David Rotman has authored an excellent article titled, “How to Measure the Returns on R&D Spending: Forget the Glorious Successes of Past Breakthroughs—the Real Justification for Research Investment is What We Get for Our Money. Here’s What Economists Say” in the MIT Technology Review. The article does a nice job explaining recent research concerning public funding of R&D and the return on investment to the public. The article notes that many questions are not answered. The article is available, here.
"Where money issues meet IP rights". This weblog looks at financial issues for intellectual property rights: securitisation and collateral, IP valuation for acquisition and balance sheet purposes, tax and R&D breaks, film and product finance, calculating quantum of damages--anything that happens where IP meets money.
Wednesday, 8 October 2025
A Good Idea to Cut Public Funding for R&D? Doesn't Look Like It.
Wednesday, 12 June 2024
Was the U.S. National Institutes of Health conflicted during the COVID-19 pandemic period?
Jon Cohen at Science has an interesting and informative article titled, “Accusers’ bad math: NIH researchers didn’t pocket $710 million inroyalties during pandemic,” published on June 5. The article addresses allegations that government scientists made $710 million in royalties on COVID-19-related technologies. Those allegations raise an interesting conflict of interest issue.
The article is definitely worth a read to provide some clarity
to the controversy. The article does note
that government researchers did receive around almost $37 million in royalties during
a three-year period that were mostly related to COVID-19-related technologies. The article also states that there is a significant
limit on the amount of royalties an NIH researcher can receive a year:
$150,000. I guess the math adds up to
around a maximum of $450,000 over a three period for an individual
researcher. How long will they receive
those royalties? Do we have an issue
with this or is this type of system which provides an incentive for government
researchers to try to invent useful and valuable inventions for the public a
very good thing? Does the yearly limit effectively
eliminate the conflict of interest issue?
Monday, 22 January 2024
U.S. GAO Report on Tracking U.S. Government Funding to Foreign Entities
The U.S. Government Accountability Office released a report on January 11, 2024, which studies federal funding provided to foreign entities for research and development. The Report states:
According to the National Science Foundation, federal
agencies obligated about $1.4 billion for R&D with foreign entities in
fiscal year 2020 (the most recent data available). However, some foreign
entities may try to exploit U.S. openness in sharing R&D for nefarious
purposes.
The Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act
includes a provision for GAO to review research funding provided to foreign
entities of concern. The act's definition of such entities includes foreign
terrorist organizations and foreign entities subject to the control, ownership,
and jurisdiction of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.
This report examines challenges in identifying R&D funds
awarded to foreign entities of concern and requirements for awarding and
monitoring such funding.
The Report also states, in part:
GAO found that determining whether federal research and
development (R&D) funds were provided to a foreign entity of concern is
challenging. Such entities include foreign terrorist organizations and
specially designated nationals, among others. Awarding agencies are generally
prohibited from doing business with foreign terrorist organizations and
specially designated nationals.
GAO found that government-wide databases which report on some
of these entities lack common identifying information such as a unique
identifier or personally identifiable information. For example, a physical
address, date of birth, or other identifying information for entities on the
foreign terrorist organization list is often unavailable as entities often try
to conceal their identity or location, according to the Treasury Department.
When personally identifiable information such as date of birth is available,
similar information is not available in the public federal funding data source,
USAspending.gov. Specifically, although awarding agencies collect other
identifying information, such as phone numbers of entities seeking an award,
not all such information is reported in USAspending.gov. Together, these
challenges limit the ability to match foreign entities on certain lists with
those receiving government-wide funding.
The full Report is available, here.
Tuesday, 23 May 2023
U.S. Government Accountability Office Report on Unwanted University Tech Transfer Risk
The U.S. Government Accountability Office has released a report titled, “CHINA Efforts Underway to Address Technology Transfer Risk at U.S. Universities, but ICE Could Improve Related Data,” concerning recommendations to better track visiting scholars, students and researchers from outside the United States. The published report is incomplete because some of it has been deemed too sensitive to disclose. Notably, the published report points to a failure of law enforcement agencies, including Immigration, Customs and Enforcement (ICE), to track certain relevant data concerning the risk that unlawful technology transfer may occur involving federally funded university research. The report is available, here, and states, in part:
According to federal internal control standards, management
should use quality information that is, among other things, complete and
accurate to achieve the entity’s objectives, and process relevant data into
quality information within the entity’s information system. The U.S. government
has identified research in sensitive fields, facilities and locations of
expected work, and employment and employment history as potential risk factors
for the transfer of technology. Improving the completeness of employer
information in SEVIS could enhance ICE’s management of the OPT program and
provide the U.S. government with more information on who is employing foreign
students and, therefore, whether certain individuals may have access to
technology.
Since 2016, oversight bodies at the five U.S. grant-making
agencies in our review—NIH, NSF, NASA, DOD, and DOE—have investigated an
increased number of researchers for potential violations related to the
security of federally funded research at U.S. universities, according to agency
data. These include grant fraud and compliance violations related to failures
to disclose potential sources of foreign influence on researchers, such as
other support for individual research endeavors, significant financial
interests, or other conflicts of interest. These investigations have often
involved undisclosed affiliations with the PRC, such as receiving PRC research
funding. However, agency officials emphasized that decisions made to initiate
an investigation or during the course of an investigation are not based on
individual characteristics such as nationality or visa status, which is
information that none of the five agencies in our review consistently collect.
Agency data indicate that investigations have resulted in agency and university
actions to address research security risks related to foreign influence.
