US Department of Justice Remarks Regarding IP and Global Competition

On July 8, 2026, the US Department of Justice issued a press release containing the remarks of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Dina Kallay at the Hudson Institute Forum for Intellectual Property.  The remarks describe the US Department of Justice’s position on numerous cases in which the Department has filed a statement of interest.  Notably, the remarks also address IP and global competition:

Intellectual Property Enforcement Strengthens Global Competition

Now that we have discussed an example of our domestic IP dance, I want to turn to an international example which demonstrates that strong protection of IP rights benefits robust market competition worldwide.

Each year the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) issues a Special 301 Report, as required by Congress, which is a review of the global state of IP rights protection and enforcement.[29] Internationally, failure to enforce IP laws as required under the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights[30] (“WTO TRIPS Agreement”) creates barriers to trade that negatively impact U.S. companies and consumers. Without robust IP protection and enforcement globally, American innovators cannot “defend their rights when their IP is stolen or infringed” and, consequently, the benefits of that IP cannot flow back to the United States economy.[31] Effectively, failure to enforce IP laws creates a non-tariff barrier to trade, as it can subsidize domestic industry or increase costs on foreign industry.

The recently issued 2026 Special 301 Report, highlighted several “emerging global trends [that] have the potential to improperly and unfairly harm U.S. innovators” related to patents and standards.  The Intellectual Property and Standards section of the report[32] underscores the importance of IP protection to U.S. leadership in developing next-generation technologies, and states unequivocally that “American innovation leadership, economic competitiveness, and national security are threatened by proposals or actions that undermine the effective enforcement of patent rights.” The Report went on to identify three emerging global trends that improperly harms U.S. innovators:

• Court rulings called “anti-suit injunctions” that bar U.S. companies from enforcing their patents anywhere else in the world; 
• Judicial or administrative procedures that compel innovators to grant, without their consent, global licenses to patented technologies on terms set by the court or the government; and
• Judicial or legislative efforts to prohibit the seeking or availability of injunctions against patent infringement, the core remedy that allows patent holders to enforce their rights. 

The Report’s findings dovetail with the antitrust policy principles I highlighted earlier, including the importance of robust intellectual property protection both domestically and globally; an unfettered intellectual property marketplace; and the unhindered availability of injunctions and other remedies against infringement. They are also consistent with globally recognized WTO treaty obligations.[33] So it’s a case where, while arriving from different angles, antitrust and international trade policies converge around the same principles.   

The full remarks are available, here. 

U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology Releases Cybersecurity Framework Profile for AI

The U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology has released the draft, “Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Artificial Intelligence,” which is subject to public comment. The abstract states:

The Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Artificial Intelligence (AI) Profile (“Cyber AI Profile” or “The Profile”) will provide guidelines for managing cybersecurity risk related to AI systems as well as identifying opportunities for using AI to enhance cybersecurity capabilities. The Profile is organized using the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 outcomes (Functions, Categories, and Subcategories). This Preliminary Draft is shared along with a request for public comment to solicit feedback on the planned direction and content. Comments received will inform the initial public draft. More information about this project, including a roadmap, is available on the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) Cyber AI Profile project page.

Notably, the Cyber AI Profile addresses standard essential patents:

Call for Patent Claims

This public review includes a call for information on essential patent claims (claims whose use would be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements in this Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) draft publication). Such guidance and/or requirements may be directly stated in this ITL Publication or by reference to another publication. This call also includes disclosure, where known, of the existence of pending U.S. or foreign patent applications relating to this ITL draft publication and of any relevant unexpired U.S. or foreign patents.

ITL may require from the patent holder, or a party authorized to make assurances on its behalf, in written or electronic form, either:

a) assurance in the form of a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does not hold and does not currently intend holding any essential patent claim(s); or

b) assurance that a license to such essential patent claim(s) will be made available to applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of complying with the guidance or requirements in this ITL draft publication either:

i. under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination; or

ii. without compensation and under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.

Such assurance shall indicate that the patent holder (or third party authorized to make assurances on its behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the assurance, provisions sufficient to ensure that the commitments in the assurance are binding on the transferee, and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of future transfers with the goal of binding each successor-in-interest. The assurance shall also indicate that it is intended to be binding on successors-in-interest regardless of whether such provisions are included in the relevant transfer documents. Such statements should be addressed to: cyberaiprofile@nist.gov

The Intellectual Property Office of the United Kingdom Call For Opinions on Standard Essential Patents

 

The Intellectual Property Office has published a Call for views on Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/standard-essential-patents-and-innovation-call-for-views

 The purpose of the call for views is to allow the UK Government to better understand whether the current SEPs framework encourages innovation and effectively promotes competition in markets, or whether there are any barriers to innovation and competition. It will establish whether government intervention is required and understand what intervention could look like.

 The call for views will seek to gather evidence on the following:

 

· The link between SEPs, innovation and competition and how these elements interrelate with each other.

 · The functioning of the market and whether balance is right between SEP holders and implementers.

 · The level of transparency in the SEPs framework.

 · How pricing in licensing of SEPs is determined during negotiations.

 · The functioning of licensing agreements, the patent system, the IP framework and the courts system.

The call for views will run for a duration of 12 weeks closing on 1 March 2022 at 23:45. After this call for views closes the government will assess the responses it receives and this will inform the government’s decision on any next steps on potential intervention that is required.

