US DOJ Sues Google for Anticompetitive Conduct in Advertising Practices

The U.S. Department of Justice has brought a competition suit against Google concerning its internet advertising practices.  The DOJ press release states:

Today, the Justice Department, along with the Attorneys General of California, Colorado, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia, filed a civil antitrust suit against Google for monopolizing multiple digital advertising technology products in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

Filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the complaint alleges that Google monopolizes key digital advertising technologies, collectively referred to as the “ad tech stack,” that website publishers depend on to sell ads and that advertisers rely on to buy ads and reach potential customers. Website publishers use ad tech tools to generate advertising revenue that supports the creation and maintenance of a vibrant open web, providing the public with unprecedented access to ideas, artistic expression, information, goods, and services. Through this monopolization lawsuit, the Justice Department and state Attorneys General seek to restore competition in these important markets and obtain equitable and monetary relief on behalf of the American public.

As alleged in the complaint, over the past 15 years, Google has engaged in a course of anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct that consisted of neutralizing or eliminating ad tech competitors through acquisitions; wielding its dominance across digital advertising markets to force more publishers and advertisers to use its products; and thwarting the ability to use competing products. In doing so, Google cemented its dominance in tools relied on by website publishers and online advertisers, as well as the digital advertising exchange that runs ad auctions.

“Today’s complaint alleges that Google has used anticompetitive, exclusionary, and unlawful conduct to eliminate or severely diminish any threat to its dominance over digital advertising technologies,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “No matter the industry and no matter the company, the Justice Department will vigorously enforce our antitrust laws to protect consumers, safeguard competition, and ensure economic fairness and opportunity for all.”

“The complaint filed today alleges a pervasive and systemic pattern of misconduct through which Google sought to consolidate market power and stave off free-market competition,” said Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco. “In pursuit of outsized profits, Google has caused great harm to online publishers and advertisers and American consumers. This lawsuit marks an important milestone in the Department’s efforts to hold big technology companies accountable for violations of the antitrust laws.”

“The Department’s landmark action against Google underscores our commitment to fighting the abuse of market power,” said Associate Attorney General Vanita Gupta. “We allege that Google has captured publishers’ revenue for its own profits and punished publishers who sought out alternatives. Those actions have weakened the free and open internet and increased advertising costs for businesses and for the United States government, including for our military.”

“Today’s lawsuit seeks to hold Google to account for its longstanding monopolies in digital advertising technologies that content creators use to sell ads and advertisers use to buy ads on the open internet,” said Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “Our complaint sets forth detailed allegations explaining how Google engaged in 15 years of sustained conduct that had — and continues to have — the effect of driving out rivals, diminishing competition, inflating advertising costs, reducing revenues for news publishers and content creators, snuffing out innovation, and harming the exchange of information and ideas in the public sphere.”

Google now controls the digital tool that nearly every major website publisher uses to sell ads on their websites (publisher ad server); it controls the dominant advertiser tool that helps millions of large and small advertisers buy ad inventory (advertiser ad network); and it controls the largest advertising exchange (ad exchange), a technology that runs real-time auctions to match buyers and sellers of online advertising.

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Google’s anticompetitive conduct has included:

• Acquiring Competitors: Engaging in a pattern of acquisitions to obtain control over key digital advertising tools used by website publishers to sell advertising space;
• Forcing Adoption of Google’s Tools: Locking in website publishers to its newly-acquired tools by restricting its unique, must-have advertiser demand to its ad exchange, and in turn, conditioning effective real-time access to its ad exchange on the use of its publisher ad server;
• Distorting Auction Competition: Limiting real-time bidding on publisher inventory to its ad exchange, and impeding rival ad exchanges’ ability to compete on the same terms as Google’s ad exchange; and
• Auction Manipulation: Manipulating auction mechanics across several of its products to insulate Google from competition, deprive rivals of scale, and halt the rise of rival technologies.

