USPTO Director Iancu Calls for Change of Focus in so-called "Patent Troll" Debate

USPTO Director Iancu recently gave a speech in Texas concerning the debate involving innovation and patent enforcement by so-called "patent trolls" in the United States.  Notably, he lauds risk takers and innovators, and states that the patent troll narrative is designed to stifle innovation by essentially creating fear about participating in innovation.  He wants to focus on the positive stories of innovation.  He doesn’t appear to take the position that patent trolls (or patent assertion entities) do not abuse the patent system; just that we should focus on the positive by keeping in mind how far we’ve come from an innovation perspective.  He gets pretty close though.  Here’s a relevant portion of his speech:

Anyone could invent in America and everyone was incentivized by our constitutional patent system to do so. And incentivized they were. And invent they did. And the results have been remarkable.

Our constitutional patent system has given rise to a spark of ingenuity and development the magnitude of which humanity has never before known. Electricity and the telephone; the automobile and the airplane; recombinant DNA and DNA synthesis; the microprocessor, genetics and cancer treatments. And so much more. And all of it done with American patents.

Edison, Bell, and the Wright Brothers; Boyer and Cohen and Caruthers; Ted Hoff and Frances Arnold. These are inventors whose work we should celebrate. And theirs are the stories we should tell. Not scary monster stories.

Repeatedly telling “patent troll” stories is indeed odd, especially when they’re being told to the people who have been responsible for the greatest advances in human history.

The narrative must change. And, at least as far as the USPTO is concerned, it has now changed.

We are now focusing on the brilliance of inventors, the excitement of invention, and the incredible benefits they bring to all Americans and to the world.

Take, for example, Bob Metcalfe, currently a professor of innovation and Murchison Fellow of Free Enterprise at the University of Texas in Austin.

By the age of 10, Bob knew he wanted to become an electrical engineer and attend MIT. He did. And followed that up with a master’s and Ph.D. from Harvard. In 1972, Bob began working at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center, where he met electrical and radio engineer D.R. Boggs.

With Boggs, Bob invented what came to be known as the Ethernet, the local area networking (LAN) technology that turns PCs into communication tools by linking them together. Today, more than a billion Ethernet-based devices are shipped every year. And then, in 1979, at the height of his career, Bob took a huge risk and left the comfort of Xerox and founded 3Com Corporation.

An inventor on many U.S. patents, Bob was awarded the National Medal of Technology by President George W. Bush in 2003 for his leadership in the invention, standardization, and commercialization of Ethernet. And in 2007, he was inducted into the National Inventors Hall of Fame.

Bob told us recently: “Rapid execution and patents are probably the two major defense mechanisms against the vicious status quo, which is out to crush you.”

Innovation and IP protection have indeed always been America’s mechanisms for progress in the face of the “vicious status quo.”

Take as another example Susann Keohane, IBM Global Research Leader for the Aging Initiative, another Texas-based inventor. Her inventions combine cognitive technology, the Internet of Things, and other emerging technologies to improve quality of life for people with disabilities and the aging population.

Susann is an IBM Master Inventor who holds 114 U.S. patents. And, importantly, she told me she is working on more!

This is the American patent system. These are the heroes who have taken risks to make something new and to change the world. Theirs are the stories that must drive our patent policies.

Because in this country, we want people to take risks. Like Susann and Bob, we want folks to leave their comfort zones and step into the forests of discovery and innovation. We want folks to step out of their lanes and try big, bold, new things. And scaring them with ugly monster stories does precisely the opposite; it drives towards policies that inhibit innovation.

Remarkably, in what I believe amounts to Orwellian “doublespeak," those who’ve been advancing the patent troll narrative argue that they do so because they are actually pro-innovation. That by their highlighting, relentlessly, the dangers in the patent system, they actually encourage innovation. Right!

After hearing about the Big Bad Wolf eating Little Red Riding Hood and her Grandma, would kids be more eager to go into the woods and more eager to take risks? Come on! What encourages more innovation? Susann Keohane, Bob Metcalfe, Thomas Edison, the Wright Brothers, Frances Arnold—or scary monster stories?

What encourages more folks to take risks and become entrepreneurs and inventors? Is it stories highlighting the success of risk-taking and the personal and public gratification of invention, or is it stories highlighting green monsters under bridges and the faults in the patent system?

Look, people are free to express any point of view, and they can certainly advocate for weakening our patent system. But they should be up front about it. Those who spend their time and money relentlessly preaching the dangers of monsters lurking under the innovation ecosystem, and who work exclusively to identify only faults in the system, are unconvincing when they argue that they are doing so for purposes of increasing innovation.