However, little information is available about civil and criminal cases related
to potential transfer of university research because DOJ does not
systematically track all cases specific to U.S. universities or federal grant
funding. Further, officials from grant-making and law enforcement agencies we
spoke with noted that it is challenging to assess the more general extent and
negative impact of technology transfers to foreign countries. Amid agency
efforts to address this type of national security threat, university faculty,
officials from university and Asian and Asian-American associations, and others
have highlighted the importance of balancing protection of federally funded
research against potential adverse effects of these efforts. . . .
As a result of investigations initiated from 2016 through
2021, grantmaking agencies—particularly NIH, which accounted for about 73
percent of the individuals under investigation in our review—addressed a number
of violations that could threaten the integrity of university research. As of
October 2021, 94 percent of NIH investigations into researchers of concern had
uncovered at least one compliance violation that NIH deemed serious, such as a
failure to disclose foreign conflicts of interest (e.g., foreign affiliations,
grant funding, or talent recruitment program participation), according to NIH
data. As a result, NIH reported that at least 76 percent of individuals under
investigation were no longer associated with grant-funded research or other
grant-related responsibilities, primarily through resignation or actions taken
by grant recipient institutions, including termination or exclusion from
grant-funded research. In addition, NIH officials noted that because many of
their investigations remained ongoing, they expected the number of actions
taken in response to violations to rise. . . .
In this context, U.S. agencies and others have identified
factors that indicate the types of foreign students or scholars who may pose a
greater risk of transferring technology from U.S. universities. ICE already
maintains information in its SEVIS database related to several of these
factors, including country of citizenship and level of education. However, ICE
has not completed a required assessment to understand whether it needs to
update SEVIS to better capture information related to students and scholars who
may pose a greater risk for technology transfer. Furthermore, data related to
other risk factors already required in SEVIS, such as employer information, are
incomplete. More complete data, and a better understanding of the information
needed to identify students who present the highest risk for the potential
transfer of university research, could strengthen U.S. government efforts to
identify and assess risks to U.S. research and development.
Monday, 26 April 2021
Balancing Security Concerning University Research and Anti-Asian Sentiment in the United States: U.S. Senate Hearings
On April 22, 2021, the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions held hearings on “Protecting U.S. Biomedical Research: Efforts to Prevent Undue Foreign Influence.” The Committee heard testimony from representatives from various governmental entities, including the National Institutes of Health [NIH] and the Government Accounting Office. In written testimony, Dr. Michael Lauer, Deputy Director for Extramural Research at the NIH, explored the tension between balancing security and very serious anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. The context involves the attempts by governments to take advantage of the open collaboration amongst international researchers in attempting to address biomedical crises. Notably, Dr. Lauer pointed to three issues confronted by the NIH concerning security and biomedical research:
1) failure by some researchers at NIH‐funded institutions to
disclose substantial contributions of resources from other organizations,
including foreign governments and businesses, which threatens to distort
decisions about the appropriate use of NIH funds and accurate evaluation of
commitment of effort to US‐supported research; 2) diversion of proprietary
information included in grant applications or produced by NIH‐ supported
biomedical research to other entities, including other countries; and 3)
failure by some peer reviewers to keep information in grant applications
confidential; including, in some instances, disclosure to foreign entities or
other attempts to influence funding decisions.
Dr. Lauer raises attempts by the NIH to address these
issues, including cybersecurity measures.
Importantly, he states that the NIH has contacted over 90 awardee
institutions and over 900 scientists raising potential serious concerns. Dr. Lauer also raised potential actions that
can be taken by the NIH:
Terminations or suspensions of scientists who have engaged in
egregious violations of NIH grant terms and conditions and institutional
policies. ·
Interventions to address previously un‐reported affiliations with foreign
institutions. ·
Relinquishment or refund of NIH funds.·
Prohibition of certain individuals from serving as investigators on NIH grants.
· Outreach to FBI for
assistance. ·
Discovery (through acquisition of certain foreign grants and contracts) of
overlapping or duplicative work, or conflicts in stating committed effort to
research projects. This discovery has led to NIH suspensions of active grants
as appropriate. ·
Efforts to raise awareness among institutional faculty about government and
institutional policies dealing with foreign affiliations and relationships
(see, for example, the Penn State web site).
In addressing concerns with
anti-Asian violence in the United States, Dr. Lauer states, in part:
We must ensure that our responses to this issue do not create
a hostile environment for colleagues who are deeply dedicated to advancing
human health through scientific inquiry. We cannot afford to reject brilliant
minds working honestly and collaboratively to provide hope and healing to
millions around the world.
Dr. Lauer’s testimony can be found, here. The difficulty, of course, is maintaining security
while at the same time fostering an open and collaborative environment wherein research
can continue to flourish. It will be
interesting to see how this develops. The
COVID-19 global pandemic has decreased human movement throughout the world likely increasing
the transfer of information through digital networks and resulting in even
greater importance of the security of networks.
At the same time, as COVID-19 eases eventually (and hopefully), how will
the United States ensure that foreign researchers and entrepreneurs,
particularly from China, will feel welcome attending university and working in the
United States. Notably, the U.S. Senate
recently passed legislation, almost unanimously (94-1 – only Senator Josh Hawley
voting against it), addressing anti-Asian hate crimes.
Friday, 18 October 2019
Improving the Allocation of Resources: Artificial Intelligence to Predict Future Clinical Success of Basic Research
In a new paper published on October 10, 2019 titled, “Predicting Translational Progress in Biomedical Research,” authors B. Ian Hutchins, Matthew T. Davis, Rebecca A. Meseroll, and George M. Santangelo describe a new way to use artificial intelligence to measure and predict which basic research type findings are likely to be translated into clinical advances. The abstract states:
The full paper is available, here. This appears to have the promise of mitigating some significant investment risk.