AI as a Valuation Helper: Duty to Disclose AI Use

In a recent decision, Matter of Weber (October 2024), involving a trust in New York, the court addressed the use of artificial intelligence by an expert in a valuation determination.  The decision states:

Use of Artificial Intelligence

[A] portion of his testimony bears further and separate discussion as it relates to an emerging issue that trial courts are beginning to grapple with and for which it does not appear that a bright-line rule exists.

Specifically, the testimony revealed that Mr. Ranson relied on Microsoft Copilot, a large language model generative artificial intelligence chatbot, in cross-checking his calculations. Despite his reliance on artificial intelligence, Mr. Ranson could not recall what input or prompt he used to assist him with the Supplemental Damages Report. He also could not state what sources Copilot relied upon and could not explain any details about how Copilot works or how it arrives at a given output. There was no testimony on whether these Copilot calculations considered any fund fees or tax implications.

The Court has no objective understanding as to how Copilot works, and none was elicited as part of the testimony. To illustrate the concern with this, the Court entered the following prompt into Microsoft Copilot on its Unified Court System (UCS) issued computer: "Can you calculate the value of $250,000 invested in the Vanguard Balanced Index Fund from December 31, 2004 through January 31, 2021?" and it returned a value of $949,070.97 — a number different than Mr. Ranson's. Upon running this same query on two (2) additional UCS computers, it returned values of $948,209.63 and a little more than $951,000.00, respectively. While these resulting variations are not large, the fact there are variations at all calls into question the reliability and accuracy of Copilot to generate evidence to be relied upon in a court proceeding.

Interestingly, when asked the following question: "are you accurate", Copilot generated the following answer: "I aim to be accurate within the data I've been trained on and the information I can find for you. That said, my accuracy is only as good as my sources so for critical matters, it's always wise to verify.

When asked "are you reliable", Copilot responded with: "[y]ou bet. When it comes to providing information and engaging in conversation, I do my best to be as reliable as possible. However, I'm also programmed to advise checking with experts for critical issues. Always good to have a second opinion!" When the follow-up question of "are your calculations reliable enough for use in court" was asked, Copilot responded with "[w]hen it comes to legal matters, any calculations or data need to meet strict standards. I can provide accurate info, but it should always be verified by experts and accompanied by professional evaluations before being used in court . . . "

It would seem that even Copilot itself self-checks and relies on human oversight and analysis. It is clear from these responses that the developers of the Copilot program recognize the need for its supervision by a trained human operator to verify the accuracy of the submitted information as well as the output.

Mr. Ranson was adamant in his testimony that the use of Copilot or other artificial intelligence tools, for drafting expert reports is generally accepted in the field of fiduciary services and represents the future of analysis of fiduciary decisions; however, he could not name any publications regarding its use or any other sources to confirm that it is a generally accepted methodology.

It has long been the law that New York State follows the Frye standard for scientific evidence and expert testimony, in that the same is required to be generally accepted in its relevant field (see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 [D.C. Cir. 1923]).

The use of artificial intelligence is a rapidly growing reality across many industries. The mere fact that artificial intelligence has played a role, which continues to expand in our everyday lives, does not make the results generated by artificial intelligence admissible in Court. Recent decisions show that Courts have recognized that due process issues can arise when decisions are made by a software program, rather than by, or at the direction of, the analyst, especially in the use of cutting-edge technology (People v Wakefield, 175 AD3d 158 [3d Dept 2019]). The Court of Appeals has found that certain industry specific artificial intelligence technology is generally accepted (People v. Wakefield, 38 NY3d 367 [2022] [allowing artificial intelligence assisted software analysis of DNA in a criminal case]). However, Wakefield involved a full Frye hearing that included expert testimony that explained the mathematical formulas, the processes involved, and the peer-reviewed published articles in scientific journals. In the instant case, the record is devoid of any evidence as to the reliability of Microsoft Copilot in general, let alone as it relates to how it was applied here. Without more, the Court cannot blindly accept as accurate, calculations which are performed by artificial intelligence. As such, the Court makes the following findings with regard to the use of artificial intelligence in evidence sought to be admitted.

In reviewing cases and court practice rules from across the country, the Court finds that "Artificial Intelligence" ("A.I.") is properly defined as being any technology that uses machine learning, natural language processing, or any other computational mechanism to simulate human intelligence, including document generation, evidence creation or analysis, and legal research, and/or the capability of computer systems or algorithms to imitate intelligent human behavior. The Court further finds that A.I. can be either generative or assistive in nature. The Court defines "Generative Artificial Intelligence" or "Generative A.I." as artificial intelligence that is capable of generating new content (such as images or text) in response to a submitted prompt (such as a query) by learning from a large reference database of examples. A.I. assistive materials are any document or evidence prepared with the assistance of AI technologies, but not solely generated thereby.

In what may be an issue of first impression, at least in Surrogate's Court practice, this Court holds that due to the nature of the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence and its inherent reliability issues that prior to evidence being introduced which has been generated by an artificial intelligence product or system, counsel has an affirmative duty to disclose the use of artificial intelligence and the evidence sought to be admitted should properly be subject to a Frye hearing prior to its admission, the scope of which should be determined by the Court, either in a pre-trial hearing or at the time the evidence is offered.