As a result of its illegal monopoly, and by its own estimates, Google pockets on average more than 30% of the advertising dollars that flow through its digital advertising technology products; for some transactions and for certain publishers and advertisers, it takes far more. Google’s anticompetitive conduct has suppressed alternative technologies, hindering their adoption by publishers, advertisers, and rivals.

The Sherman Act embodies America’s enduring commitment to the competitive process and economic liberty. For over a century, the Department has enforced the antitrust laws against unlawful monopolists to unfetter markets and restore competition. To redress Google’s anticompetitive conduct, the Department seeks both equitable relief on behalf of the American public as well as treble damages for losses sustained by federal government agencies that overpaid for web display advertising. This enforcement action marks the first monopolization case in approximately half a century in which the Department has sought damages for a civil antitrust violation.

In 2020, the Justice Department filed a civil antitrust suit against Google for monopolizing search and search advertising, which are different markets from the digital advertising technology markets at issue in the lawsuit filed today. The Google search litigation is scheduled for trial in September 2023.

Google is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with a headquarters in Mountain View, California. Google’s global network business generated approximately $31.7 billion in revenues in 2021. Google is owned by Alphabet Inc., a publicly traded company incorporated and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware and headquartered in Mountain View, California.

US FTC to Ban Noncompete Agreements?

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has proposed a rule which would essentially bar noncompete agreements.  The FTC’s press release states:

The Federal Trade Commission proposed a new rule that would ban employers from imposing noncompetes on their workers, a widespread and often exploitative practice that suppresses wages, hampers innovation, and blocks entrepreneurs from starting new businesses. By stopping this practice, the agency estimates that the new proposed rule could increase wages by nearly $300 billion per year and expand career opportunities for about 30 million Americans.

The FTC is seeking public comment on the proposed rule, which is based on a preliminary finding that noncompetes constitute an unfair method of competition and therefore violate Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

“The freedom to change jobs is core to economic liberty and to a competitive, thriving economy,” said Chair Lina M. Khan. “Noncompetes block workers from freely switching jobs, depriving them of higher wages and better working conditions, and depriving businesses of a talent pool that they need to build and expand. By ending this practice, the FTC’s proposed rule would promote greater dynamism, innovation, and healthy competition.”

Companies use noncompetes for workers across industries and job levels, from hairstylists and warehouse workers to doctors and business executives. In many cases, employers use their outsized bargaining power to coerce workers into signing these contracts. Noncompetes harm competition in U.S. labor markets by blocking workers from pursuing better opportunities and by preventing employers from hiring the best available talent.

“Research shows that employers’ use of noncompetes to restrict workers’ mobility significantly suppresses workers’ wages—even for those not subject to noncompetes, or subject to noncompetes that are unenforceable under state law," said Elizabeth Wilkins, Director of the Office of Policy Planning. “The proposed rule would ensure that employers can’t exploit their outsized bargaining power to limit workers’ opportunities and stifle competition.”

The evidence shows that noncompete clauses also hinder innovation and business dynamism in multiple ways—from preventing would-be entrepreneurs from forming competing businesses, to inhibiting workers from bringing innovative ideas to new companies. This ultimately harms consumers; in markets with fewer new entrants and greater concentration, consumers can face higher prices—as seen in the health care sector.

To address these problems, the FTC’s proposed rule would generally prohibit employers from using noncompete clauses. Specifically, the FTC’s new rule would make it illegal for an employer to:

• enter into or attempt to enter into a noncompete with a worker;
• maintain a noncompete with a worker; or
• represent to a worker, under certain circumstances, that the worker is subject to a noncompete.

The proposed rule would apply to independent contractors and anyone who works for an employer, whether paid or unpaid. It would also require employers to rescind existing noncompetes and actively inform workers that they are no longer in effect.

The proposed rule would generally not apply to other types of employment restrictions, like non-disclosure agreements. However, other types of employment restrictions could be subject to the rule if they are so broad in scope that they function as noncompetes.

