Showing posts with label Nokia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nokia. Show all posts

Thursday, 17 February 2022

USPTO Finds No One Country or Firm "Winning" 5G Tech Race

The United States Patent and Trademark Office has released a report titled, “Patenting Activity Among 5G Developers.”  Notably, the USPTO Report states:

In recent years, many studies have attempted to identify a single global leader in 5G technologies. Because it is difficult to directly determine which company owns the most patent-protected technologies used in 5G networks, existing studies have examined company activity in 5G standardization work and patents and patent applications declared potentially essential to 5G standards.

This report provides a broader perspective by examining more than one data set and by recognizing the variances in significance that patents have to a sophisticated technical standard, such as 5G.

Specifically, the report examines which companies have fled for more patents at the USPTO in four technologies that have seen the most patenting activity among declared patent flings: Management of Local Wireless Resources, Multiple Use of Transmission Path, Radio Transmission Systems, and Information Error Detection or Error Correction in Transmission Systems. This approach narrows the focus to patent flings on technologies central to 5G innovation. In addition to measuring patenting activity in these four technologies, the report also examines certain patent fling attributes associated with greater value. By analyzing the question of the 5G patenting activity from a variety of perspectives, the USPTO has generated a rich set of results that are arguably more informative of 5G competitiveness than prior studies.

The USPTO’s examination shows that six 5G companies consistently competed in patenting activity: Ericsson, Huawei, LG, Nokia, Qualcomm, and Samsung. According to the data generated for the report, no single firm dominates 5G innovation at present.

In summary, the results suggest that there remains ongoing competition among these six 5G companies in patenting activity notwithstanding media claims that a single firm may lead. Given the complexity of the results, caution is recommended when reviewing media claims of 5G dominance.

The Report also notes some key takeaways:

• Unique among studies on 5G patenting activity, this report examines both (1) overall global 5G patenting trends, and (2) patent flings and value indicators in the four most patented 5G-related technologies. • Based on the report’s analysis of patenting activity, the six most active 5G companies are Ericsson, Huawei, LG, Nokia, Qualcomm, and Samsung. • The findings of the report call into question claims that any single firm or country is “winning.”

The report is available, here. 

Wednesday, 11 September 2013

The Nokia-Microsoft Transaction: Further Thoughts on Strategy and Valuation

Fellow blogger Mike recently discussed ("Microsoft Acquires Nokia Handset Business and Licence-Related Patents"), here, the high-profile acquisition by Microsoft of Nokia's handset business. Permit me to offer my own view of certain aspects of this blockbuster transaction. To remind readers, Microsoft paid 3.79 billion EUR for the mobile phone and smart devices business units plus certain support assets and activities (the business "itself") and an additional 1.65 billion EUR for a 10-year non-exclusive licence (subject to possible extension in perpetuity) to use certain Nokia patents. I scratched my head and did a lot of on-line digging in search of a previous example where multiple billion dollars were paid for a non-exclusive licence, but my efforts came up empty. Whether or not these licence arrangements, having regard to the sums paid, are indeed without precedent, the more interesting question still remains: what do we make of these licence arrangements, given that the previous mega-patent transactions of recent years have focused in whole, or nearly in whole, on the acquisition of patent ownership of large patent portfolios? Two reports of this transaction offer somewhat different perspectives.

First, let's consider the 3 September Reuters report by Dan Levine ("Why Nokia didn't sell its patents to Microsoft"), here. Until the transaction, it is claimed, Nokia had not widely licensed its handset-related patents, instead using its patents as a shield against competitors. That will change, said a Nokia spokesman, "[o]nce we no longer have our own mobile devices, following the close of the [Microsoft] transaction, we would be able to explore licensing of those technologies." That is well and good, but it takes two enter into a non-exclusive licence arrangement, so why did Microsoft agree to take such a licence rather than to acquire the patents?