Valuation of the King of Pop's Image and Likeness: Not That High

The U.S. Tax Court released an opinion concerning the dispute between the U.S. Government and Michael Jackson’s Estate concerning the valuation of his image and likeness.  Notably, the court stated that the estate valued his image and likeness at $3,078,000, and the government valued it at $161,307,045.  That’s quite a spread and you can imagine that the tax bill looks very different based on the valuation.  The court ultimately valued Jackson’s name and likeness at $4,153,912.  The decision is over 250 pages and chronicles Michael Jackson’s rise to fame as well as the problems.  Importantly, the decision raises how even when Michael Jackson was enjoying commercial success as an artist that licenses of his name and likeness did not do well at all.  The decision states:

Jackson’s personal fame meant that he received numerous requests for merchandising licenses for his “image and likeness.” To handle these requests, Triumph International, Inc.--an S corporation with Jackson as its sole shareholder --was incorporated in March 1984. In July 1984 Triumph entered into a five-year licensing agreement with Sullivan’s company, Entertainment Properties, for the use of Jackson’s image and likeness on a variety of products, including a line of clothing and fragrances. Under the agreement, Jackson was to receive $18 million upfront, with a potential total of $28 million. Jackson, however, was the only winner in this deal. He got the $18 million, but the merchandise didn’t sell, and the deal ultimately proved disastrous for the Sullivan family.

Based on Michael Jackson’s success at that time, one wonders if there were management issues concerning the exploitation of his image and likeness.  After Jackson was sued for child sexual assault, the court notes that his next tour, while successful, did not have dates in the United States and was not sponsored.  The court states:

The tour did have one merchandising agreement. Triumph granted Sony Signatures “the sole and exclusive right and license to utilize the Licensed Marks in connection with the manufacture and [distribution]” of merchandise, with “Licensed Marks” defined as “name(s), symbols, logos, trademarks, designs, likenesses and/or images of [Jackson].” Sony Signatures paid a $6 million advance, and Jackson also got nominal amounts from a few other licensees. Sales of tour merchandise were, however, significantly less than the advance, and Jackson had to repay Sony Signatures nearly $4 million.

The court concludes that:

We have to look for the value of each of Jackson’s assets as if “in the decedent’s hands at the time of its transfer by death.” Estate of Simplot, 249 F.3d at 1194-95. The value we put them as of the day he died is, we acknowledge, much less than their value much later under the Estate’s management. Branca, a friend of Jackson’s for many years, but a practical man forever, credibly testified that as popular singers age their prominence declines. Jackson, at the time of his death, was not behaving as if this were true; even a rational and undistressed hypothetical seller would have been hardpressed to avoid fire-sale prices. But Branca is right. Older stars’ “fans are less apt to buy tchotchkes.” Older stars do get less play on the radio. And according to all the expert witnesses, the same is true about even Jackson. They predicted that, like most popstars, Jackson would have a foreseeable surge in sales of his songs when he died, but a surge that would fade with time. They are right. Popular culture always moves on. There will come a time when Captain EO joins Monte Brewster and Terry Forbes as names that without googling sort of sound familiar, but only to people of a certain age or to students of entertainment history. And just as the grave will swallow Jackson’s fame, time will erode the Estate’s income. It resurrected and then sold what became its most valuable asset to Sony before trial. The value of what it has left, no matter how well managed, will now dwindle as Jackson’s copyrights expire and his image and likeness shuffle first into irrelevance and then into the public domain.

I am not sure “radio” time is that important anymore—like on an FM station, but see the licensing information mentioned above.  The full opinion has a lot of information on valuation and is available, here. 

Damages for Noneconomic Harm in Intellectual Property Law

FREE Webinar                               June 23, 2020 15:00 PM- 16:00 PM British Standard Time Damages for Noneconomic Harm in Intellectual Property Law By Professor Thomas Cotter

This talk offers a comprehensive analysis of awards of “non-economic” damages for reputational and emotional harm in intellectual property (IP) law. It discusses, among other matters, the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Castillo v. G&M Realty LP, affirming a $6.75 million award of statutory damages for the infringement of artists’ moral rights in graffiti art; the European Union’s Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive and its 2016 Liffers decision, which appear to require member states to award, where warranted, non-economic (“moral prejudice”) damages across the full range of IP cases; and some recent arguments in favor of awarding damages for emotional harm in, even, patent infringement actions. Courts should recognize reputational harm as a potentially cognizable injury throughout all of the branches of IP law, but damages for emotional harm should be limited to right of publicity and moral rights matters.

About the Speaker

Professor Thomas F. Cotter joined the University of Minnesota Law School faculty in 2006. From 1987-89, Professor Cotter clerked for the Honorable Lawrence W. Pierce, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He practiced law at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in New York City from 1988-90, and at Jenner & Block in Chicago from 1990-94. From 1994-2005, he taught at the University of Florida College of Law, where he held a University of Florida Research Foundation Professorship and directed the school’s Intellectual Property Law Program.

From 2005 to 2006, he was a Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University School of Law. In 2007, he was named to a two-year Solly Robins Distinguished Research Fellowship at the University of Minnesota Law School, and in 2008 was named to the Briggs and Morgan Chair in Law (now Taft Stettinius & Hollister).

to join click on this link: https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_08T5BlUzSIuRoJ_Mnwa9MQ

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Guest Post: Intellectual Property, Finance and Corporate Governance

We are pleased to publish this guest post by former IP Finance contributor and Senior Lecturer in Law, Dr. Janice Denoncourt, at the Nottingham Law School at the Nottingham Trent University. 

The emergence of IP rich companies is the new corporate governance challenge. This is because IP is largely invisible, not only in the financial accounts, but also more generally in corporate law theory and the legal framework.  The research in my new book Intellectual Property, Finance and Corporate Governance demonstrates why companies need to communicate more about how they manage corporate intellectual property (IP) rights portfolios and their strategy for delivering shareholder value. Depending on their business model and corporate objectives, companies add value via their corporate IP assets in different ways to achieve their goals.   In the modern era, all companies, large and small, have intellectual property (IP) rights, sometimes across multiple jurisdictions.  They are corporate IP owners.  At the same time, the shift to intangibles and IP assets as the major driver of value in business is clear and unstoppable.  Since the Global Financial Crisis ten years ago there has been a renewed interest in our current understanding of capitalism.  As a result, shareholders, business people, stakeholders and the public, seek more relevant, accurate information about IP-dependent business models and their impact on commercial value.    