This NPRM aligns with the FTC’s recent statement to reinvigorate Section 5 of the FTC Act, which bans unfair methods of competition. The FTC recently used its Section 5 authority to ban companies from imposing onerous noncompetes on their workers. In one complaint, the FTC took action against a Michigan-based security guard company and its key executives for using coercive noncompetes on low-wage employees. The Commission also ordered two of the largest U.S. glass container manufacturers to stop imposing noncompetes on their workers because they obstruct competition and impede new companies from hiring the talent needed to enter the market. This NPRM and recent enforcement actions make progress on the agency’s broader initiative to use all of its tools and authorities to promote fair competition in labor markets.

The Commission voted 3-1 to publish the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which is the first step in the FTC’s rulemaking process. Chair Khan, Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Commissioner Alvaro Bedoya issued a statement. Commissioner Slaughter, joined by Commissioner Bedoya, issued an additional statement. Commissioner Christine S. Wilson voted no and also issued a statement.

The NPRM invites the public to submit comments on the proposed rule. The FTC will review the comments and may make changes, in a final rule, based on the comments and on the FTC’s further analysis of this issue. Comments will be due 60 days after the Federal Register publishes the proposed rule. The public comment period will be open soon.

The proposed rule states [I’ve modified this post to include the entire rule.]:

910.1 Definitions

(a) Business entity means a partnership, corporation, association, limited liability company, or other legal entity, or a division or subsidiary thereof.

(b) Non-compete clause.

(1) Non-compete clause means a contractual term between an employer and a worker that prevents the worker from seeking or accepting employment with a person, or operating a business, after the conclusion of the worker’s employment with the employer.

(2) Functional test for whether a contractual term is a non-compete clause. The term non-compete clause includes a contractual term that is a de facto non-compete clause because it has the effect of prohibiting the worker from seeking or accepting employment with a person or operating a business after the conclusion of the worker’s employment with the employer. For example, the following types of contractual terms, among others, may be de facto non-compete clauses:

i. A non-disclosure agreement between an employer and a worker that is written so broadly that it effectively precludes the worker from working in the same field after the conclusion of the worker’s employment with the employer.

ii. A contractual term between an employer and a worker that requires the worker to pay the employer or a third-party entity for training costs if the worker’s employment terminates within a specified time period, where the required payment is not reasonably related to the costs the employer incurred for training the worker.

(c) Employer means a person, as defined in 15 U.S.C. 57b-1(a)(6), that hires or contracts with a worker to work for the person.

(d) Employment means work for an employer, as the term employer is defined in paragraph (c) of this section.

(e) Substantial owner, substantial member, and substantial partner mean an owner, member, or partner holding at least a 25 percent ownership interest in a business entity.

(f) Worker means a natural person who works, whether paid or unpaid, for an employer. The term includes, without limitation, an employee, individual classified as an independent contractor, extern, intern, volunteer, apprentice, or sole proprietor who provides a service to a client or customer. The term worker does not include a franchisee in the context of a franchisee-franchisor relationship; however, the term worker includes a natural person who works for the franchisee or franchisor. Non-compete clauses between franchisors and franchisees would remain subject to Federal antitrust law as well as all other applicable law.

910.2 Unfair Methods of Competition

(a) Unfair methods of competition. It is an unfair method of competition for an employer to enter into or attempt to enter into a non-compete clause with a worker; maintain with a worker a non-compete clause; or represent to a worker that the worker is subject to a non-compete clause where the employer has no good faith basis to believe that the worker is subject to an enforceable non-compete clause.

(b) Existing non-compete clauses.

(1) Rescission requirement. To comply with paragraph (a) of this section, which states that it is an unfair method of competition for an employer to maintain with a worker a non-compete clause, an employer that entered into a non-compete clause with a worker prior to the compliance date must rescind the non-compete clause no later than the compliance date.

(2) Notice requirement.