Certainly, innovation and entrepreneurship are risky. And certainly every system has faults, and we must be vigilant about identifying and eliminating abuses when they arise. I am personally committed to doing so. But for any system to be successful, it cannot focus exclusively on its faults. Successful systems must focus on their goals, successes, and aspirations.

Focusing exclusively on selected, known problems has damaging consequences.

Chemical Company Joins the LOT Network Against Trolls

Covestro, a chemical company which uses digital technologies to build better products, has joined the LOT Network.  As previously discussed, the LOT Network was started to thwart patent trolls.  Essentially, each member agrees to provide a license to the other members of the network if their patent is transferred to a patent troll.  Covestro’s press release states:

“With the convergence of the chemical industry and digital technologies, our sector has increased exposure to PAE litigation,” said Gilbert Voortmans, Vice President, Head of Intellectual Property Rights at Covestro. “Innovation is core to our business, and we feel it’s important to take a stance against anything that could interfere with the fair use of intellectual property.”

Interestingly, this is the first chemical company to join the LOT Network, according to the press release.  We’ll have to see whether other companies in industries generally thought not to be subject to troll suits will join the network, particularly as digital technologies influence almost all industries.  Moreover, I count around 170 members listed on the LOT Network website, including companies ranging from Alibaba to Crate and Barrel to Wells Fargo to Uber to Target to Honda. I wonder if universities should create something like the LOT Network to protect themselves from future suits by university based patents.  

"Opportunistic" Google and Intertrust Launch "Patent Shield": Protection for Startups

Google and Intertrust have announced the creation of Patent Shield, which is designed to protect startups.  Essentially, the exchange is access to a patent portfolio for an equity stake in the startup.  It seems to put startups in the position of a much more resourced company with a portfolio of patents and presumably freedom to operate.  This appears to be another attempt to get ahead of something like the patent troll problem; however, it seems to be aimed at patent demands from entities that are practicing not absolute non-practicing entities because the portfolio is supposed to provide leverage against the entity asserting infringement initially.  Interestingly, this appears to be a great way for Google and Intertrust to find licensing partners for their patented technology without looking like a “bad guy” by operating through patent demand letters—let them come to us.  Very clever.  It also gives Intertrust the opportunity to offer its IP services to startups, and maybe a chance for additional investment/acquisition opportunities through notice about great new startups that have attracted the attention of established players in the market. Very, very clever. For more details, please see here. 

Preparation for (more) Patent Assertion Entites in Europe: Intellectual Property 2 Innovate

As reported by Florian Mueller on the FOSS Patents Blog on April 5, a relatively new organization has been formed to raise awareness of and presumably lobby against patent assertion entities in Europe.  The organization is called Intellectual Property 2 Innovate and its members include: Adidas, Google, Intel, Bull AtWios Technologies, Proximus, Spotify, Wiko, Daimler, the European Semiconductor Industry Association, and Syndicat De Industrie Des Technologies De L'Information.  Notably, the Intellectual Property 2 Innovate website has references to a list of suits brought by patent assertion entities in Europe, media reports concerning patent assertion activity in Europe and third party studies concerning patent assertion entities in Europe.  The website includes link to a helpful seven page position paper, which states in part:

Patents support innovation by allowing companies to protect their technology from copying, to share and develop new technology, and to obtain the freedom to operate necessary to bring new products to market.  But a patent system that can be manipulated through abusive litigation tactics, including the assertion of low quality patents, will undermine rather than support innovation, disserving consumers and the economy by draining scarce resources from the development of new products.

The dramatic rise in patent litigation involving PAEs is a dangerous trend that merits the attention of EU policy makers. In the United States, lawsuits brought by PAEs have nearly quadrupled over the past decade.1 PAEs now account for a majority of all patent litigation.2  Small and medium-sized entities (SMEs) are frequently the targets of these assertions, facing lawsuits that can disrupt their business and even threaten their survival.3,4

In Europe, PAE lawsuits have begun to follow the same trajectory, growing in number and often targeting SMEs.  PAE activity has long existed in Europe, accounting for roughly 10% of the lawsuits filed in Germany between 2000 and 2008 and in the United Kingdom between 2000 and 2013.5 More recent evidence, however, suggests that PAE activity is accelerating rapidly. An empirical study of the registers for recording patent ownership in Europe demonstrated that PAE purchases of European patents increased ten-fold from 2005 to 2015.6 Most of the transferred patents involved communications or computer technology and were purchased by PAEs based in the United States. Those purchases now form the basis of a growing number of PAE lawsuits in Europe against productive companies. European countries together received 80% of all PAE cases filed outside the US over the past five years.7 Germany receives by far the greatest number, with the large majority of those cases proceeding during 2015 and 2016.8 A recent study provides examples of lawsuits brought by PAEs in Europe.9 According to this study, while PAEs account for 19% of known patent lawsuits filed in Europe accounted for in the study, it is nonetheless a significant fraction which will undoubtedly come to increase in the next years. This rate corresponds roughly to the same level of PAE activity in the US in the early 2000s to mid-2005. Despite the alarming data and active discussions amongst the legal community, US public authorities nevertheless did not seriously tackle this problem which has led patent lawsuits to skyrocket in the US since then.