One answer may simply be that, when compared with several of the mega-deals for patents, most notably the Google-Microsoft Mobility transaction, Nokia simply did not receive an offer for the amount that it wished to receive for sale of its patent portfolio to Microsoft. Maybe yes, maybe no, given all of the second-guessing about the amount actually paid by Google that are attributed to the patents. The better answer, as suggested in the article, is not simply a case of the licence arrangement being the best available option. Rather, the licence was part of a strategy for the exploitation of the company's patents.

In particular, it is connected with Microsoft's attack on Android manufacturers. Thus, it turns out that Microsoft has already succeeded in convincing approximately 20 Android manufacturers to pay royalties, thereby adding a further cost to the overall Android system. The argument is that, by leaving the patents in the ownership of Nokia, the company can separately sue the same Android manufacturers, with the intention of obtaining a royalty and further adding to the cost of the device. The article called this step a "pincer movement" made possible by the ownership of Nokia in the patents. If this be correct, we can expect to witness, over the next several months, multiple law suits for patent infringement and filed by Nokia.

A somewhat different approach is offered on the FOSS patents blog post of 3 September ("1.65 billion euro patent licensing portion of Microsoft-Nokia validates Nokia's portfolio"), written by the perceptive Florian Mueller, here. Of particular interest are two slides set out in the post, taken from a "strategic rationale" document furnished by Microsoft (Mike's post provides a link to the document). Most notable are the following claims by Microsoft:
1. Microsoft is taking an assignment of more than 8500 design patents;

2. The utility patent portfolio that is the subject of the Nokia licence to Microsoft consists of more than 30,000 granted patents and pending applications and is described as one of the most valuable portfolios in the wireless connectivity industry.

3. Microsoft will taken an assignment of the benefits of more than 60 third-party patent licenses.
Mueller observes that Microsoft, unlike Google, already has a strong patent position (witness its success in smart-phone litigation and convincing 20 Android device manufacturers to take a licence with recourse to litigation). Thus it had no interest in acquiring the Nokia patents, but merely in ensuring that it would be free from interference based on these patents, whoever ultimately owns them. The blog also suggests (and others have apparently discussed more directly), that Nokia now is in a position to assert its patents against other parties for the purpose of obtaining royalties (and thereby becoming a "patent assertion entity" or even a "patent troll"?).

Despite the stark differences between the Google-Motorola Mobility transaction, in which the portfolio was acquired by Google, and the Microsoft-Nokia transaction, which emphasizes the grant of licences by Nokia, there are still some common nagging questions: (i) how did Microsoft reach the 1.65 billion EURO valuation for the licences; (ii) how did Microsoft assign a value to the design patents acquired; and (iii) how did Microsoft reach the conclusion that the Nokia portfolio is a particularly strong one?

More generally, Florian states that "Google grossly overpaid for Motorola's patents", apparently based on the thin record of successful litigation resting on these patents. Maybe yes, maybe no. Perhaps Google assigned a large value to the fact that in acquiring the patents, it precluded acquisition by someone else. Perhaps Google has other metrics by which it is valuing the success of its patent acquisition. As for Microsoft, the entire acquisition may make sense only if the company can make a go of it in the smartphone industry. If Microsoft fails, then not only can it be claimed that it "overpaid" for the Nokia patents, but in doing so, it precluded these amounts from being utilized by the company to develop other product categories. Seen from this vantage, the ultimate strategic concern is not the potential benefits flowing from the grant of the licensed rights, but rather the very transaction itself. As such, the issue of the licensing is at most a matter of high level (and expensive) tactics. Without being trite—"only time will tell."

Tuesday, 3 September 2013

Microsoft Acquires Nokia Handset Business and Licenses Related Patents: Microsoft's Strategic Rationale

Microsoft has acquired Nokia’s handset business for about $5 billion and has licensed related Nokia patents for about $2.18 billion (supposedly 8,500 design patents and 30,000 utility patents and applications).  Discussion about the deal can be found here, here, here and here.  Interestingly, The New York Times notes that, as partners, Microsoft and Nokia have not been very successful, but that Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia may “make things run more smoothly.”  Why?  The New York Times states that the issue concerned slow development in the fast moving mobile market because of “friction” caused by intellectual property rights. 