(A) An employer that rescinds a non-compete clause pursuant to paragraph (b)(1) of this section must provide notice to the worker that the worker’s non-compete clause is no longer in effect and may not be enforced against the worker. The employer must provide the notice to the worker in an individualized communication. The employer must provide the notice on paper or in a digital format such as, for example, an email or text message. The employer must provide the notice to the worker within 45 days of rescinding the non-compete clause.

(B) The employer must provide the notice to a worker who currently works for the employer. The employer must also provide the notice to a worker who formerly worked for the employer, provided that the employer has the worker’s contact information readily available.

(C) The following model language constitutes notice to the worker that the worker’s non-compete clause is no longer in effect and may not be enforced against the worker, for purposes of paragraph (b)(2)(A) of this section. An employer may also use different language, provided that the notice communicates to the worker that the worker’s non-compete clause is no longer in effect and may not be enforced against the worker.

A new rule enforced by the Federal Trade Commission makes it unlawful for us to maintain a non-compete clause in your employment contract. As of [DATE 180 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION OF THE FINAL RULE], the non-compete clause in your contract is no longer in effect. This means that once you stop working for [EMPLOYER NAME]:

• You may seek or accept a job with any company or any person—even if they compete with [EMPLOYER NAME].
• You may run your own business—even if it competes with [EMPLOYER NAME].
• You may compete with [EMPLOYER NAME] at any time following your employment with [EMPLOYER NAME].

The FTC’s new rule does not affect any other terms of your employment contract. For more information about the rule, visit https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/federal-register-notices/non-compete-clause-rulemaking.

(3) Safe harbor. An employer complies with the rescission requirement in paragraph (b)(1) of this section where it provides notice to a worker pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section.

910.3 Exception

The requirements of this Part 910 shall not apply to a non-compete clause that is entered into by a person who is selling a business entity or otherwise disposing of all of the person’s ownership interest in the business entity, or by a person who is selling all or substantially all of a business entity’s operating assets, when the person restricted by the non-compete clause is a substantial owner of, or substantial member or substantial partner in, the business entity at the time the person enters into the non-compete clause. Non-compete clauses covered by this exception would remain subject to Federal antitrust law as well as all other applicable law.

910.4 Relation to State Laws

This Part 910 shall supersede any State statute, regulation, order, or interpretation to the extent that such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation is inconsistent with this Part 910. A State statute, regulation, order, or interpretation is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Part 910 if the protection such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation affords any worker is greater than the protection provided under this Part 910.

The proposed rule itself is interesting because of its breadth.  It does not make a distinction based on the reasonableness of the restriction, such as taking into account time, geographic scope or level of employment of the worker, such as an executive or researcher.  It does not make a distinction between types of businesses, such as research intensive industries.  It also seems to leave a number of questions open concerning the protection of trade secrets and other valuable know-how.  In some ways the rule is a double-edged sword—a company may lose employees, but may also gain them.  It does seem that it may favor companies with the resources to lure employees of competitors away.  The question of competition between countries and the protection of trade secrets is fascinating as well.  Interestingly, the noncompete rule seems to include agreements for additional consideration such as payment for the agreement not to compete. 

Partnerships for Innovation: A Report on a Workshop

The National Academies has released a brief review of recent workshop panel discussions concerning partnerships titled, “Enhancing U.S. Science and Innovation with Novel Cross Sector Partnerships: Proceedings of a Workshop in Brief.”  The document describes some of the discussion from panelists concerning some of the new initiatives in the United States, including the National Science Foundation’s Directorate for Technology, Innovation and Partnerships and the National Science Foundation Regional Innovation Engines.  One panelist noted that it may be time to revisit the Bayh-Dole Act’s provisions.  The Accelerating Therapeutics for Opportunities in Medicine initiative was also described and recommendations were made for further consideration and improvement.  One panelist also described efforts to develop a pipeline of trained workers in Ohio for STEAMM workers.  STEAMM stands for Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts, Mathematics and Medicine.  The report is available, here. 