American Antitrust Institute Adds Voice to Criticism of Lax Competition Law Enforcement in the United States

The American Antitrust Institute has released a report titled, “The State of Antitrust Enforcement and Competition in the United States” (Report).  The Report takes the Trump Administration as well as prior administrations to task for a relatively low level of merger and acquisition scrutiny.  The Report also points out that numerous current policy proposals are essentially underdeveloped.  The following is a list of the major conclusions of the Report: 

•  DECLINING COMPETITION PRESENTS A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC DILEMMA IN THE U.S.: The cumulative effects of decades of lax antitrust enforcement, coupled with a step-down in enforcement under the Trump administration, poses fundamental challenges for markets and the democratic values that undergird them. Long-term inaction has compromised the effectiveness of the U.S. antitrust laws, presenting a significant political-economic dilemma around the role of antitrust in solving the broader public policy problem of declining competition.

•  ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT HAS DECLINED UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION: Key metrics indicate a decline in cartel enforcement under the Trump administration, as well as a falloff in second requests and merger challenges. And despite a few high-profile cases, there is no meaningful invigoration of monopolization enforcement. Recent agency actions to block some mergers involving highly concentrated markets reflect “emergency” merger control of the most egregiously anticompetitive transactions.

•  POLICY PRIORITIES AT THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES ARE MARKEDLY DIFFERENT: The Trump DOJ has introduced major changes in government policy surrounding cartel and merger enforcement, the intersection of competition and intellectual property, and competition advocacy. Many of these policies could work against the interests of competition and consumers. The FTC has taken a more pro-active approach, with continued efforts to challenge the expansion of intellectual property to achieve anticompetitive objectives in pharmaceutical markets.

•  SHIFTS IN AGENCY ADVOCACY REFLECT MORE FEDERAL INTERVENTION BY DOJ IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST CASES: The important role of antitrust agency advocacy has shifted markedly under the Trump agencies. The FTC’s competition advocacy, embodied in comments before federal and state agencies and amicus briefs, has fallen off dramatically. In contrast, the DOJ’s competition advocacy has increased but often stakes out positions that work against the interests of competition and consumers.

•  PRIVATE ENFORCERS CAN TAKE UP SOME OF THE SLACK IN FEDERAL UNDER-ENFORCEMENT AND SPUR POLICY CHANGE, BUT THEY FACE SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES: Key private antitrust cases have had positive impacts by obtaining compensation for victims, deterring future violations, and spurring public debate and state legislative reform. There are also opportunities for private challenges of consummated mergers that have harmed consumers and workers. But challenges remain, with tightening judicial standards for showing collusion and other impediments that make it more difficult to bring, litigate, and win cases.

•  STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ARE BECOMING MORE ACTIVE BUT LIMITATIONS PERSIST THAT WILL DEFINE HOW MUCH THE STATES CAN DO IN RESPONSE TO FEDERAL INACTION: State Attorneys General are stepping up efforts in response to weak federal enforcement. These include independent lawsuits to block illegal mergers and confront price fixing, a proactive stance on strengthening federal merger settlements, and investigations into the competitive practices of large digital technology companies. Resource limitations and a change in the tenor of coordination between the DOJ and the states, however, pose challenges.

•  LEGISLATIVE ANTITRUST REFORM IS NEEDED BUT PROPOSALS THUS FAR LACK A COMPREHENSIVE AND COORDINATED APPROACH: Legislative efforts to reform the antitrust laws have accelerated in the 116th Congress and are at levels not seen since the early 1990s. These include comprehensive reform proposals and narrower initiatives targeting specific antitrust issues and particularly vulnerable sectors. Legislative reform is needed to strengthen and clarify the antitrust laws, but these efforts require a coordinated response to ensure that they promote enforcement, not inadvertently weaken it or cause confusion in the courts.

• REVERSING DECLINING COMPETITION IS A PROBLEM THAT WILL REQUIRE A PUBLIC POLICY SOLUTION: Change in the way the U.S. promotes competition and protects the market system is badly needed. Strengthening antitrust to promote more vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws is part of a broader solution that should be complemented through the use of other tools, including social and economic regulation, standard-setting and interoperability, labor policy, and intellectual property law.

The Report notably discusses the intersection of competition policy and intellectual property, particularly efforts concerning SEPs and pharmaceuticals.  On SEPs, the Report states, in part, that: 

Under the Trump administration, the DOJ has unilaterally reversed course on patent holdup issues. For example, in 2018, the Antitrust Division withdrew from its 2013 Joint Policy Statement with the Patent & Trademark Office on Remedies for Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). The Policy Statement had endorsed sensible limits on court-ordered injunctive relief and the International Trade Commission’s issuance of exclusion orders, which ban imports of products into the U.S. if the products infringe a U.S. patent. It cautioned against such injunctions and orders when the alleged infringer’s products are compliant with industry standards and the patent holder has voluntarily committed to an SSO to license the patent on FRAND terms.

In December 2019, the Antitrust Division issued a new Policy Statement downplaying the concerns and ignoring the public policy justifications against injunctions and exclusion orders on products alleged to infringe SEPs.62 The new Policy Statement offers no tailored rules or meaningful guidance, and it signals increased scrutiny of SSOs rather than SEP owners. The new Policy Statement warns that such heightened scrutiny could result in an investigation or enforcement action when SSO’s take certain steps to clarify their patent policies and procedures to mitigate the risks of hold-up and disputes over licensing terms, whereas the previous statement had encouraged SSOs to make appropriate clarifications to that end.

The Report is available, here. 

OxFirst Conference: Globalization and FRAND

OxFirst is hosting a very interesting conference on FRAND and globalization on October 18, 2019 at the University of Oxford.  The press release states: 

The decisions of national courts on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing rates have the potential to impact the licensing and litigation of standard essential patents (SEPs) internationally, according to speakers at OxFirst’s 4^th intellectual property (IP) and competition forum.

