Showing posts with label Procter and Gamble. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Procter and Gamble. Show all posts

Saturday, 15 September 2012

An Innovation Cliff? Is It P&G's Problem or All Our Problem?

Forget Silicon Valley and Apple. If one really wants to understand long-term success in innovation, one should leave the California West Coast and sojourn in the US Midwest. In particular, one should focus on the likes of 3M (in Minneapolis) here and Procter & Gamble (in Cincinnati) here. Is is here, where solid and even stolid trump racy and edgy, that retail innovation has been taking place for multiple decades. What happens at companies like 3M and P&G is crucial to the future countenance of innovation, not merely in the U.S. but globally. For that reason, an article that appeared in the September 7, 2012 issue of Bloomberg Businessweek is worthy of special note.

Entitled "P&G’s 1,000 PhDs Not Enough to Crank Up New Blockbusters" here, the article, written by Lauren Coleman-Lochner and Carol Hymowitz, describes the relative decline in successful innovative activity at P&G, the world's largest consumer product company (think Crest and Pringles) and it offers various explanations for the current state of innovative affairs. P&G is described by a former innovation officer, Larry Huston, as being "largely a branded science company." At the business level, this means that company flourishes when it can "charge premium prices for cutting-edge products." At the product development level, this means that, in the words of Tuck School of Business professor Peter Golder, "P&G is built on creating new categories, and innovation is in its DNA, but they need to rediscover it." If not, the continued likelihood of customers being willing to pay more for a P&G product than other products in the same product space, especially in tough economic times, will prove to be a monumental challenge.

Against this background, consider the P&G innovation scorecard:
1. P&G has not had a homegrown product blockbuster in a decade. This is so, despite employing more than 1,000 PhDs as part of an innovation staff of 8,000 employees spread across 26 innovation facilities world-wide.  
2. R&D spending as a percentage of sales has declined since 2006 (from 3% to 2.60%).  
3. In the words of analyst Victoria Collin, P&G's product offerings have focused on"reformulating, not inventing products." 
 Of particular interest are two factors that the article considers in connection with this relative decline in P&G's innovative activity--outside collaborations and the deleterious affect of decentralized R&D.

As for outside collaboration, the article is unclear how successful it has been. The article gave one example of collaborative success (a wrinkle-reducing ingredient obtained from a French company), but we are not told whether this an isolated instance or merely one example of many successful relationships. The only hint at the answer to this question is that, except for this mention of the wrinkle-reducing ingredient, the rest of the article focuses entirely on internal R&D/innovation activities by the company. This suggests that outside collaborations may not be contributing materially to P&G's innovative activities, although this conclusion may simply be an artifact of the article rather than a reflection of actual circumstances.

As for in-house R&D, the article provides much more information. It seems that, together with more outside collaborations, former CEO A.G. Lafley decentralized R&D activities, giving responsibility to business-unit heads for product development. Presumably, the thinking was that innovation would be enhanced by bringing R&D closer to the business unit likely to commercialize such developments. The result? As they say --au contraire. Between the years 2003-2008, sales from new products declined by nearly 50%. By the year 2009, so-called big product breakthroughs had declined to six a year at the most. Whether an example of unintended consequences or maladroit management ab initio, the ultimate affect of the move to drive innovation closer to the business units was to slow down innovation at the price of tying research results to short-term profit considerations.

Perhaps the biggest question is whether P&G's current innovation slowdown is due more to managerial missteps, such as those described above, or whether there is something more fundamental going on. A similar question is being asked in connection with impending patent cliff faced by the pharmaceutical industry. For both, the issue is the way in which managerial decisions impact on a company's innovation. If the better answer is that managerial errors are largely responsible, then in principle what is needed is primarily for corrective managerial measures to be taken.

Consider, however, another explanation, namely that, for reasons not fully understood, spurts of innovative activity are punctuated by cyclical declines in innovation. Managerial decisions may have marginal impact, but they are not likely, on their own, to accelerate the time line from a period of less innovation to one of higher innovation. This view was well-summarized by the thoughtful Swedish academic Ove Granstrand, who described the ups and downs of innovation activity as "the nature of nature". For a company as large as P&G, a lot rides on getting right the answer to the question above. This is especially if the Granstrand view of innovation is the more correct one. In such a case, too much managerial change intended to accelerate, of whatever kind, may be a drain on resources and less effective in the ultimate result than no, or little change at all.