Gaming the System: A Scatter-Gun Approach to 5G Declarations

While it is already widely believed that “over-declaration” of standard essentiality is due to large and excessive numbers of patents being filed in patent offices and declared to Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs), my new quantitative research suggests that over-declaration is also being pursued with claims that individual patents read on multiple Technical Specifications.

Some declare patents essential to multiple Technical Specifications

Participants in technology standard standard-setting, such as in 3^rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Working Groups, are obliged to declare their patents that they believe might be or might become essential to technology standards such as 5G. For example, the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) policy of 3GPP partner ETSI requires declarations to ensure that standards are not blocked by IPR being unavailable. Declaration practices differ among participating companies, but with all of them reasonably declaring some patents that would never actually be found standard essential if tried in litigation by courts of law.

More and more patents

However, with the increasing use of patent counts as a measure of companies’ respective patent strengths, for example in determining royalties, it is widely believed that some technology developers puff up their positions with numerous declarations in excess of what is reasonably required to protect their IPR, shield them from assertions of anticompetitive behaviour such as patent ambush and provide the commitments required by IPR policies. Over-declaration is thus commonly understood to be the filing and declaring of large and increasing numbers of low quality patents that would never be found essential in litigation. Accordingly, there has been an exponential increase in patent declarations. Rapidly approaching 80,000 patent families have been declared to ETSI including various communications standards.

With over-declaration, raw patent counts and checked-essential patent counts exaggerate patent strength. There is no essentiality checking in standard setting, such as by 3GPP or ETSI. While essentiality checking is undertaken by some specialist firms, my previous research shows that this does a poor job in correcting the inflated relative positions of companies that over-declare. Systemic bias prevails because essentiality checking is far from perfectly accurate. False positive determinations (i.e. where a patent is found essential when it is not truly essential) tend to exceed false negative determinations. And, the lower the true essentiality rate (i.e. the percentage of declared patents that are truly essential), the more bias there will be.

Throw everything at the wall and see what sticks

In addition to inflating patent counts by flooding IPR databases with increasing numbers of declared patents, my new research paper—based on patent declaration and standards data collected and processed by Dolcera—indicates that some companies are also declaring individual patents to multiple different Technical Specifications. While most major declarers declare their patents to an average of no more than 2.5 Technical Specifications, some companies declare essentiality to more than twice as many, and with individual patents declared to as many as 12 or even 18 different Technical Specifications. However, essentiality is based on whether a patent reads on any Technical Specification, not on how many of the latter are referenced.

As human and automated checks have to assess each declared patent’s essentiality against every Technical Specification referenced, the more of those that are referenced the higher the probability of false positive determinations while the probability of false negative determinations cannot increase even to partially offset the above. Assessing any additional Technical Specification can, therefore, only increase the possibility that a patent is found essential. This means that the systemic bias inflating essentiality rates found in checking will be higher than if declarations for each patent were more diligently focused on only one or two Technical Specifications. Costs also increase with the expanded workload in checking more Technical Specifications.

My full new research paper analysing patent essentiality declarations to multiple Technical Specifications can be downloaded here and from SSRN.

FTC Hits Vonage with $100 million Hammer for "Dark Patterns"

On November 3, 2022, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission fined Vonage $100 million for “dark patterns” to be paid to consumers. The tricky issue has been defining what exactly is a "dark pattern."  The FTC Press Release describes the "dark patterns" as:

• Eliminating cancellation options: Despite allowing its customers to sign up for services online, over the phone, and through other venues, the complaint alleges that starting in 2017, Vonage made the decision to force customers to cancel only by speaking to a live “retention agent” on the phone. The complaint notes that this practice runs counter to Vonage’s own advice to its clients not to “frustrate customers by requiring them to contact you for support that should be available on a self-service basis” and that “[i]t should be just as easy to return your product as it is to buy it.”