“The global FRAND licensing framework is meant to strike a balance between the rights of the Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) holders and the needs of downstream innovators,” says Dr Roya Ghafele, founder and CEO of OxFirst.

“Decisions made at the national level, by national courts, bear the potential to affect licensing negotiations in other jurisdictions. It is therefore important that such decisions take into account the increasingly global nature of commerce,” Ghafele adds.

SEPs have become central to patent wars in information and communications technology because the use of these patents is essential for compliance with technical standards. Standards such as 3G, 4G, GSM or UMTS have been instrumental for the establishment of wireless communication. The advent of 5G bears the potential to be a crucial element for the internet of things. (IoT) As such, there is a lot at stake.

OxFirst’s conference, titled “Globalisation and FRAND: Coming to grips with the interplay of IP and competition law”, addresses issues facing the various players in these patent wars.

The conference, held Oct 18 at St Cross College, at the University of Oxford, is attended by academics, government officials, and IP experts in the commercial world.

Among the speakers at the conference are Hon Judge Fabian Hoffman, a judge of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice of Germany); Prof Eric Sergheraert, from the University of Lille; Prof Valerio Sterzi, from the University of Bordeaux; and Prof Thomas Cotter, from the University of Minnesota.

OxFirst is scheduled to host its next IP and competition symposium in Brussels in February 2020. OxFirst Conferences are fully accredited for continuous legal professional education for the legal profession.

About the conference:

https://www.oxfirst.com/oxfirst-fourth-ip-competition-forum-globalisation-and-frand/

OxFirst Webinar featuring Professor Peter George Picht: "Injunctions in SEP/Frand Cases"

Our friends at OxFirst have another interesting free webinar titled, “Injunctions in SEP/Frand Cases,” scheduled for October 24, 2019, starting at 16:00 BST (14:00 CET).  The speaker is Professor Peter George Picht.  Here is his bio: 

Prof Peter Georg Picht studied law at Munich University and Yale Law School, did his PhD (summa cum laude) at Munich University/the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, and holds a masters degree from Yale Law School.

He has been working, i.a., with the EU Commission’s DG for Competition, as a Senior Research Fellow with the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, as well as with two international law firms.

Prof. Picht now holds a chair for Economic Law at the University of Zurich and is head of the University’s Center for Intellectual Property and Competition Law (CIPCO). He remains affiliated to the Max Planck Institute as a Research Fellow and is an Of Counsel with the law firm Schellenberg Wittmer. His further affiliations include board memberships in the Academic Society for Competition Law (ASCOLA), the Association Européenne du Droit Èconomique (AIDE), and the Munich IP Dispute Resolution Forum. In 2019, he will be a Visiting Professor at King’s College, London.

Prof. Picht’s academic teaching and writing, as well as his counseling activity, focus on

· intellectual property law

· competition law

· international private and procedural law, in particular commercial arbitration (mainly IP and Competition), trusts and estates.

In these fields, he advises governments, companies, foundations, trusts, as well as private persons and families. Prof. Picht is admitted to the bar in Germany and Switzerland (Art. 28 BGFA).

For further information, see:

http://www.rwi.uzh.ch/de/lehreforschung/alphabetisch/picht/person.html

https://www.rwi.uzh.ch/de/oe/cipco.html

Here is a link to register: https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/2194048367188788236, and here are the details concerning registration: 

Attention, please sign up with your professional email account. We don’t accept registrations from personal email addresses. Participation is limited at 100 participants. We reserve the right to eliminate participants.

OxFirst Presentation: "Patent Aggregator meets Patent Aggregator: SISVEL and RPX Join Forces"

OxFirst is offering another interesting presentation titled, “Patent Aggregator meets Patent Aggregator: SISVEL and RPX Join Forces,” on June 3, 2019, at 14.00 BST and 15.00 CET.  Registration is available, here.  The description of the presentation states: 

For the first time in history, an aggregator of innovative Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) and an aggregator of willing licensees worked together to enter into a deal that simplifies access to widely-used technology, effectively allowing hundreds of transactions involving patent rights to occur through a single agreement. The aggregator of innovative SEPs is Sisvel International S.A., a patent management company that pools and licenses patented technology essential to widely-used standards such as Wi-Fi. The aggregator of willing licensees is RPX Corporation, a patent risk management company that acquires rights in patents for members. Sisvel and RPX entered into an agreement providing a license to specified RPX members under 500 standard essential patents that make up the Sisvel Wi-Fi Joint Licensing Program. In addition, Sisvel also licensed those RPX members under 200 non-essential Wi-Fi patents, owned by Sisvel’s subsidiary, Hera Wireless S.A. The presenters are Mattia Fogliacco, CEO of the Sisvel Group, and Dan McCurdy, CEO of the RPX Corporation.  Their respective short biographies are below.

