Tuesday, 11 December 2018
US Antitrust Chief Delrahim Announces Withdrawal from DOJ/USPTO Policy Statement on Remedies for SEPs subject to FRAND
On December 7, the chief of the Antitrust Division at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Makan Delrahim, announced that the DOJ will be withdrawing from the 2013 USPTO and DOJ joint statement, “Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments.” The announcement was part of his speech, titled “Telegraph Road: Incentivizing Innovation at the Intersection of Antitrust and Patent law.” His speech provides, in part:
. . . In the more recent past, we have seen somewhat of a shift toward the view that patents might confer too much power, particularly if those patents are essential to a technical interoperability standard. The fundamental right of the patent holder to exclude competitors has been questioned in this context.
In particular, I have criticized the argument that it ought to be a violation of antitrust law for a holder of a standard-essential patent, or SEP, to exclude competitors from using the technology, including by seeking an injunction against the sale of infringing goods—I think that argument is wrong as a matter of antitrust law and bad as a matter of innovation policy.
. . . When it comes to the test for obtaining injunctive relief against infringement, patent law already strikes a careful balance that optimizes the incentive to innovate, for the benefit of the public. The test was articulated by the Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange.
. . . A court applying the eBay test is thus allowed to consider effects in the market, including (as Justice Kennedy noted in concurrence) how significant the patented invention is to the use of the product, and whether the patent holder can be properly rewarded for that contribution without the ability to exclude competitors.
When this test is used to maintain appropriate incentives to innovate, it thus facilitates the goals of antitrust law and patent law alike.
I fear that we at the Antitrust Division gave some observers the opposite impression, however, with the confusion created by the joint statement issued by the Department of Justice and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office in early 2013, entitled “Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments.”
That Policy Statement purported to offer the agencies’ perspectives on the propriety of a federal court issuing an injunction, or the International Trade Commission’s issuing an exclusion order, “when a patent holder seeking such a remedy asserts standards-essential patents that are encumbered by a RAND or FRAND licensing commitment.” In particular, the statement discusses what is in the “public interest” because the eBay test and the Tariff Act governing the ITC name the public interest as a relevant factor.
As I have said before, this joint statement should not be read as a limitation on the careful balance that patent law strikes to optimize the incentive to innovate. There is no special set of rules for exclusion when patents are part of standards. A FRAND commitment does not and should not create a compulsory licensing scheme.
In those cases, as in all cases, the question is what result will optimize the incentives to innovate for the benefit of the public. Since injunctions against infringement frequently do serve the public interest in maintaining a patent system that incentivizes and rewards successful inventors through the process of dynamic competition, enforcement agencies without clear direction otherwise from Congress should not place a thumb on the scale against an injunction in the case of FRAND-encumbered patents.
Despite my clarification of the Antitrust Division’s position on the propriety of these types of injunctions, the potential for confusion remains high because the joint statement from 2013 indicates that an injunction or exclusion order “may harm competition and consumers,” seeming somehow to suggest an antitrust inquiry that is distinct from the goal of optimizing the incentives for innovation—namely, dynamic competition.
This potential for confusion has lead me to a conclusion that I would like to announce here today, in the interest of clarity and predictability of the laws, and among the patent law community with whom we share the goal of incentivizing innovation: The Antitrust Division is hereby withdrawing its assent to the 2013 joint “Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments.”
The 2013 statement has not accurately conveyed our position about when and how patent holders should be able to exclude competitors from practicing their technologies. We will be engaging with the U.S.P.T.O. to draft a new joint statement that better provides clarity and predictability with respect to the balance of interests at stake when an SEP-holder seeks an injunctive order.
Any discussion regarding injunctive relief should include the recognition that in addition to patent holders being able to engage in patent “hold up,” patent implementers are also able to engage in “hold out” once the innovators have already sunk their investment into developing a valuable technology. Additionally, a balanced discussion should recognize that some standard-setting organizations may make it too easy for patent implementers to bargain collectively and achieve sub-optimal concessions from patent holders that undermine the incentive to innovate. That is the topic I want to turn to next.
Although standard-setting organizations can undoubtedly offer enormous benefits to consumers, there are antitrust risks associated with any activity that involves competitors making joint decisions. When there is evidence that participants in a standard-setting organization have engaged in collusion, which is the “supreme evil” of antitrust law, according to the Supreme Court in Trinko, the Division will be inclined to investigate.
For instance, there is a potential antitrust problem where a group of product manufacturers within a standard-setting organization come together to dictate licensing terms to a patent holder as a condition for inclusion in a standard because it may be a collective exertion of monopsony power over the patent holder. . . .
The Antitrust Division will therefore investigate and bring enforcement actions to end practices that eliminate the independent centers of decision-making and thereby harm competitive processes, including price competition and innovation competition. Often a single maverick firm may be willing to take a chance on a new and innovative technology or business model that the rest of its competitors would rather see killed off in its incipiency. Antitrust law recognizes the consumer benefit of those entrepreneurial and innovative tendencies and their vulnerability to collusion.
Although there are certain best practices for guarding the process of standard setting against such abuses, we are concerned that some standard-setting organizations may not even attempt to adopt these safeguards.
. . . Calling your meetings a standard-setting organization, or even in fact publishing some standards necessary for interoperability, is not a free pass for coordination designed to reduce common competitive threats or forestalling innovative developments in the industry that put a legacy business model at risk.
… Patent policies affect the incentives for innovation. If an SSO’s policy is too restrictive for one side or the other, it also risks deterring participation in procompetitive standard setting.
Just as competition in the marketplace results in better outcomes for the consumers of goods and services, competition among standard-setting organizations to adopt better patent policies can result in better outcomes for the consumers of standard-setting activities (that is, for the participants themselves).
It is for this reason that we will take a dim view of any coordinated effort by competitors to stifle competition among standard-setting organizations, including competition to offer the patent policy that brings the most participants to the table. For instance, competitors would come under scrutiny if they orchestrated a group boycott of an SSO with a patent policy that is unfavorable to their commercial interests.