Dr. Janice Denoncourt

In the aftermath of the Theranos 'misleading investors' scandal, this is an increasingly important modern corporate governance issue.  Theranos, Inc. is an American consumer healthcare technology company based in Palo Alto, California founded in 2003 by inventor and Managing Director Elizabeth Holmes. In 2018 Holmes was subject to civil charges by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for massive fraud in excess of $700 million USD for having repeatedly yet inaccurately assured shareholders and regulators that the company’s patented blood testing technology was revolutionary (see https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2018/comp-pr2018-41-theranos-holmes.pdf).  Theranos’ 200 plus US patent portfolio is public information via the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) portal and a significant corporate investment in IP. Holmes co-invented more than 270 of the company’s patented innovations. While patents do not equate to innovation or commercial success, they do act as business indicators of inventive activity as well as a commitment to protect the results of innovation.  Holmes, of all people, was well placed (if not best placed) to understand the capability of the blood testing technology. The alleged misconduct, namely misleading investors and government officials, has generated a new global regulatory discourse about what companies need to tell us about their IP.  Arguing that it needed 'to protect its IP' to excuse material omissions and misleading disclosures is not acceptable according to the SEC.  In the SEC’s press release on 14 March this year, Steven Peikin, Co-Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division stated:

            Investors are entitled to nothing less than complete truth and candor from companies and their executives... The charges against Theranos, Holmes, and Balwani make clear that there is no exemption from the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws simply because a company is non-public, development-stage, or the subject of exuberant media attention.

Stephanie Avakian, Co-Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division further confirmed:

            As a result of Holmes’ alleged fraudulent conduct, she is being stripped of control of the company she founded, is returning millions of shares to Theranos, and is barred from serving as an officer or director of a public company for 10 years...This package of remedies exemplifies our efforts to impose tailored and meaningful sanctions that directly address the unlawful behaviour charged and best remedies the harm done to shareholders.

Key corporate governance principles of transparency and disclosure are being more rigorously applied to corporate ownership of monopolistic IP rights that protect innovation and creativity.  In the US, SEC disclosure law Regulation S-K requires disclosure of the importance, duration and effect of all patents, trademarks, licences, franchises and concessions that a company holds.  The standard for 'material' corporate IP asset disclosures will continue to evolve in the US and other IP-rich jurisdictions.  The civil legal action brought by the SEC against Holmes is the catalyst highlighting a void in corporate practice.   IP-rich companies like Theranos will continue seeking corporate finance which falls under the corporate governance regulatory umbrella.   IP rich companies need to ensure they reflect on disclosure and transparency rules and take into account the growing magnitude of their corporate intangibles, IP assets and IP business models that potentially generate future wealth for their shareholders and potential investors.  

Closer to home, in 2017 the UK implemented the EU Non-Financial Disclosure Directive which requires large and listed companies to include additional disclosures of non-financial information in their annual reports, similar to the disclosure requirements in the Strategic Report.  The Non-Financial Reporting Regulations insert sections 414CA and 414CB into the Companies Act 2006, supplementing the existing strategic report requirements as set out in section 414C.  These new company law equirements potentially increase the reporting of non-financial information, better business and IP strategy reporting through the mandatory requirement to report the company’s business model.  This EU-wide reform highlights the growing importance of disclosure of non-financial information.

IP rights have evolved from being “a little pool to a big ocean” of corporate value and that corporate governance needs to respond to society’s rising expectations of directors and boards.  The astonishing lack of quantitative and qualitative public information about the growing magnitude of corporate IP assets makes it difficult to assess strategic value (“the IP value story”) and directors’ stewardship of those assets.  More relevant, accurate and 'joined up' corporate IP information (mostly known to internal management) is needed to triangulate intangibles financial data through cross verification with narrative disclosures and actual events.  The SEC stated that Theranos engaged in “elaborate, years-long fraud in which they exaggerated or made false statements about the company’s technology, business and financial performance.”  This is a new frontier in corporate governance thinking and practice. 

My research evaluates how corporate boards can ensure an appropriate level of transparency and make voluntary and mandatory ‘true and fair’ disclosures about a company’s corporate IP assets such as patents and trade secrets in traditional formats such as the accounts and the annual report.   The philosophies and principles that underpin debates on disclosure and transparency suggest that more 'open' disclosures about innovation, whilst preserving competitive advantage, are necessary so we have something to read, evaluate, react to and question. Countries including the US and the United Kingdom have mandatory obligations to report on gender balance, climate change and more, but not expressly corporate IP.  Patents, mini-case studies and an original business triage-style model for assessing corporate IP information, strategy and disclosures illustrate the gaps corporate governance theory needs to address.  Companies need to tell us how their corporate investment in R&D and IP rights contributes to the bottom line and regulators need to ensure boards of directors are accountable for IP management and strategy decisions, an important underside of the intangible economy.  

Intellectual Property, Finance and Corporate Governance contributes to the legal and economic literature for readers interested in what lies behind the headlines.  The foreword is written by Professor Nicolas Binctin, Universite of Poitiers. As for the future of the Silicon Valley biotech company Theranos, Inc., the company has since made hundreds of staff redundant to avert becoming insolvent.

Dr J Denoncourt, Nottingham Law School

Whitney Houston's Tax Settlement on IP and Royalties

Accounting Today reports that Whitney Houston has settled with the tax authority in the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), concerning mostly the value of her intellectual property, particularly the right of publicity, and royalties.  The IRS's valuation was around $22 million.  The parties settled for $2 million.  Michael Jackson's estate has been embroiled in a similar problem with the IRS, here. For more on valuation of the right of publicity for estate tax purposes, see Sara Zherhi's article on the subject in Harvard's Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law (be sure to check the new tax law in the United States).  