As CEO of the Sisvel Group Mattia Fogliacco’s focus lies in making sure Sisvel maintains its leadership in the creation of value through licensing activities, while continuing to foster innovation and Intellectual Property protection. He is in charge of defining the strategies, growing the business and manage the resources of the Group. As CEO of the Sisvel Group my focus lies in making sure Sisvel maintains its leadership in the creation of value through licensing activities, while continuing to foster innovation and Intellectual Property protection. Mattia Fogliacco has a background in business and innovation management and holds an MSc from Bocconi University and a CEMS master's in international management. He has been part of the Executive Management team of the Sisvel Group since 2014, working as Chief New Business Officer for the last 3 years. Before joining Sisvel, Mr. Fogliacco was Managing Director at Iinnovation SA, a company focused on licensing and IP transactions. He also served as Senior International Manager at a service provider of Deutsche Bank, managing three IP and innovation investment funds. Dan McCurdy is CEO of RPX Corporation, where he previously served as senior vice president from 2014 to 2016. Prior to RPX, Dan was a partner with Quatela Lynch McCurdy. From 2008 through June 2014, he was CEO of Allied Security Trust, and Chairman and CEO of PatentFreedom. In June 2014, PatentFreedom was acquired by RPX.  Previously, Dan was founding CEO of ThinkFire; President of Intellectual Property of Lucent Technologies and Bell Laboratories; a Vice President of IBM responsible for the creation of its Life Sciences business unit; a Vice President of Ciena Corporation where he directed merger, acquisition and corporate development; Director of Business Development for IBM Research; and Manager of Technology and Intellectual Property Policy for IBM worldwide.  Dan graduated summa cum laude from the University of North Carolina. He served on the Intellectual Property Policy committee of the United States’ National Academies, in 2011 was named CEO of the Year by Intellectual Property Magazine, and in 2014 was named one of the 40 most influential “movers and shakers” in IP transactions and acquisitions by Intellectual Asset Magazine. He has been named in the IAM Strategy 300, honoring the leading 300 IP strategists worldwide, every year since the annual list has been published.

US Antitrust Chief Delrahim Announces Withdrawal from DOJ/USPTO Policy Statement on Remedies for SEPs subject to FRAND

On December 7, the chief of the Antitrust Division at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Makan Delrahim, announced that the DOJ will be withdrawing from the 2013 USPTO and DOJ joint statement, “Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments.”  The announcement was part of his speech, titled “Telegraph Road: Incentivizing Innovation at the Intersection of Antitrust and Patent law.”  His speech provides, in part:

. . . In the more recent past, we have seen somewhat of a shift toward the view that patents might confer too much power, particularly if those patents are essential to a technical interoperability standard.  The fundamental right of the patent holder to exclude competitors has been questioned in this context.

In particular, I have criticized the argument that it ought to be a violation of antitrust law for a holder of a standard-essential patent, or SEP, to exclude competitors from using the technology, including by seeking an injunction against the sale of infringing goods—I think that argument is wrong as a matter of antitrust law and bad as a matter of innovation policy. 

. . . When it comes to the test for obtaining injunctive relief against infringement, patent law already strikes a careful balance that optimizes the incentive to innovate, for the benefit of the public.  The test was articulated by the Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange.  

. . . A court applying the eBay test is thus allowed to consider effects in the market, including (as Justice Kennedy noted in concurrence) how significant the patented invention is to the use of the product, and whether the patent holder can be properly rewarded for that contribution without the ability to exclude competitors. 

When this test is used to maintain appropriate incentives to innovate, it thus facilitates the goals of antitrust law and patent law alike. 

I fear that we at the Antitrust Division gave some observers the opposite impression, however, with the confusion created by the joint statement issued by the Department of Justice and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office in early 2013, entitled “Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments.” 

That Policy Statement purported to offer the agencies’ perspectives on the propriety of a federal court issuing an injunction, or the International Trade Commission’s issuing an exclusion order, “when a patent holder seeking such a remedy asserts standards-essential patents that are encumbered by a RAND or FRAND licensing commitment.”  In particular, the statement discusses what is in the “public interest” because the eBay test and the Tariff Act governing the ITC name the public interest as a relevant factor.

As I have said before, this joint statement should not be read as a limitation on the careful balance that patent law strikes to optimize the incentive to innovate.  There is no special set of rules for exclusion when patents are part of standards.  A FRAND commitment does not and should not create a compulsory licensing scheme.  

In those cases, as in all cases, the question is what result will optimize the incentives to innovate for the benefit of the public.  Since injunctions against infringement frequently do serve the public interest in maintaining a patent system that incentivizes and rewards successful inventors through the process of dynamic competition, enforcement agencies without clear direction otherwise from Congress should not place a thumb on the scale against an injunction in the case of FRAND-encumbered patents. 

Despite my clarification of the Antitrust Division’s position on the propriety of these types of injunctions, the potential for confusion remains high because the joint statement from 2013 indicates that an injunction or exclusion order “may harm competition and consumers,” seeming somehow to suggest an antitrust inquiry that is distinct from the goal of optimizing the incentives for innovation—namely, dynamic competition.  

This potential for confusion has lead me to a conclusion that I would like to announce here today, in the interest of clarity and predictability of the laws, and among the patent law community with whom we share the goal of incentivizing innovation: The Antitrust Division is hereby withdrawing its assent to the 2013 joint “Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments.”

The 2013 statement has not accurately conveyed our position about when and how patent holders should be able to exclude competitors from practicing their technologies.  We will be engaging with the U.S.P.T.O. to draft a new joint statement that better provides clarity and predictability with respect to the balance of interests at stake when an SEP-holder seeks an injunctive order.

Any discussion regarding injunctive relief should include the recognition that in addition to patent holders being able to engage in patent “hold up,” patent implementers are also able to engage in “hold out” once the innovators have already sunk their investment into developing a valuable technology.  Additionally, a balanced discussion should recognize that some standard-setting organizations may make it too easy for patent implementers to bargain collectively and achieve sub-optimal concessions from patent holders that undermine the incentive to innovate.  That is the topic I want to turn to next.

Although standard-setting organizations can undoubtedly offer enormous benefits to consumers, there are antitrust risks associated with any activity that involves competitors making joint decisions.  When there is evidence that participants in a standard-setting organization have engaged in collusion, which is the “supreme evil” of antitrust law, according to the Supreme Court in Trinko, the Division will be inclined to investigate. 