• Making cancellation process difficult: In addition to forcing customers into one cancellation method, it made that method difficult. The company created significant cancellation hurdles, including by making it difficult to find the phone number on the company website, not consistently transferring customers to that number from the normal customer service number, offering reduced hours the line was available and failing to provide promised callbacks. The complaint cites one internal Vonage email saying customers were “sent in a circle when they want to downgrade or remove the service.”

• Surprising customers with expensive junk fees when they tried to cancel: In many cases, customers who are able to access the cancellation line are told they will have to pay an unexpected early termination fee that was not clearly disclosed when they signed up for Vonage service. In some cases, these fees were in the hundreds of dollars.

• Continuing to charge customers even after they canceled: Customers who managed to speak to an agent and request cancellation often found that their accounts continued to be charged. Even when they contacted Vonage to complain, they received only partial refunds of the money they were charged without authorization.

A $2 Billion Trade Secret Misappropriation Verdict

U.S. courts can be fun.  Appian received over a $2 billion trade secret judgement in Virginia state court.  In addition, Appian secured over $23 million in attorney fees.  The case involved trade secret misappropriation and the Virginia Computer Crimes Act.  Appian was represented by Patterson Belknap.  The attorneys representing Appian included:  Adeel A. Mangi, Muhammad U. Faridi and Jeffrey Ginsberg.  The Appian Press Release is here and the Patterson Belknap Press Release is here. Apparently, a company should not call someone possibly engaged in corporate espionage for them a "spy" or something like that.  That looks bad later.   

Essentiality checks might foster SEP licensing, but they won’t stop over-declarations from inflating patent counts and making them unreliable measures

 Essentiality checks could help implementers determine with whom they need patent licenses.  However, essentiality checking does a poor job in adjusting for over-declaration in patent counts and will encourage even more spurious declarations.

We await a new policy framework from the European Commission (EC) with its Impact Statement regarding the Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) licensing of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). The EC is considering instigating checks on patents disclosed—to Standard Setting Organization (SSO) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) databases as being possibly standard essential— to establish whether they are actually essential to the implementation of standards such as 5G. Objectives for essentiality checking are to:

1.      enable prospective licensees to determine with whom they need to be licensed

2.      correct for over-declaration and only count patents deemed essential; and

3.      use such figures in FRAND royalty determinations.

If clutches of selected patents are independently and reliably checked to establish that prospective licensors each have at least one patent that would likely be found essential by a court, these results might be used by several or many prospective licensees to determine with whom they need to be licensed.[1] But such checks would be of limited and questionable additional use to existent court determinations. Checks have already been made on some patents for all major licensors and many others in numerous SEP litigation cases over many years. Greater legal certainty is provided in court decisions where many patents have been found standard essential, infringed and not invalid.

My full paper on this topic, which can be downloaded here, focuses on the wider use of essentiality checks and sampling in patent counting. With too many patents to check them all properly, it is hoped that thorough checking of random samples of declared patents will—by extrapolation—also enable accurate SEP counts to be derived. However, essentiality checks do not fix and can only moderate exaggerations in patent counts due to over-declaration. For example, false positive essentiality determinations will exceed correct positive essentiality determinations where true essentiality rates are less than 10% unless at least 90% of determinations are correct.[2] Inadequate checking could imbue many with a false sense of security about precision while encouraging even more over-declaration by others which would further misleadingly inflate their measured patent counts and essentiality rates.

My empirical analysis also shows that declared essential patents are too numerous, and bias in checking and random errors in sampling are too great to provide even the modest precision expected and that should be required for patent counts to determine FRAND royalties without very thorough and highly accurate checks on thousands of patents per standard.

Even ignoring residual bias after improved but imperfect checking, sample sizes of thousands of patents would be required to provide even only modest levels of precision in essential patent counts (e.g. a ±15% margin of error on the estimated patent count at the 95% confidence level) on patent portfolios and entire landscapes where essentiality rates are low (e.g. 10%) due to over-declarations.