Two New Valuation Seminars

There are two interesting valuation seminars coming up.  The first is by the American Intellectual Property Law Association and is free.  It is tomorrow, Wednesday, August 22, 2017 and remote participation is possible.  The event is titled, “Assessing the Value of Intellectual Property in Rapidly Changing Markets and Law.”  Here is a summary of the event:

Rapidly changing markets and products affect the value of intellectual property.  Traditional methods of valuation are highly challenged, as comparable transactions, costs to develop "equivalent" IP and measuring income streams are all compromised by abbreviated time lines.  So, too, innovation at an increasing pace in certain sectors and rapidly changing intellectual property law (Alice, PTAB developments) heavily impact valuation approaches and outcomes.  Listen to our panel discuss these intriguing challenges.

The Speakers: Philip W. Kline of 284 Partners, LLC; Brian Scarpelli of ACT | The App Association; and David Stein of Cooper Legal Group, LLC

Wednesday, August 23^rd, 2017, 12:30 PM ET

REGISTRATION: http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/live_webinars/Pages/Front-and-Center-Discussion-Series.aspx

The Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law in Dallas is holding a symposium titled: “The Value of Intellectual Property.”  The description states: “A one-day symposium exploring the latest news, legal developments, and judicial decisions, including panels on: What Drives Innovation; Perspectives on the Value of Intellectual Property; Patent Eligibility; Patent Valuation and Complex Products; The Supreme Court’s Recent IP Cases; and The Patent Trial and Appeal Board.”  The “featured speakers” are: Manny Schecter, Chief Patent Counsel, IBM and Phil Johnson, Senior Vice President – Intellectual Property Strategy and Policy (ret.).  The event is on Friday, September 29, 2017 in Dallas at SMU, Dedman School of Law. 

The Increasing Value of Trade Secrets: Baker & McKenzie and Euromoney Release Trade Secret Report

The law firm of Baker and McKenzie (and Euromoney Institutional Investor Thought Leadership) has released a 22 page report titled, “Protect and Preserve: The Rising Importance of Trade Secrets.”  The authors surveyed 404 senior executives in industries which included Industrials; Financial Services; Consumer Goods/Retails; Information, Communication and Technology; and Chemical, Healthcare, Biotechnology, and Pharmaceuticals.  Over half of those surveyed reported that trade secrets were more valuable than other types of intellectual property for them.  Additionally, 69% of those surveyed believe that trade secrets will be even more important in the future because of the rapid change of technology.  Apparently, short product/service cycles coupled with the time required to obtain some IP rights (patents?) may make them less important.  The key findings of the report, include:

[1] In our survey, 82% of respondents said their trade secrets are an important, if not essential, part of their businesses. Among industries, 46% of financial services executives said they consider their trade secrets to be essential to their corporate strategy, followed by industrials and ICT executives (both 41%), healthcare (35%) and consumer goods and retail (27%).

[2] Among our respondents, 61% said that protecting their company trade secrets and IP is a board-level issue, reflecting the rising value of trade secrets in our digital age. Nearly one-third ranked it a top-five concern.

[3] Among the companies in our survey, 20% said they’ve had trade secrets stolen. Another 11% said they don’t know whether they’ve been the victim of misappropriation, indicating that the incidents of theft are likely higher. The healthcare industry is by far the most targeted, with 33% of those executives in our survey reporting that they’ve suffered trade secret theft, followed by industrials (18%) and ICT (17%).   

[4] When asked to identify the greatest threat to their trade secrets, 32% of our respondents said they most feared having trade secrets stolen by former employees, followed by suppliers, consultants and other third parties (28%), and current employees (20%). Another 15% said they most fear rogue or state-sponsored cybercriminals or hackers.

[5] Despite the heightened awareness of the importance of trade secrets, only 31% of our respondents said they have procedures in place to respond to the threat of or actual theft of trade secrets. Given that trade secrets are no longer protected once they become public, the question is how much more they should be doing to manage this risk.

The report identifies the apparent cause of the disconnect between the importance of trade secrets and the fact that companies have insufficient protection with the belief that many companies do not know which of their trade secrets are the most valuable until they are actually stolen.  One reason for this appears to be a failure to audit and perhaps a lack of clarity in valuing trade secrets.  Executives also seem to want stronger trade secret protection, particularly those based in Asia.  [Hat tip to Corporate Counsel for a lead to the report.]

US Securities and Exchange Commission Rules on Crowdfunding Effective

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules on crowdfunding became effective on May 16, 2016.  The rules are a hefty 685 pages long and are available, here.  The Investor Bulletin issued by the SEC Office of Investor Education and Advocacy provides an overview of the rules and the JOBS Act tailored to potential investors, here.  The Investor Bulletin explains that anyone can make a crowdfunding investment, but that there are limitations based on net worth and annual income on the amount that can be invested.  The Investor Bulletin explains: 

If either your annual income or your net worth is less than $100,000, then during any 12-month period, you can invest up to the greater of either $2,000 or 5% of the lesser of your annual income or net worth.
If both your annual income and your net worth are equal to or more than $100,000, then during any 12-month period, you can invest up to 10% of annual income or net worth, whichever is lesser, but not to exceed $100,000. 

Additionally, crowdfunding investments can only be made through a portal and not through other direct means.  "The broker-dealer or funding portal—a crowdfunding intermediary—must be registered with the SEC and be a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)."  The Rules provide numerous requirements for intermediaries to protect investors.  The Investor Bulletin also provides numerous warnings to potential investors concerning the risks associated with crowdfunding.  The Rules provide that, "An issuer is permitted to raise a maximum aggregate amount of $1 million through crowdfunding offerings in a 12-month period." 