For instance, there is a potential antitrust problem where a group of product manufacturers within a standard-setting organization come together to dictate licensing terms to a patent holder as a condition for inclusion in a standard because it may be a collective exertion of monopsony power over the patent holder.  . . . 

The Antitrust Division will therefore investigate and bring enforcement actions to end practices that eliminate the independent centers of decision-making and thereby harm competitive processes, including price competition and innovation competition.  Often a single maverick firm may be willing to take a chance on a new and innovative technology or business model that the rest of its competitors would rather see killed off in its incipiency.  Antitrust law recognizes the consumer benefit of those entrepreneurial and innovative tendencies and their vulnerability to collusion.

Although there are certain best practices for guarding the process of standard setting against such abuses, we are concerned that some standard-setting organizations may not even attempt to adopt these safeguards.  

. . . Calling your meetings a standard-setting organization, or even in fact publishing some standards necessary for interoperability, is not a free pass for coordination designed to reduce common competitive threats or forestalling innovative developments in the industry that put a legacy business model at risk.

… Patent policies affect the incentives for innovation.  If an SSO’s policy is too restrictive for one side or the other, it also risks deterring participation in procompetitive standard setting. 

Just as competition in the marketplace results in better outcomes for the consumers of goods and services, competition among standard-setting organizations to adopt better patent policies can result in better outcomes for the consumers of standard-setting activities (that is, for the participants themselves). 

It is for this reason that we will take a dim view of any coordinated effort by competitors to stifle competition among standard-setting organizations, including competition to offer the patent policy that brings the most participants to the table.  For instance, competitors would come under scrutiny if they orchestrated a group boycott of an SSO with a patent policy that is unfavorable to their commercial interests. 

Northwestern Releases Technology Standards and Standard Setting Organizations Databases and Congratulations to Dr. Roya Ghafele!

Northwestern University, Pritzker Law School, has released three databases on technology standards and standard setting organizations.  The announcement states:

The Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth is pleased to announce the release of three important databases on Technology Standards and Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs). The databases are available free of charge for all academic researchers.

The first database, known as the Searle Center Database on Technology Standards and Standard Setting Organizations, created by Justus Baron and Daniel F. Spulber, contains original data on the rules and membership of SSOs, and bibliographic information on published technology standards (including an original database of normative and informative references between standard documents).

The second database, created by Justus Baron and Tim Pohlmann (IPlyitics), contains the currently most comprehensive database of declared standard-essential patents (SEP) and the first detailed mapping of declared SEPs to a systematic dataset of standard documents.

The third database, created by Justus Baron and Kirti Gupta (Qualcomm), includes detailed procedural data on standard development at an important SSO, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project 3GPP.

The three databases are inter-related, and share a common system of identifiers for standards and firms to facilitate research applications combining the various databases.

Under the direction of Daniel F. Spulber, (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, and Research Director of the Searle Center), the Searle Center's Research Project on Innovation Economics addresses a broad range of important issues involving intellectual property (IP), research and development (R&D), the market for inventions, innovation, and technology standards.

For details on the databases and the Searle Center's ongoing Research Project on Innovation Economics Project please visit: http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/innovationeconomics
Papers describing the databases can be found at the following links:

- Justus Baron and Daniel Spulber: Technology Standards and Standard Setting Organizations: Introduction to the Searle Center Database, Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 17-16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073165 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3073165, forthcoming Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2018.

- Justus Baron and Kirti Gupta: Unpacking 3GPP Standards. forthcoming Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2018.

- Justus Baron and Tim Pohlmann: Mapping Standards to Patents Using Declarations of Standard-Essential Patents, forthcoming Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2018.

Please see the following instructions to receive access to the database:

- The three Searle Center databases are intended only for academic research. Commercial and or for-profit research is strictly prohibited.

- Prior to being granted access to the databases, all academic researchers must first compete a Data License Agreement (DUA).

- The DUA is available for download here: http://bit.ly/searlessodua
- Once requestor has filled out the required fields and signed the DUA, email a scan of the DUA to searlecenter@law.northwestern.edu

- Please note that a PDF electronic signature on the DUA is acceptable.

- All research assistants or research personnel that will have access to the data must also complete DUA's.

- Once we receive your signed DUA, we will verify that your application fits the criteria listed above. If we conclude that it does, we will then send you a link to a Box Folder where all of the files and supporting documents will be permanently hosted. You may have to create a Box account in order to access the databases.
. . .

The databases release is apparently for academics.  My guess is that others can access the databases for a fee. 

Congratulations to Oxfirst’s Dr. Roya Ghafele on joining the EU Commissions’ Group of Experts on Licensing and Valuation of Standard Essential Patents!  According to the press release:

The purpose of the expert group is to ‘deepen the expertise on evolving industry practices related to the licensing of standard essential patents in the context of the digitalisation of the economy, the sound valuation of intellectual property and the determination of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory ("FRAND") licensing terms.’ The Expert Group’s importance to European and international governance formulation on FRAND is widely recognized. The Expert Group will address a host of complex issues pertaining to patents that read on standards, as already set out in 2017 in the E.C.’s ‘Communication from the Commission to the Institutions on Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents.’

Where is 5G communications technology IP coming from?

As I explained in IP Finance last week, following President Trump's blocking of Broadcom’s hostile bid to acquire Qualcomm, by remaining independent the cellular technology leader will be able to maintain its long-term commitment to high levels of R&D investment (at 23 percent of sales recently), most significantly including that in 5G communications standard-essential IP.