The dangers in not recognizing the sources and extent of bias and other errors and in not designing studies with sufficient scale and precision (e.g. for a court setting a royalty rate) is that far from increasing transparency, information provided will be imprecise, distorted and unreliable. Ignoring analytical errors, and mistakenly implying or pretending otherwise is even worse.

This new paper, also available on SSRN, is a follow-on to my previous research on essentiality checking and patent counting in 2011, 2017 and 2021.

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[1] This ignores validity and actual infringement in any specific product, which also determine whether licensing is required under patent law and FRAND conditions. These are also important issues.

[2] The essentiality rate is the number of essential patents divided by the number of declared essential patents. An estimated or found essentiality rate will differ from the true essentiality rate due to inaccuracies.

Can Patents Resolve the Quest for Capital?

 

Can Patents Resolve the Quest for Capital?

Most people recognise the utility of patents to be the exclusivity, albeit temporary exclusivity, they impart on their owners to profit from an invention. Yet patents also hold real value for companies that may not even sell a product yet: they can help in the quest for capital.

At present there is often a difference in approaches to patents depending on the industry. For the chemical or biotechnology industries, patents are vital intangible assets. In others though, for example software start-ups, a patent strategy might not be so high on the list of priorities. Yet patents ought to be important to all innovative enterprises looking to bring something new to the market.

Once start-ups run out of friends and family to seek funds from, they often turn to early-stage venture capital firms as a source of funds. For example, OxFirst has helped a young innovative company in the SaaS – Software as a Service – space access further capital. The patent valuation we undertook helped the firm access over 25 Million UK Pounds in funding. The patent valuation served as a substantial instrument to communicate the value proposition of the firm to investors.  

Investors looking to assess the risk/return profile of early-stage technology often content themselves with a simple Freedom to Operate search. However, a patent valuation goes way beyond such simple question. It allows an assessment of potential revenues associated with the intellectual property while at the same time supporting senior management decisions.

As this simple example illustrates, not only venture capital firms, but also investment banks, high net worth individuals and family offices may be prepared to finance otherwise risky technology ventures, provided the patent valuation allows them to get a better understanding as to what they may be getting themselves involved in.

Patents go a long way to mitigating the risk assumed by venture capital firms, and therefore making the start-up a more appetising investment opportunity by ensuring the future product they are investing in cannot be copied by another and a return can be made on that investment. The patent valuation can again help to size markets related to patents. There are several ways a patent valuation can be undertaken. Often one turns to the market, income or cost approach. In the case of start-ups, the early-stage nature of the firm often requires further assumptions, quite simply because markets are yet to be grasped. In an IP valuation this is often reflected in the risk rate.

The same basic logic also applies to later stage venture capital funding. A business need not have a product on the market to make themselves appealing to investors, a patent can be enough.

Should a business choose to go public through an IPO later in its life, knowledge that a company’s intellectual property is adequately managed and used to maximize revenues, will be an important element in enticing investors and driving up the potential funds from entrance to the stock market. Further use cases of a patent valuation can be the support of licensing revenues, technology transfer, transfer pricing and fostering a firm’s reputation.

Some estimations put 80-90% of a firm’s value in its intangible assets, of which patents are a component. That’s potentially a lot of money in the event of a sale. In 2021 Elon Musk’s Tesla bought Springpower International, a small Canadian start-up working on battery manufacturing technologies. At the time, Springpower had patents pending on core technologies – those patents changed ownership to Tesla following the purchase. Whilst by no means the only motivator behind the purchase, Tesla acquired Springboard’s employees and their expertise too, it is obvious the intellectual property was an important driver behind Tesla’s decision.  