Notably, the Rules also state that: 

Certain companies are not eligible to use the Regulation Crowdfunding exemption. Ineligible companies include non-U.S. companies, companies that already are Exchange Act reporting companies, certain investment companies, companies that are disqualified under Regulation Crowdfunding’s disqualification rules, companies that have failed to comply with the annual reporting requirements under Regulation Crowdfunding during the two years immediately preceding the filing of the offering statement, and companies that have no specific business plan or have indicated their business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies.

Offering documents must disclose: 

Information about officers and directors as well as owners of 20 percent or more of the issuer; • A description of the issuer’s business and the use of proceeds from the offering; • The price to the public of the securities or the method for determining the price, the target offering amount, the deadline to reach the target offering amount, and whether the issuer will accept investments in excess of the target offering amount; • Certain related-party transactions; • A discussion of the issuer’s financial condition; and • Financial statements of the issuer that are, depending on the amount offered and sold during a 12-month period, accompanied by information from the issuer’s tax returns, reviewed by an independent public accountant, or audited by an independent auditor. An issuer relying on these rules for the first time would be permitted to provide reviewed rather than audited financial statements, unless financial statements of the issuer are available that have been audited by an independent auditor. 

Happy investing!

 

A Relatively New Resource: Guide to Intangible Asset Valuation

Robert Reilly and Bob Schweihs, two managing directors of Willamette Management Associates, have authored a book titled, Guide to Intangible Asset Valuation.  The 700 page book "explores the disciplines of intangible asset valuation, economic damages, and transfer price analysis."  Some of the topics addressed include:

Identifying intangible assets and intellectual property; Structuring the intangible asset valuation, damages, or transfer price assignment; Generally accepted valuation approaches, methods, and procedures; Economic damages due diligence procedures and measurement methods; Allowable intercompany transfer price analysis methods; Intangible asset fair value accounting valuation issues; and Valuation of specific types of intangible assets (e.g., intellectual property, contract-related intangible assets, and goodwill). 

I have not read the book yet, but here is a favorable review by Neil Beaton, Certified Public Accountant.  The book is also reasonably priced at $122.50--a very nice price compared to some of its competitors.  The publication brochure (attached to the referenced review) notes that those "[w]ho would benefit from [the] book" include:

Litigation counsel involved in tort or breach of contract matters; Intellectual property counsel; International tax practitioners; Property tax practitioners; Auditors and accountants; Valuation analysts; Licensing Executives; Multinational corporation executives; Commercial bankers and investment bankers; Merger and acquisition professionals; Bankruptcy professionals; and Judges and arbitrators. 

 I look forward to reading it.

Low Valuations at the Heart of Tax Avoidance IP Schemes – An IP Solution?

Professor Andrew Blair-Stanek of the University of Marlyand, Francis King Carey School of Law, has published an article on SSRN titled, “Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance” (forthcoming 62 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. __).  The article helpfully explains how transferring IP can result in substantial tax savings for IP owners and why initial low valuations of IP are at the heart of tax avoidance schemes.  He focuses his proposal on addressing tax avoidance schemes by using substantive IP law, as well as procedural rules involving IP cases, to incentivize IP owners to make initial valuations of IP closer to their “actual value.”  He provides a hypothetical example of the problem involving Google and licensing:

When Google’s California-based engineers develop a promising invention, Google owns the rights to all patents that can be obtained on the invention. Corporate ownership of employee-created IP is common practice.

Google then quickly licenses all the patent rights to a subsidiary in a tax haven like Ireland. Licensing allows the future profits from the patents to accrue to the Irish subsidiary, while the legal ownership remains with Google itself in the U.S., with its robust protection for IP owners.  This license is respected, since Google and its Irish subsidiary are separate corporate entities, and IP can be freely licensed.

U.S. tax law requires that Google receive “arm’s-length” royalties from its Irish subsidiary for the patent license.  The “arm’s-length” price is defined as the price that would have been charged if Google had instead been dealing with an unrelated party under the same circumstances.  The “arm’s-length” principle for cross-border transactions is deeply enmeshed in not only U.S. tax law, but also the numerous bilateral tax treaties that the U.S. has signed with its trading partners, including Ireland.  Google must pay U.S. corporate tax of 35% of these “arm’s-length” royalties.  

Herein lies the mischief. Google does not transfer its promising IP to unrelated parties, so there is no observable “arm’s-length” price. Valuing IP – particularly brand-new IP – is difficult and subjective. Unlike a mass-produced machine or a ton of aluminum, each piece of IP is unique and its economic potential is difficult to predict. Treasury regulations provide detailed econometric methods to estimate IP values, but these are extremely imprecise, often leading to a wide possible range of acceptable prices.

Google must hire appraisers (oftentimes economists) to ascertain an “arm’s-length” price for the transfer to Ireland, and to support that price with extensive contemporaneous documentation.  But Google chooses and pays these appraisers, who are inclined to err towards lower valuations. As a leading tax practitioner recently observed, “appraisers tend to agree with their paymasters on [valuation] questions.”

After the transfer to Google’s Irish subsidiary, the patented technology is incorporated into a new Google device.  The Irish subsidiary oversees a Chinese contract manufacturer’s building of the new devices.  The Irish subsidiary then sells the devices for a full markup that includes the value of the IP to Google distribution subsidiaries worldwide, who then sell them to consumers. The substantial profits from the IP remain in Ireland, typically not subject to Irish tax, and not subject to U.S. tax as long as the cash is not returned to the U.S.