According to Microsoft’s Strategic Rationale document, Microsoft is acquiring “Nokia’s Qualcomm and other key IP licenses”; “licens[ing] Nokia’s patents for use across all of Microsoft’s products”; and “licens[ing the] ability to use Nokia’s HERE broadly in its products.”  The document notes that “Nokia retains NSN, HERE, its CTO Office and its patent portfolio.”  The document also states:

IP Acquisition and License Agreements with Nokia

                Intellectual property is an important element of the smart devices business

                                Unless managed proactively patent issues can create uncertainty for smartphone shipments

                                Unless managed creatively, patent royalties can add over 10 percent to the costs of a smartphone Bill of Materials

                Microsoft is acquiring over 8,500 design patents, ownership of the Lumia & Asha brands, and a ten-year license to use the Nokia brand on feature phones.

                Microsoft is paying 1.65 billion [Euros] for a fully paid-up license to Nokia’s utility patents

                                Covers all of Nokia’s patents and patent applications as of the closing date (except NSN)

                                The total license price includes an option to convert coverage from a ten-year to a perpetual license

                                The agreement provides for a broad, five-year, two-way standstill, including NSN

                Nokia’s patent portfolio is one of the most valuable in the tech sector

                                Nokia’s portfolio has approximately 30,000 utility patents and patent applications; we consider it to be one of the two most valuable portfolios relevant to wireless connectivity

                                The license also provides significant value for Microsoft’s existing businesses, replacing after 2014 Microsoft’s existing annual license payment to Nokia

Microsoft also secures other Valuable Patent Benefits

                Nokia is assigning to Microsoft benefits under more than 60 patent licenses with third parties

                                Nokia is assigning its existing license with Qualcomm, which is the other company that ranks with Nokia at the top of having a valuable wireless patent portfolio

                                Nokia is also conveying rights under its agreements with IBM, Motorola Mobility and Motorola Solutions

                                These give Microsoft the benefit of attractive royalty arrangements Nokia negotiated

                Microsoft will combine the new Nokia license and these agreements with its existing patent agreements

                                Microsoft’s agreement with Samsung will provide coverage for these additional devices without added payments

                                Microsoft will also benefit from its prior or continuing agreements with Apple, LG, Nortel, Kodak, and others at no additional cost

                                Put all together, Microsoft will have the most cost-effective patent arrangements for smart devices

Another interesting point is that this deal may take Microsoft out of contention for the BlackBerry patent portfolio.  And, at least one commentator placed the highest value for the BlackBerry portfolio as a potential target for Microsoft for around $5 billion.  BlackBerry’s stock is up since the Microsoft and Nokia announcement. 

Friday, 11 June 2010

The Branding Wars in Smart Phones.

The media-hyped recent coverage of Steve Jobs, as he discussed the bells and whistles that adorn the 4g iPhone, stands in stark contrast to a sombre article that appeared on Bloomberg.com on 12 May. Entitled "Nokia Goes 'Back to the Future' in Attempt to Topple iPhone" and written by Diana ben-Aaron here, it discusses the appoint of Anssi Vanjoki as head of the company's smartphone unit. Vanjoki's mission: make Nokia competitive in the smartphone space. His challenge (as described by Carolina Milanesi of Gartner, Inc.): "It's a bit back to the future ... [and] he doesn't have much time, so Nokia needs to deliver."

The company's recent history in this area is grim. While the company worldwide is the largest manufacturer of handsets, it has become a laggard in the up-scale smartphone business. In a field with compressed timeframes and ferocious competition, how long ago March 2007 seems now. Then, Nokia launched the N95, the company's first handset with GPS. It reported sold more than 10 million units and enjoyed an operating profit of more than 21%. That was then, however.

In the face of the onslaught of the BlackBerry by Research in Motion, and the iPhone of Apple, not to mention Android-based devices such as those of HTC, Samsung and LG Electronics, operating margins plummeted to just over 10% in Q1 2010. There seems to have been a subsequet model N97, being a combination touchscreen and keyboard phone, but that model has not enabled Nokia to overcome the Blackberry or iPhone products.