Use Cases for 5G International Mobile Telecommunications

5G is strategically important to the entire mobile ecosystem and to many nations for economic as well as for national security reasons.  The 5G standard will support many complementary technologies and market developments. Total estimated value is $12.3 trillion in 2035.

5G is a new standard that significantly embodies cumulative technology developments from previous cellular standards including 3G UMTS and 4G LTE. Many more innovative new technologies will also be added to 5G over the next decade or so. 

Transformation and growth with 5G

Mobile communications has improved in leaps and bounds since the introduction of analog phones in the early 1980s. After cellular was only significantly used for voice calling for a couple of decades, network traffic from voice was surpassed by data communications in 2009 with demand for the latter at least doubling every 18 months ever since. This is no mean feat. It resulted from major investments in technology R&D as well as in network facilities and new devices.

Exponential growth in mobile data

With the first commercial 5G deployments from around 2019, the new standard promises to be transformative and facilitate further growth with:

• Enhanced mobile broadband—even more of the above, with higher speeds and increased capacity to support that and additional users
• Ultra-reliable and low-latency communications for applications such as self-driving cars
• Massive Machine Type Communication in the Internet of Things (IoT) to connect tens of billions of sensors and other devices worldwide

While market opportunities are wide ranging and will include numerous technologies, they are most significantly underpinned by the mobile communications technologies developed and contributed to the 5G standard, including IP protected by standard-essential patents.

Building on the shoulders of giants

5G is substantially based upon previous cellular technologies. For example, whereas previous advances from 1G to 2G, from 2G to 3G and from 3G to 4G where largely defined by a totally new “air interface”, both 4G LTE and 5G “New Radio” are predominantly based on OFDMA wireless technology. 5G is also capitalizing on many other technologies that were already introduced in previous standards. Examples include QAM modulation, MIMO space division multiplexing and multi-carrier aggregation technologies. This short paper of mine explains in greater depth how seminal and foundational technologies are initially contributed to the standards and are then also very valuably reused in later standards. As standardization progresses, many more companies get involved in the process, including some who supplement these foundational technologies with additional contributions of varied worth.

As declarations begin to be made—of patents that owners believe are essential to the 5G standard—it will soon become apparent that a clear majority of these will have already have been declared essential to previous standards including various 3G standards and 4G LTE. Technology-IP leaders in 3G and 4G will therefore also tend be the leaders in 5G.

It is still very early for 5G SEP declarations because declarations are usually made several months after the setting of standards. The first standardization of 5G was not until December 2017 in 3GPP Release 15.[1]

Following this initial 5G standard release, there is substantial additional and ongoing development work including trials, debugging, development of commercial products and the introduction many new technical features and performance improvements.

Leading cellular technology innovators, among others, will continue to make new contributions to the standards in 5G, including additional technologies that are being introduced in later releases of the 5G standard, as also illustrated in this Qualcomm blog posting.

Quality trumps quantity in SEPs

The value of standard-essential technologies is largely a function of patent quality—particularly including seminal and foundational contributions—rather than of the raw numbers of patents filed, issued or declared essential to the standards. Nevertheless, significant attention is paid to these metrics, and on the numbers of technical contributions to standard setting organizations because these figures are easy to count and promote in the media, in licensing negotiations and in court litigation.

However, SEP declarations and the number of technical contributions companies make to the standard-setting process can easily be inflated by those who seek to “game the system.” Declarations of patents that owners believe might be essential or might become essential to the standards are not policed or verified by SSOs. Their IPR databases were set up to identify patents and their owners, not for the purposes of apportioning SEP value or FRAND royalty rates. As I have indicated previously in IP Finance, patent counting is inaccurate and unreliable even when third parties make essentiality checks.

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[1] 3GPP is the stand setting organization responsible for all the major mobile communications standards including 2G GSM, 3G UMTS, 4G LTE and 5G.

SEP Injunctions and the Balance of IPRs and Competition in India

Professor V.K. Unni of the Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta has authored a short and concise opinion paper titled, Promoting Innovation: Moving Towards a Better Intellectual Property Regime, in the Financial Express.  His paper discusses the importance of finding the right balance between patent rights and competition law with respect to standard essential patents for India.  Interestingly, he observes that in India injunctive relief has been granted relatively frequently with respect to standard essential patents held by Ericsson against Indian companies, particularly when compared to pharmaceuticals.  He notes that, “the Delhi High Court [recently] held that laws dealing with protection of IPR and competition do not have any irreconcilable repugnancy or conflict, and upheld the jurisdiction of the [Competition Commission of India] to entertain complaints dealing with abuse of dominance against the patent holder.”  The article is available, here. 

Patents and Share Prices - Ericsson

Apple and Ericsson have been engaged in a number of patent infringement suits over the past few years. Finally, on Monday Ericsson announced that it had reached a settlement with Apple under which Apple would be granted to all of Ericsson's standard-essential patents, as well as to certain other patent rights (which are not named). We've often reported on these patents on this blog and my fellow contributor Keith Mallinson has studied them extensively and their effect on competition.

The Apple settlement will apparently boost Ericsson's revenue from licensing of intellectual property rights in 2015 to SEK 13-14 b (around USD 1.5 billion) compared to 2014's revenue of SEK 9.9 bn reported here. It's not surprising that Ericsson's share price jumped yesterday from Friday's closing price of USD 9.12 to USD 9.62 at 09.50 Eastern time after announcement and closed today (Tuesday) at USD 9.56. Apple's price did not change much during the same period.