He also discusses why meaningful change in tax laws is unlikely to happen which leads to his IP focused proposals.  Why is the solution unlikely to be based in tax law?  He provides, at least two reasons: nearly impossible coordination of tax law between many countries; and information asymmetries between multinationals and government tax authorities.  In describing the information asymmetry problem, he states that:

First, information asymmetry refers to the fact that the taxpayer inherently knows far more about the characteristics, potential, and value of its IP than does the IRS [U.S. Internal Revenue Service] (or any appraiser). For example, Google understands how its new invention could fit profitably into a new smartphone in a way that neither a team of IRS experts, nor a team of private appraisers, ever could. When the IRS challenges a low transfer price in court, the taxpayer has a depth of understanding of its own IP that gives it a large advantage in refuting the IRS challenge.

Largely as a result of this information asymmetry, the IRS has lost both high-profile IP transfer-pricing cases litigated in the past decade. A quote from one of those opinions encapsulates the problem: “Taxpayers are merely required to be compliant, not prescient.” Taxpayers can fully comply with the law by disclosing all facts to their appraisers who must determine the “arm’s-length” transfer price. Any outsider (including judges) will not be able to discern its profit potential. But the multinational can determine its profit potential, which materializes after the IP is safely in Ireland.

His proposals for change (or perhaps, in some cases, suggestions for interesting arguments) essentially focus on using the initial low valuation position taken by the IP owner against it later in litigation (when the relevant information is likely discoverable) and licensing.  For example, he states:

First, the defendant should argue that the artificially low price is evidence that the patent was obvious at the time of invention, and hence is invalid.  Patent law recognizes that non-technical “secondary considerations” such as commercial success and licensing success are evidence for or against the validity of a patent. The artificially low price fits nicely into this rubric, because it demonstrates with a hard figure that, immediately after the invention, Google did not see the patent as being a substantial innovation. Additionally, the expert documentation justifying the low price may include damaging language downplaying the patent’s innovativeness.

Second, the defendant should argue that, even if the patent is valid, it has a narrow scope. Courts give innovative patents a broad scope that allows finding infringement whenever the infringer uses a close equivalent to the claimed invention. By contrast, less-innovative patents are given a narrower scope. The low transfer price is evidence that Google did not perceive the patent as particularly innovative, and thus should receive a narrower scope. Again, the expert documentation justifying the low price will often include damaging language downplaying the innovation.

Third, even if the court finds the patent valid and infringed, the defendant should be able to point to the low transfer price as evidence that damages should be correspondingly low. After all, a patent’s price reflects its potential to generate profits and royalties, and patent damages replace the patentholder’s lost profits and royalties.

Fourth, patent plaintiffs typically request a preliminary injunction against infringement and, if they prevail on the merits, then request a permanent injunction. But a low price for the patent suggests that infringement is unlikely to cause Google “irreparable harm,” which is required for injunctions. The low price also suggests Google does not come out ahead on the “balance of hardships,” another requirement for injunctions. Additionally, as discussed earlier, the low transfer price is evidence of invalidity and narrower scope, both of which suggest Google has a lower “likelihood of success on the ultimate merits,” a requirement for a preliminary injunction.

Finally, even if the court finds Google’s patent valid and infringed, the defendant should be able to argue that Google’s tax avoidance was “patent misuse.” When a court finds that a patentholder used the patent in a way that violates public policy, it will refuse to award damages or injunctive relief, at least until the misuse has been remedied. Misuse does not require that the patentholder harmed the defendant, only that the patentholder used the IP in a way that violated public policy. If the court finds Google’s tax avoidance sufficiently egregious, it could refuse relief to Google until it has repaid the U.S. Treasury the taxes it improperly avoided.  

Professor Stanek also discusses how copyright and trademark law have similar doctrines, such as copyright fair use, strength of the mark and secondary meaning, and damages that could be used to incentivize valuations closer to “actual valuation” and how the theories underlying IP protection support his proposals.  Notably, he states that usage of the initial transfer valuation could be used to undermine the IP holders royalty negotiation position if his proposals are adopted.  Do readers know of situations where the initial transfer valuation has been used in negotiating royalties, arguing damages, or in arguments concerning the scope or validity of IP?  (Hat tip to Professor Paul L. Caron’s (Pepperdine University) Taxprof blog for a lead to the article). 

The Nokia-Microsoft Transaction: Further Thoughts on Strategy and Valuation

Fellow blogger Mike recently discussed ("Microsoft Acquires Nokia Handset Business and Licence-Related Patents"), here, the high-profile acquisition by Microsoft of Nokia's handset business. Permit me to offer my own view of certain aspects of this blockbuster transaction. To remind readers, Microsoft paid 3.79 billion EUR for the mobile phone and smart devices business units plus certain support assets and activities (the business "itself") and an additional 1.65 billion EUR for a 10-year non-exclusive licence (subject to possible extension in perpetuity) to use certain Nokia patents. I scratched my head and did a lot of on-line digging in search of a previous example where multiple billion dollars were paid for a non-exclusive licence, but my efforts came up empty. Whether or not these licence arrangements, having regard to the sums paid, are indeed without precedent, the more interesting question still remains: what do we make of these licence arrangements, given that the previous mega-patent transactions of recent years have focused in whole, or nearly in whole, on the acquisition of patent ownership of large patent portfolios? Two reports of this transaction offer somewhat different perspectives.

First, let's consider the 3 September Reuters report by Dan Levine ("Why Nokia didn't sell its patents to Microsoft"), here. Until the transaction, it is claimed, Nokia had not widely licensed its handset-related patents, instead using its patents as a shield against competitors. That will change, said a Nokia spokesman, "[o]nce we no longer have our own mobile devices, following the close of the [Microsoft] transaction, we would be able to explore licensing of those technologies." That is well and good, but it takes two enter into a non-exclusive licence arrangement, so why did Microsoft agree to take such a licence rather than to acquire the patents?