Sunday, 21 November 2010

Frugal Innovation: Two Titillating Tales


Perhaps the hottest notion floating through international management circles is the idea of "reverse", or "frugal" innovation.  Roughly speaking, the notion is that the time-honoured direction of innovation, namely from West to East/from developed world to developing world, is giving way to a more multi-directional approach. In particular, the idea focuses on emerging markets, such as China and especially India: these markets increasingly have the ability to hone "frugal" innovations intended for the local market, placing a premium on stripping costs while satisfying essential requirements and functionality. The best of these frugal innovations are then ripe for transfer to mature markets as well.

The notion became a particular focus of business school parlour talk after the publication of an article, "How GE is Disrupting Itself", in the Harvard Business Review here, late in 2009, by Jeffrey R. Immelt, Vijay Govindarajan and Chris Trimble. Imeldt is the CEO of GE and Govindarajan, professor at the Tuck Business School at Dartmouth College, is a leading proponent of the "reverse innovation" concept. We ourselves had an early inkling about the potential potency of this concept and already wrote about it on this blog site with great favour in the spring of 2009, here and here.

It is against this backdrop that two recent items drew my intention. The first is a
brief report in the November 13 issue of The Economist, "Tata's Nano: Nah, no." To remind the reader, the Nano is the much-heralded compact car, intended to cost around the equivalent of $2,500 plus taxes, which is meant to address the vehicular needs of the massive emerging middle class in India and elsewhere. I seem to recall that over 100 patent applications were filed in connection with the development of the Nano, which sought to merge world-beating technology in the service of producing frugal innovation at its best. Indeed, the Nano was lauded as a prime example of frugal innovation.

The problem is that there have been relatively few buyers for the car. Cumulative sales to date for 2009 are 40,467 (which seems to me the number of cars struggling to advance at a given moment at any major intersection in Mumbai). Sluggish sales are attributed to the fact that the car is marketed in only a few places in India, the higher-than-expected actual costs, and some early technological glitches in the vehicle. Whatever the reasons, and without discounting the possibility that the Nano might yet become a big success and a bell-wether for frugal innovation in the passenger car industry, its post-natal difficulties point to the dififculties that confront efforts to commercialize the fruits of frugal innovation, first in local markets, such as India, and thereafter to other emerging (and even developed) markets.

The second item was a brief report published on November 18 on Bloomberg.com and written by the prolific Scott Anthony. Entitled "Three Innovation Lessons from the Gillette Guard", it discussed one part of a webinar that will appear as part of an article in the January 2011 issue of "Havard Business Review". Anthony's article describes the efforts of Procter & Gamble to develop a double-edged razor for the Indian market that will meet the requirements of its Indian customers, but which will retail at the price of 15 rupees (about $0.33), with refill cartridges to cost five rupees (about $0.11).


Unlike a previous attempt by P&G in this area, which apparently used MIT graduate students from India, comfortably ensconsed in their Cambridge, Massachusetts surroundings, as its focus group, this time P&G seems to have reached out to actual consumers in the target market to come up with a potentially successful product. As well, P&G appears to have adopted distinctive forms of manufacturing, distribution and promotion for the product. In so doing, according to Anthony, P&G parlayed three fundamental features of product development appropriate for the Indian market: (i) go the source, (ii) delight, don't dilute and (iii) match the model to the market.

What is notable here is that frugal innovation may not be solely the purview of innovators in the emerging market. In this case, the frugal innovation seems to have been carried out by a standard-bearer of the mature market world. The interesting question is whether any of the features adopted by P&G for its Indian-focused market can be repatriated to Western markets. Paying $0.33 for a razor with limited, but satisfactory functionality, and $0.11 for replacement cartridges, sounds like something to which the Western consumer might also be attracted. Or are the economic and cultural demands of the two markets so different that there is nothing that P&G can bring back to its Western markets in connection with this product? And what happens to the P&G brand if there are substantial price differentials, based on the locus of the market, for products of the same category?