It's clear that licensing revenue is becoming a significant contributor to Ericsson's bottom line. In 2014 operating income was reported to be SEK 11.1 Bn, which included a payment from Samsung for an IPR licence of SEK 2.1 Bn.  The amount paid by Apple remains confidential and will include an ongoing royalty (as does the Samsung agreement) and so there will be further contributions to Ericsson's bottom line over the next few years.

The European Commission, among other organisations, have been concerned that the smartphone patent wars damage competition, as reported in the Financial Times. The Apple/Ericsson agreement show how patent can work - Ericsson receive additional revenue for their work on the development of telecommunication standards and Apple pay for access to this technology.

Vote on FRAND?

World Intellectual Property Review is running a survey about FRAND and the formation of the Fair Standards Alliance reported on this blog here.

WIPR is asking whether you agree that the definition of FRAND must have a clearer meaning to allow standards to foster innovation. There's no link provided to the arguments set out in the Fair Standards Alliance's white paper (found here), but at least one can post comments.

In this blogger's view, the question is a leading one. It's seems to be a no-brainer that it would be nice to have a clearer understanding of FRAND. But what does a clearer understanding mean? Clearly different things to different people and that is the kernel of the problem.

The survey can be taken here.

Huawei ruling: bad news for SEPs?

From our friend Colm Ahern (Elzaburu, Madrid) comes the following hot-off-the-press comment on today's decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-170/13 Huawei v ZTE [noted on the IPKat here].

Standard Essential Patents Lose Ground

The judgment in in Huawei v ZTE (C‑170/13) which was published today largely confirms the Advocate General’s Opinion. It amounts to a significant departure from the very strict conditions laid down by the German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) in the Orange Book case regarding standard essential patents (SEPs) and antitrust law. It also vindicates the Commission’s position, which has been openly critical of Orange Book.

The Court effectively rejects the rules established by the BGH in the Orange Book case whereby the seeking of a cessation injunction by a patent holder with a dominant position, would only constitute abuse of that position if the alleged infringer had made an unconditional and binding licence offer which could not be limited to cases where patent infringement had been proven. By contrast the Court places the burden on the patent holder to first send a notice letter setting out not only the alleged infringement. Failure to do so before seeking a cessation injunction and removal of infringing products would constitute abuse of dominant position. If the alleged infringer expresses willingness to negotiate, then the patent holder must offer licence terms offer under FRAND conditions specifying, in particular, the amount of the royalty and the way in which that royalty is to be calculated. The alleged infringer could then respond with a counter-offer setting out alternative terms. If this offer is rejected the alleged infringer could provide a bank guarantee or place the amounts necessary on deposit. The patent holder could only avoid the charge of abuse if the counter-offer were held not to be serious and to constitute a mere delaying tactic. The alleged infringer could also reserve the right to later challenge both patent validity and the existence of infringement.

The rights held by owners of SEP patents under the “Orange Book Standard” have been significantly curtailed as a result of this judgment.

Thanks, Colm!

Closing time for open standards and patents consultation

The European Commission’s DG GROWTH (formerly DG Enterprise) is running a public consultation with the stated objective of gathering information and views on the interplay between standardisation and intellectual property rights such as patents. It was opened on 14 October 2014 to 15 February 2015 and is about to close. The initial deadline for comments of 31 January 2015 was extended by two weeks to 15 February.

Demands for change lack evidentiary support

Prior to this in 2013, DG GROWTH commissioned a fact-finding study on the issue of patents and standards upon which it has centred this consultation. Research presented in this is largely based on a small number of 37 interviews, many of which are outside the industry sectors where interoperability standards are most commonly used. 

The Report’s findings are very subjective and speculative. It makes the introductory statement that “[t]o ensure that Europe is well positioned in today’s global competitive environment, unnecessary barriers in the market for IPR licensing need thus to be removed." However, quantitative data from desk research such as that on the extent of patenting and disclosures neither measure any of the purported problems, such as allegedly excessive transaction costs, nor measure the effects they have in the marketplace, for example, on market entry costs or market shares. There is no overall empirically-based assessment of information costs, transaction costs or overall costs in licensing SEPs, or how these are actually trending in the market.

Unintended and undesirable consequences

DG GROWTH should be cautious when discussing and proposing changes to rules and practices, including disclosures and licensing for patented technologies in interoperability standards. Changing the dynamics of standardisation, participation in which remains voluntary, may impair innovation and reduce contributions to standards setting. This is particularly true if policy recommendations or changes undermine the evidently well-functioning aspects of standardisation processes.

As I have explained in several of my IP Finance blogs including my most recent on IEEE’s proposed patent policy changes, which has now been approved by the IEEE board of directors, alleged problems and harms in standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing remain unsupported with evidence. Nor have the impact of proposed “remedies” on R&D, investment or long-term innovation been assessed in any meaningful way. The danger of proposing reforms that do not address quantifiable harm is dire unintended consequences. Standard-setting Organization (SSOs) participation is voluntary with rules and procedures determined by members in accordance with the law. Imposing change could have adverse effects such as discouraging members to invest in R&D, contribute patented technologies to standards or outright departure from SSOs with reversion to more proprietary implementations.

Facts and figures show market is working well

The system of licensing interoperability standards is working remarkably well, as exemplified in mobile phones, to the benefit of consumers with vibrant competition which has resulted in extensive innovation, increasing product choice, falling prices and massive adoption with 7 billion connections worldwide. It has attracted large and increasing R&D expenditures which have grown 50 percent since 2008 to $42 billion in 2013. Licensing fees paid for mobile SEP royalties remain below 5 per cent ($19 billion) of Morgan Stanley’s estimated $377 billion in 2013 handset sales. And these figures are dwarfed by the $1.1 trillion in mobile operator service revenues which are also very dependent on mobile 2G, 3G and 4G technologies.