One answer may simply be that, when compared with several of the mega-deals for patents, most notably the Google-Microsoft Mobility transaction, Nokia simply did not receive an offer for the amount that it wished to receive for sale of its patent portfolio to Microsoft. Maybe yes, maybe no, given all of the second-guessing about the amount actually paid by Google that are attributed to the patents. The better answer, as suggested in the article, is not simply a case of the licence arrangement being the best available option. Rather, the licence was part of a strategy for the exploitation of the company's patents.

In particular, it is connected with Microsoft's attack on Android manufacturers. Thus, it turns out that Microsoft has already succeeded in convincing approximately 20 Android manufacturers to pay royalties, thereby adding a further cost to the overall Android system. The argument is that, by leaving the patents in the ownership of Nokia, the company can separately sue the same Android manufacturers, with the intention of obtaining a royalty and further adding to the cost of the device. The article called this step a "pincer movement" made possible by the ownership of Nokia in the patents. If this be correct, we can expect to witness, over the next several months, multiple law suits for patent infringement and filed by Nokia.

A somewhat different approach is offered on the FOSS patents blog post of 3 September ("1.65 billion euro patent licensing portion of Microsoft-Nokia validates Nokia's portfolio"), written by the perceptive Florian Mueller, here. Of particular interest are two slides set out in the post, taken from a "strategic rationale" document furnished by Microsoft (Mike's post provides a link to the document). Most notable are the following claims by Microsoft:

1. Microsoft is taking an assignment of more than 8500 design patents;

2. The utility patent portfolio that is the subject of the Nokia licence to Microsoft consists of more than 30,000 granted patents and pending applications and is described as one of the most valuable portfolios in the wireless connectivity industry.

3. Microsoft will taken an assignment of the benefits of more than 60 third-party patent licenses.

Mueller observes that Microsoft, unlike Google, already has a strong patent position (witness its success in smart-phone litigation and convincing 20 Android device manufacturers to take a licence with recourse to litigation). Thus it had no interest in acquiring the Nokia patents, but merely in ensuring that it would be free from interference based on these patents, whoever ultimately owns them. The blog also suggests (and others have apparently discussed more directly), that Nokia now is in a position to assert its patents against other parties for the purpose of obtaining royalties (and thereby becoming a "patent assertion entity" or even a "patent troll"?).

Despite the stark differences between the Google-Motorola Mobility transaction, in which the portfolio was acquired by Google, and the Microsoft-Nokia transaction, which emphasizes the grant of licences by Nokia, there are still some common nagging questions: (i) how did Microsoft reach the 1.65 billion EURO valuation for the licences; (ii) how did Microsoft assign a value to the design patents acquired; and (iii) how did Microsoft reach the conclusion that the Nokia portfolio is a particularly strong one?

More generally, Florian states that "Google grossly overpaid for Motorola's patents", apparently based on the thin record of successful litigation resting on these patents. Maybe yes, maybe no. Perhaps Google assigned a large value to the fact that in acquiring the patents, it precluded acquisition by someone else. Perhaps Google has other metrics by which it is valuing the success of its patent acquisition. As for Microsoft, the entire acquisition may make sense only if the company can make a go of it in the smartphone industry. If Microsoft fails, then not only can it be claimed that it "overpaid" for the Nokia patents, but in doing so, it precluded these amounts from being utilized by the company to develop other product categories. Seen from this vantage, the ultimate strategic concern is not the potential benefits flowing from the grant of the licensed rights, but rather the very transaction itself. As such, the issue of the licensing is at most a matter of high level (and expensive) tactics. Without being trite—"only time will tell."

“A Kodak Moment” or “Rembrandts in the Attic”: The Valuation for the BlackBerry Patent Portfolio

On the heels of the announcement that BlackBerry would start looking “at strategic alternatives,” the web has lit up with commentary and speculation on the value of the BlackBerry patent portfolio—a whopping 5,000 plus patents and almost 4,000 patent applications! (here, here, here and here) And, the value is – well, $2 billion.  Or, maybe $3 billion.  But, well, under some circumstances could be $5 billion.  Wow.  A $2 to $5 billion range?  To be fair, these valuations are being made “on the fly.”  I do hope that this time the folks doing the valuing are taking into account, at least, how extensive the licensing of the critical patents in the portfolio has been (apparently a mistake with the Kodak portfolio valuation), the existence of noninfringing substitutes, the relevant markets, the construction of the claims and potential prior art not considered by the relevant patent offices. (How much is that analysis going to cost?) 

Could the portfolio be a "Rembrandt in the Attic" (or a lot of them)?  Again, how extensive has the licensing of the patents been?  At least one analysis has pointed out that there is quite a bit of term left on some of the BlackBerry patents.  And, in early 2013, Intellectual Asset Management reportedly gave the BlackBerry Patent Portfolio a relatively high rating based on quality and quantity of patents and BlackBerry supposedly has been spending "$1.5 billion to $2 billion" on R&D a year. Here is the Envision IP analysis (and update) of the BlackBerry Patent Portfolio.  ThinkFire will release its analysis of the present BlackBerry Patent Portfolio soon.    Anyone need a shield or something to trade?    

Besides the valuation issue, it will be interesting to see if the BlackBerry patents are eventually used by so called “patent trolls” to hold up other entities since BlackBerry (Research in Motion) was such a famous “victim” of NTP and has been an outspoken critic of "patent trolls."  (the sword).  Again, anyone need a shield?  We shall see how the game plays out. 

Kodak, Patents and the Deal That You Can't Refuse?

Let's start from the end: No, I am not going to let this subject disappear quietly.

