks for bilateral FRAND licensing. That analysis focused on pricing (i.e. royalty rates) — specifically, on the risk of inferring inapplicable rates from fundamentally different licensing arrangements.

This article addresses a logically prior question now before the England and Wales (“UK”) Supreme Court in Tesla v InterDigital / Avanci: Before any court determines whether a platform licence is FRAND, does it have jurisdiction and is there any entitlement to have those terms determined in court?

That question is not merely procedural. It goes to the meaning and scope of FRAND.

The point is not that platform rates are “sub-FRAND” or otherwise deficient. On the contrary, they may be entirely FRAND within their own commercial context. The point is that FRAND operates through different processes in different licensing structures, and those processes should not be conflated.

FRAND does not necessarily include a right to a platform licence. Recognising that preserves both the integrity of the ETSI undertaking and the legitimacy of alternative licensing institutions developed by the market.

My full 5-page article can be downloaded here.

Are patent pool royalty rates FRAND?

This question sits at the intersection of licensing practice, competition policy, and judicial interpretation. Courts, regulators, and industry participants often look to patent pools for guidance in determining FRAND[1] rates. Yet doing so risks a fundamental mistake. Patent pool rates — whether characterised as FRAND, sub‑FRAND,[2] or otherwise — are structurally unsuited to serve as benchmarks for bilateral licensing.

I asked several attendees this headline question at the recent Patents and Standards conference in London — in informal conversations during coffee breaks. I also posed the question to fellow panellists there in our session entitled Platforms and Pools: Where Next?  While Sisvel panellist Matteo Sabattini was proud to inform us emphatically that courts had found patent pool Sisvel’s rates FRAND, most others answered equivocally.

This question is also under consideration by the UK Supreme Court. In December 2023, Tesla raised proceedings seeking, among other requests, a declaration of FRAND terms for a license to SEPs in the Avanci 5G Platform. Before opining on FRAND terms, the UKSC must determine if those are applicable in that case.

There’s extensive effective and efficient SEP licensing based on FRAND commitments — bilaterally and in patent pools. However, pool rates are typically below bilateral FRAND rates for various reasons. For example, pooling is well-known to reduce transaction costs and so these savings can be passed on in lower royalty rates.

Pooling rates that might be considered sub-FRAND in bilateral licensing shouldn’t be deemed a breach of SEP owners’ FRAND commitments. Voluntarily offering relatively low royalty rates non-discriminately is not harmful to any licensee. Similarly, unilaterally offering licensing to all royalty-free is also harmless.

As patent pool terms are generally regarded as FRAND it should be accepted that the range of FRAND rates might be very large, given the various other differences in licensing structure and terms versus bilateral licensing.

Alternatively, perhaps Standard-Setting Organisations (SSOs) and others should regard collective licensing including patent pooling as another, distinctly different  kind of licensing arrangement to bilateral licensing — just as royalty-free is already recognised as distinct from FRAND licensing by some SSOs?[3]

Either way, patent pool rates are inapplicable benchmarks for bilateral licensing — and vice versa — in the same way that the existence of royalty-free patent pooling should not impose that pricing as an obligation on SEP owners who choose not to join such an arrangement.[4]

My full article can be downloaded, here.

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[1] Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) is generally regarded as being the same as Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (RAND).

[2] This contentious term seems to describe rates that fall below the range that would be considered suitable FRAND benchmarks in bilateral licensing determinations. See subsequent section on UK High Court Judgment in Samsung v. ZTE.

[3] The Patent Policies of IEEE SA and ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC accommodate “without compensation”  and “free of charge”, respectively, (i.e. royalty-free) as well as RAND licensing.

[4] Bluetooth SIG participation requires reciprocal, “without compensation” (i.e. royalty‑free) cross‑licensing. Google and others have asserted that open source video codecs including VP8, VP9 and AV1 can be implemented without paying any license fees to anyone. Nevertheless, various patents that are not available royalty-free read on those standards. Google paid off pool administrator MPEG LA so that free proposition could be maintained for VP8 implementers. Sisvel offers a licensing platform for patents essential to VP9. 

Injunctions — Perspectives from the Judiciary of Brazil Tuesday, 13 May 2026 15:00 UK | 16:00 CET

 

OxFirst is pleased to host a free webinar with Judge Victor Diz Torres, Judge at the Tribunal de Justiça do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, speaking in his private capacity.

Injunctions — Perspectives from the Judiciary of Brazil Tuesday, 13 May 2026 15:00 UK | 16:00 CET register here: https://oxfirst.com/insights-&-news/injunctions-brazil-judiciary-may-12/

The discussion will examine when Brazilian courts grant injunctive relief in patent litigation, how such orders are enforced in practice, and how courts balance exclusivity, market access and proportionality in innovation-driven disputes.

The webinar will also explore the emerging treatment of the FRAND defence in Brazil, particularly in cases involving standard-essential patents (SEPs). Key questions include licensing conduct, good faith negotiation, competition concerns and the limits of injunctive relief where FRAND commitments are raised.

This webinar forms part of the lead-up to the 14th IP & Competition Forum, taking place in Munich on 23–24 June 2026 under the theme:

The Global Patent Chess Game: International Patent Strategy in a Fragmented World

The 14th IP & Competition Forum will bring together senior judges, patent offices, competition authorities, industry leaders and scholars to discuss SEPs, injunctions, long-arm jurisdiction, patent quality and cross-border enforcement.

Register for the free webinar: https://oxfirst.com/insights-&-news/injunctions-brazil-judiciary-may-12/

More about the 14th IP & Competition Forum: www.oxfora.org

For enquiries: info@oxfirst.com

#PatentLitigation #Injunctions #SEP #FRAND #Brazil #CompetitionLaw #IntellectualProperty #PatentStrategy #OxFirst #OxFora