Against this backdrop, analyst Tero Kuittnen (MKM Partners) has offered Nokia only luke-warm encouragement: "The stakes couldn't be higher. The iPhone is a luxury juggernaut that can no longer be defeated, but Nokia still have a shot at snuffing out the challenge of its Aisia midrange rivals." Another analyst, Ben Wood, of CCS Insight, was more pointed, observing that "[i]f these people don't suceed, they will be doing something different in three years."

The competition in the handset industry generally, and the smartphone
business, in particular, has been the subject of countless articles and is a favoured topic for business school case studies. I want to mention an IP-based one aspect that tends to be overlooked, namely the role of trade marks. We noted above that the N95 handset was eclipsed by the Blackberry and the iPhone and that the N97 failed to buck this trend. To counter this, Vanjoki plans to roll out a new slim touchscreen device. And what is the name for this new product? Are you ready for this ...? None other than the "N 8."

I simply don't get this branding move by Nokia. First, it is a mystery why a newer model bears a lower number than an earlier model. Weren't we all conditioned to expect that the 386 Intel chip would be an improvement on the 286 product, and that the 486 chip was in improvement on the 386. I know--Intel was unable to register these later chip models as trade marks, at least in the U.S., but that does not change the basic principle that consumers expect higher model numbers or numeric brand names to represent a more advanced product than its lower-numbered predecessor. If my assumption is correct, then the rationale for the progression from N95 to N8 remains a mystery.

Second, the very choice of the series of markets based on "N" plus a number seems odd. Compare it with the Blackberry name, which is a garden-variety (no pun intended) use of an arbitrary name that has planted deep branding roots in the consciousness of consumers. It does not really matter if the consumer knows that Research in Motion (or RIM), stands behind the product. It is enough that one asks for a Blackberry. It is a wonderfully strong arbitrary mark.

The selection of the iPhone suggests an antipodal branding strategy.

Here, Apple has built a stable of strong marks, each of which is comprised of the prefix "i" together with an arguably descirptive noun. Fear not--acquired distinctiveness has or will ensure that each of these family of marks can be protected in its own right, as well as being used together the Apple mark. Both the product name and the house mark come out as branding winners.

Now let's consider N8 (or N95 or N97). Unlike the Blackberry name, there is nothing distinctive about such an alphaneumeric combination. There is ready reason for a consumer to know (and remember) that iPhone is a telephone device and that iPad is a tablet device. The same cannot be said, in my humble opinion, for the N8 mark. This means either that Nokia will have to use N8 together with Nokia, so as least to take advantage of the strong value in Nokia, or settle for a product name that is doomed to be less effective than the names of its rivals. Either way, Nokia would seem to come out second best in the trade mark wars, and where it can ill afford to do so.

Wednesday, 6 May 2009

Nokia and iPhone; Strong, Famous and Hip?

I usually keep my tweeting separate from my blogs, but this time I will make an exception. In 137 carefully chosen characters, I noted a report that appeared in Business Week, "A Bid to Reconnect with America" (April 13th), which discussed the efforts by Nokia to increase its market share for mobile phones in the U.S. from (as described) "its meager 8% share". Globally, Nokia enjoys a 37% market share. Fellow blogger and tweeter Jeremy Phillips quickly tweeted in reply that, in his view, " I'd settle for just half of that. For a foreign brand it's doing fine." Now I must admit-I was surprised by Nokia's relatively modest degree of U.S. market penetration. I had become so used to reading a 30% plus figure for Nokia's market share world-wide that I had no idea that this number masked a decidedly smaller share for the U.S. market.

The article recited a number of reasons for the single-digit market share in the U.S., including an alleged ambivalence to the U.S. market, due to "the heavy control wireless carriers exert and because wireless technology has not been as advanced as in Europe." As well, Nokia reportedly garnered more substantial returns in emerging markets, most notably China. More generally, the article concluded that, contrary to mobile users in most of the rest of the world, Americans don't think of Nokia as the cool, go-to company for advanced cell phones." I assume that the prize for image in the U.S. goes to Apple and the iPhone, with RIM and the Blackberry carving out cache of its own in the professional market. Nokia products lag far behind.