Patents, then, are crucial throughout the full business lifecycle: from sourcing initial intuitional funding through to selling the company. A patent valuation can help realise these opportunities and render otherwise intangible assets into tangible business opportunities. Business owners should take advantage of the opportunities it presents. 

https://oxfirst.com/insights-&-news/can-patents-resolve-the-quest-for-capital/

Damage Calculations in Patent Infringement Cases under the Unified Patent Court

 

Considering Patent Infringement Damage Calculations under the Unified Patent Court

A primary benefit for future users of the UPC is that legal proceedings in relation to a Unitary patent or a non-opt-out European patent will not need to be divided throughout Europe and can instead be heard by a single court, with judgement applied to the entire territory – potentially 24 countries. This promises to reduce costs and time associated with the litigative process and may minimize the risk of ‘Forum Shopping’ within the E.U., where parties seek to take advantage of differences in the procedures and judgements of national courts. Given the importance of the UPC, we wish to outline the important factors that must be considered by parties when it comes to damage calculations.

Determination of damages: routes

On the 8^th July 2022 the UPC’s Administrative Committee adopted the final version of the Rules of Procedure (RoP, accessible here). Those rules offer two routes for determining damages and compensation in the event patent infringement is found to have occurred. Rule 118.1 outlines that “[t]he amount of the damages or the compensation may be stated in the order or determined in separate proceedings”. A successful party can – within one year of the final decision – apply for separate proceedings for the determination of damages (Rule 126). The court may also award interim damages (Rule 119), to “cover the expected costs of the procedure for the award of damages … on the part of the successful party”.

Determination of damages: calculation factors

When seeking to understand what factors contribute to damage calculation we look to the UPC Agreement (UPCA, available here), which defines the legal basis of court activity. That makes two commitments in relation to the award of damages: (1) the court will instruct an infringer to pay the injured party damages “appropriate to the harm actually suffered … as a result of the infringement” and (2) the court will – as far as is possible – place the injured party in a position as if no infringement had taken place. Additionally, the infringer shall not benefit from the infringement and damages shall somewhat not be punitive.

Having made these commitments the Agreement then seeks to define what the court should look to when calculating damages. The court is to take account of “all appropriate aspects” such as negative economic consequences, which may include lost profits, any unfair profits made by the infringer, and non-economic factors where necessary (for example, damage to a brand’s reputation). The court can also set damages on the basis of royalties that would have been due if the infringer had sought a licence. In a case where the infringer did so not knowingly, the court can order compensation.

Determination of damages: IP valuation expertise

Whilst the UPCA suggests areas of consideration for damage calculation, there remains substantial room for the presence of expert analysis in reaching that calculation. OxFirst Director Dr Roya Ghafele has authored many scholarly articles on patent valuation methods for assessing damages in patent infringement cases before the UPC. This work illustrates three important means of valuation: the income, cost and market approaches. These approaches appear in publicly sanctioned IP guidelines and assist in portraying value in a dynamic manner. All three play a role in delivering effective valuation and OxFirst operates a proprietary valuation method which accounts for their advantages. Method selection represents a crucial consideration when embarking upon a valuation and pays particular attention to the utility of the income method as the only method that can incorporate risk as a consideration. Using the income method, patent value is presumed to be based on future returns over the course of the time it retains protection. Whilst the commonly applied method by courts and regulators, the income method requires particular attention to be paid to contextual information and so requires particular expertise for its effective application.

The UPC is well equipped to exercise judgement on patents at question themselves – the technical judges bring the specialist knowledge required for this. Yet when calculating appropriate damages, the UPC will – like other courts – require assistance from patent valuation experts. This will be particularly true when the UPC has to, inevitably, consider FRAND cases. In these cases, debate has already been established around defining a royalty base, either the smallest saleable practicing unit (SSPU) or the entire market value (EMV). The choice of royalty base is decisive in calculations of appropriate FRAND rates as, in most cases, damages are calculated by factoring a royalty base with a royalty rate to establish a valuation. Patent valuation expertise will therefore be especially valuable in such circumstances. https://oxfirst.com/insights-&-news/considering-patent-infringement-damage-calculations-under-the-unified-patent-court/