Submission to DG GROWTH

I have just submitted my lengthy consultation response to DG GROWTH. It is also available in pdf form here. You have two more days to get yours in!

Stacking the Deck in Analysis of Smartphone Patent Licensing Costs

Estimates of patent licensing costs for smartphone manufacturers are greatly exaggerated. Allegations of excessive fees paid and resulting harm to manufacturer profits, incentives to invest and compete are faulty and unsupported by the facts -- which show much to the contrary.

A "working paper" entitled The Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones has been published by one in-house lawyer at Intel and two outside counsel from WilmerHale. Intel Vice President and Associate General Counsel Ann Armstrong and WilmerHale's Joseph Mueller and Timothy Syrett argue that aggregate patent licensing fees including SEPs and non-SEPs are excessive at around $120 per $400 smartphone. They conclude that “few suppliers are meeting the basic goal of selling devices for more than the costs incurred in supplying them,” imply that this is due to the alleged royalty stack, and state that “those costs may be undermining industry profitability—and, in turn, diminishing incentives to invest and compete.”

The paper’s economic and empirical analyses are deficient and defective. In contradiction to its findings, evidence shows that licensing fees:

• Are not undermining profits and are not preventing manufacturers from covering more than their costs. According to Credit Suisse, handset manufacturer operating profits since 2007 have tripled to $51 billion on $326 billion revenues in 2013.
  
• Are not excessive. There is no basis for arbitrary price caps on smartphone patent fees, or limits based on chip manufacturing costs. The latter are unrelated to patented technologies and the value they generate more broadly in the entire device, its use in mobile networks, or across the broader ecosystem including services and applications. Methods of determining charges follow well established principles and benchmarks in bilateral negotiation. Patent licensing fees are analogous to licensing fees for book, music, movie or software publishers, which typically exceed greatly the cost of the physical mediums on which they are published and distributed.
  
• Are nowhere near $120 in aggregate; and there is copious evidence actual payments are much lower than purported. The Paper inexplicably and erroneously disregards fundamental offsets in cross-licensing which greatly reduce or eliminate fees paid to many patent owners. This figure is also systematically biased and inflated by including rates demanded by licensors, even where there is no evidence anybody—including those who have little or nothing to cross license —actually pays such rates. And, where there is, instead, copious evidence that rates actually paid, if at all, are substantially less—orders of magnitude less in some instances. For example, court-adjudicated rates were much lower than “demanded” rates in various cases, and yet the higher figures were used in calculating the above total.
  
• Are helpful, not detrimental, to the highly competitive and flourishing smartphone ecosystem. By every measure the patent system and the risk-reward balance it strikes—spurring innovation, market entry and competition while not overburdening licensees—is unmistakably working very well. 

My full and detailed analysis, in a pdf document, of this working paper by Intel and Wilmer Hale includes copious evidence countering the latter's findings.

This follows a previous my previous IP Finance posting on alleged royalty stacking entitled Theories of Harm with SEP Licensing do not stack up in which I responded to papers co-authored by Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro in 2006 and 2013, and my posting entitled Absurd (F)RAND licensing-rate determinations for SEPs that analyses some U.S. court judgments which have relied on these economists in their royalty rate determinations. 

 

Absurd (F)RAND licensing-rate determinations for SEPs

I have submitted many articles to IP Finance over the last couple of years as a "guest" contributor. I would like to thank Jeremy Phillips for inviting me to do so, and posting my articles for me with all the editing and production work entailed. This is my first IP Finance posting as a "resident" contributor.

Absurd (F)RAND licensing-rate determinations for SEPs

Judge James L. Robart's findings in the case between Microsoft and Motorola, which issued in April 2013, represent the first U.S. judicial attempt to determine reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing fees. Most recently, Judge James F. Holderman has also had a go in his royalty rate opinion in the Innovatio case. The judges’ rate setting applies only to standard-essential patent technologies in H.264 video and 802.11 WiFi. In my opinion, the rates set in both cases are defectively based and unreasonably low.



Rate-setting in SEP licensing

The judges’ decisions are both based on the faulty dictum that patentees are entitled only to a small proportion of standard-essential patent value. Valuation methods selected unsurprisingly reflect that predisposition. The judgements significantly rely on the defective notion that SEP-owners’ rewards should only reflect “intrinsic value” of technologies, and that they should be deprived a proportion of the value that comes through standardisation including “network effects.” Core technology developers deserve to share in the economic benefits of standardisation because of the significant costs and risks in developing, proposing and integrating their technologies. That has been the basis for investment and market success so far.

Patent pools and chipset profits used by Judges Robart and Holderman respectively provide biased and misleading benchmarks for (F)RAND royalties. The judges identify some major limitations in using patent pools while seeming oblivious to other pitfalls. Judge Robart ill-advisedly uses pools because participants are mainly implementers who tend to be most interested in keeping their royalty costs low. Those with the most valuable patents tend to steer clear. Judge Holderman latches onto an alternative approach, based on silicon chip component manufacturer profits, that is also deeply flawed, while taking comfort from choosing a reasonable royalty rate that falls within the range established for the same standard by Judge Robart. Licensing rates on ICT products commonly apply across the entire product because value is delivered and enjoyed on that basis. They have little to do with and should not be limited to profits on chips.

My full analysis is a rather lengthier 24 pages. Those with the interest and stomach for it can find it in full here as a PDF document.