But what is hip in the U.S. is not hip in the Asian subcontinent. In a small item 10 pages away from the report on Nokia in the U.S., under the title ""iPhone's Asian Disconnect", the same Business Week issue discussed the dismal success of iPhone versus Nokia in India. There, Nokia is dominant in the smart-phone market, while the iPhone is reported to have sold less than 20,000 units. The item goes on to recite a number of reasons for the lack of iPhone's success, including price, download speeds and resistence to arrangements for multi-year service agreements. Whatever the reasons, it seems clear that in India, Nokia is at least for now the preeminent brand in the field. The item went on to speculate that unless Apple figures out a way to get local carriers to subsidize the phone, "Asia is just not going to work."

The stark difference in the strength of the Nokia and iPhone in brands in the U.S. and India, respectively, got me to ask a series of questions regarding brand strength and the fame of marks. Is Nokia a famous brand: if so, where? Does an 8% market share in the U.S. affect the strength of the Nokia mark and its status as a famous mark? To what extent are strength and fame national, regional, or international in scope?

The iPhone has been around for only a short period of time, but it has benefitted from unparalleled media coverage and a certain degree of commercial success. But, as the Business Week item suggests, commercial success may be geographically limited, both in the present and in the future. If so, does the media preoccupation with the iPhone brand trump commercial realities, whereby the strength and fame of the iPhone mark and brand transcend the commercial success of the device, at least in Asia?

Not so hip in Asia?

Maybe the iPhone is the product of a particular set of cultural values coming out a particular mileu: what resonates in Palo Alto may not resonate in Mumbai. If so, perhaps perceived brand strength and fame are as much a function of media coverage as actual commercial penetration. What happens to the strength of the the iPhone brand if it never takes off in Asia, even if it remains a dominant player in North America? I'll think about these questions the next time I make a call from own modest cell phone (being a Nokia and far from being a smart phone).

Friday, 1 February 2008

Nokia sued by German Patent Holding Company IPCom

Whilst much of Germany was following the debate surrounding the closure of Nokia's Bochum factory and whether subsidies paid by the local state government had been misused, IPCom a patent holding company in Munich was preparing another attack on the handset mega-company.

A company called IPCom purchased at the end of 2006 a number of patents from Robert Bosch GmbH relating to the GSM standard. Bosch had invested in the late 1980s and early 1990s extensively in the development of the mobile telephone standard. Bosch's efforts to commercialise their investment were unsuccessful and they withdrew from the telecommunications market after a few years.

According to an interview in Munich's serious daily newspaper, the Süddeutsche Zeitung Bosch had previously tried to negotiate a licensing deal with Nokia - without success. Under the GSM standard rules set by the European Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI), Bosch was obliged to offer so-called "essential patents" at Fair, Reasonable And Non-discriminatory ("FRAND") terms. Nokia apparently offered a licence fee of less than 1%.

Christoph Schoeller, the Managing Director of IPCom, states in the interview that IPCom considers the FRAND approach to be a licence fee of 5%. Based on the patented products, he states that he is looking for a return of €12 Million for the twenty year lifetime of the patents.

Not surprisingly there is no mention of the price paid to Bosch for the patents. Given that Bosch had barely exploited the patents (and that their telecommunications activities were for many years making huge losses), the sale of the patent rights was probably an unexpected income bonus. No doubt Nokia will not be the only company expected to pay IPCom a royalty for the use of the patents.

IPCom does not appear to have a website itself. It is part of the Schoeller Group based in Pullach, Germany. The German business daily Handelsblatt reports that 50% is held by a New York-based private equity fund Fortress Investments.

It is not clear which patents are currently involved. The German PTO's website records three utility models, 52 German national patents or applications and nine European patent or applications. Several of the applications are clearly divisional applications - presumably as IPCom tailors its claim language to other alleged infringers

Update 7 Feb 2008

Joff Wild of Intellectual Asset Management Magazine was kind enough to point out that the sum involved was EUR 12 Millarden (EUR 12 US Billion) and not the paltry sum of 12 Million.