Several months ago I wrote about "Patent Valuation, T.S. Eliot and the Theatre of the Absurd" here, where I commented on the steadily decreasing valuation of the Kodak patent portfolio. The saga continues. Last week it was reported by Joe Mullin on arstechnica.com here that Kodak has entered into a credit line of $793 million dollars with its bondholders, provided that the company can raise at least $500 million from the sale of its portfolio of patents. The arrangement still needs approval of the bankruptcy court, it is reported.

The names of potential purchasers remain a combination of smartphone companies--such as Apple, Google and Samsung-- on the one hand, and patent aggregators, such as Intellectual Ventures here and RPX Corp. here, on the other. The article goes on to make a number of points that are not entirely clear to me:

1. "Because such a wide range of entities is working together to buy these Kodak patents, it is unlikely that they would fall into the hands of patent trolls or be used for other types of patent attacks."--I don't quite follow this. What does it mean that these entities are "working together"? Are they allocating the patents between them? If not, what is the nature of this coordination? Moreover, depending upon on how you define a patent troll, both Intellectual Ventures and even RPX Corp can be seen as having troll-like characteristics.

2. "This deal would allow Kodak to get one big lump-sum payment rather than eke out its patent cash in court."--This seems to be a bit of false dichotomy. Did anyone really believe that Kodak's patent folio was going to earn the company aggregate recovery in the amount of many hundreds of millions of dollars? Is sale of the patent portfolio really a commercial alternative to continuing to slog it out in courts?

3. "But the endgame will remain the same: competing companies--and, indirectly, consumers--will still have to pay a hefty tax to buy out a dying, but patent-rich, business"--This is not clear to me at all. Who are the competing companies and why are they paying "a hefty tax" for the patents?

4. I do not understand the pricing dynamic that it taking place here. In particular,
what are the pressures that are being brought to bear on these potential purchasers so that they agree to pay an amount greater than if there was a free auction of the portfolio? What comes to mind is that the bondholders want to pressure the perspective purchasers to fork over at least a half-billion dollars or take the risk that the patents fall into the "wrong" hands. Maybe that is the "hefty tax" that is referred to in the article.

More generally, I would really love someone to dig into how it came to pass that the same patent portfolio was given a valuation of over two billion dollars last year. Who had in interest in championing this over-estimate? How was this supposed to translate into fees or other income for interested parties? Is there an IP equivalent here to the tawdry conduct of several major investment houses a half decade ago, who were flogging investments of the same bundles of assets that they were shorting (i.e., betting on their price decline)?

Stated otherwise, it seems to me that the time has come for at least certain elements of the patent valuation business to come clean on what happened. Greed, misjudgment, or something more sinister?

Mega-Patent Portfolio Sales: Chimera or Here to Stay?

I do not usually use this blog platform to offer my counterpoint to a post by one of my IP Finance colleagues. However, I will make an exception this time in connection with Rob Harrison's interesting post of yesterday--"AOL posts profit based on Microsoft patent sale" here. Rob focused on the connection between the $1.056 billion dollar sale by AOL to Microsoft for a large chunk of its patent portfolio (Microsoft then turned around and sold a large portion of these former AOL patents to Facebook) and the rise of AOL's share price to a level not seen in years.

Rob concluded as follows:

"The whole deal has been presented as beefing up Microsoft's patent portfolio in the search business and helping Facebook's patent dispute with Yahoo. Certainly the volume of patents probably means that both companies have probably a better arsenal to defend themselves in this and future patent suits. AOL's shareholders can comfort themselves in having realised value from a substantial IP portfolio built up over the past fifteen years."

I have recently questioned elsewhere ("Of Medieval Marauders, Tulips and and the Sale of Patent Portfolios", here) whether the sale of these mega-patent portfolios, starting with the $12.5 billion sale by Motorola Mobility to Google, is the most graphic example of the potential value to be extracted from a properly developed patent portfolio, or the result of a number of idiosyncratic circumstances that have created a distorted market for patents, bordering on being a full-fledged patent bubble (interestingly, an item this week suggests that, contrary to previous accounts, patents may not have been the sole driver for the Motorola Mobility purchase. As reported by Washingtonpost.com on July 25th, "A report from VentureBeat highlights that Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility was only partially fueled by patent acquisitions, which many suspected was the main drive behind the deal. The report says that only $5.5 billion of the $12.5 billion deal went to patent acquisition. Google hasn’t provided much information on its strategy for Motorola, saying only that everyone should expect “some changes” at the hardware maker.").

Circling back to the AOL-Microsoft transaction, I would make the following comments in response to Rob Harrison's observations, to try and get a better understand the nature of the $1 billion plus payment received from Microsoft.

1. How much did AOL expend over the years to register, maintain and enforce these patents over the 15-year period?

2. To what extent did AOL receive licensing fees from third parties with respect to these patents?

3. What portion of salaries and other company resources can be attributed to the invention and registration of these patents?

4. To what extent did expenditures in the patent portfolio constitute forgone investment in other AOL activities?

5. Can we determine a rate of return with respect to these patents? How does it compare with the rate of return on other AOL assets?

6. As a matter of policy, to what extent should patents primarily serve the shareholder's interests in boosting share price by a one-off enhancement of revenue within the company?

7. Is the sale of the patents in the name of shareholder value another way of saying that management did not make effective internal commercial use of its patents?

8. Is it any coincidence that sale of these mega- patent portfolios has occurred about the same time as investment banks have made a push to introject themselves into this market (and earn substantial fees as a result), see "Investment Banks Seek Business in Patent Deals as M&A Work Slows", Bloomberg.com, June 25th here?

It appears that the sale of mega-portfolios of patents is not going away, especially in these difficult economic times and, with it, increasing questions about what is going on.