The position paper further suggests: increasing judicial discretion to minimize abusive patent practices and encourage higher quality patents as well as make better data available concerning patent litigation across Europe.  According to the paper, these measures are necessary in light of the soon-to-be operational European Patent Court. 

Stanford Law School Patent Assertion Entity Symposium Call for Proposals

The Stanford Law School is holding a Patent Assertion Entity (PAEs) symposium based on the empirical research of Mark Lemley and Shawn Miller on lawsuits involving PAEs.  Proposals to participate should be based on the research and directed to PAE reform efforts.  This is a timely symposium based on the release of the recent FTC Report on PAEs.  The details are pasted below.

Call for Proposals

PAE Reform Symposium at Stanford Law School

May 11, 2017

We hope that you will be able to join us at the Stanford Patent Litigation Policy Practicum’s Symposium on patent assertion entities (“PAEs”) on May 11, 2017 at Stanford Law School. The Stanford Program in Law, Science & Technology is cosponsoring this event. The Practicum is directed by Professors Mark Lemley and Shawn Miller. Since 2013, over twenty Stanford students have been working to create the Stanford NPE Litigation Dataset (the “dataset”), which when complete will categorize the patentees in all patent lawsuits filed between 2000 and the present as practicing or as one of eleven categories of non-practicing entities (“NPEs”). Several of our NPE categories are different species of PAEs.

 Within the month, we will finalize a 20-percent random sample of all lawsuits filled between 2000 and 2015. The main purpose of this symposium is to bring together scholars, policymakers and practitioners to listen to and discuss presentations by selected researchers who have used this data in empirical studies aimed at informing the debate on the need (or lack of need) for additional patent reform targeting PAEs. 

 We welcome your proposals for research using the dataset. Below are links to our taxonomy for categorizing patent owners and to our completed random sample of cases for the year 2000:

• Taxonomy and methodology (link)
• Sample of cases filed in 2000 (link)

Researchers who are selected to present at the Symposium will receive the entire random sample of over 10,000 lawsuits in early December. We will provide these researchers assistance in obtaining other data, including the patents asserted in each case, as needed. We do not expect completed papers by the date of the Symposium but rather presentations describing the participants’ hypotheses, methodology, empirical results and policy implications.

 Call for Proposals on the following subjects:

• The impact of PAEs on the courts, the patent system, innovation, producers and/or consumers (including in comparison with other types of patent owners).
• Whether patent reform to address PAEs is warranted given the evidence and if so what shape should it take?

 We welcome proposals for projects that would use the entire dataset as well as those focused on particular industries or technologies.

Deadline for submissions:

• December 2, 2016

 PROPOSAL SUBMISSION PROCEDURE: If you are interested in presenting empirical results at the Symposium please send a brief one to two page description of the study you would like to conduct using the Stanford NPE Litigation Dataset to the Practicum's research assistant Kevin Gibson at kpgibson@stanford.edu no later than December 2, 2016. Please include your name, current position and contact information in the e-mail accompanying the submission. 

 COST: There is no registration fee and meals will be provided during the conference. We will cover hotel accommodations and limited travel expenses for researchers whose proposals are selected for presentations.

 Please email Shawn Miller with any questions concerning the symposium, the dataset or the call for proposals: smiller@law.stanford.edu

U.S. Federal Trade Commission Releases Report on Patent Assertion Entities

On October 6, 2016, the Federal Trade Commission [FTC] released a 269 page report titled, "Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study" [Study].  The Study reviews PAE activity from 2009 to 2014.  The press release from the study excerpts some highlights: 

The report found two types of PAEs that use distinctly different business models. One type, referred to in the report as Portfolio PAEs, were strongly capitalized and purchased patents outright. They negotiated broad licenses, covering large patent portfolios, frequently worth more than $1 million. The second, more common, type, referred to in the report as Litigation PAEs, frequently relied on revenue sharing agreements to acquire patents. They overwhelmingly filed infringement lawsuits before securing licenses, which covered a small number of patents and were generally less valuable. 

The report found that, among the PAEs in the study, Litigation PAEs accounted for 96 percent of all patent infringement lawsuits, but generated only about 20 percent of all reported PAE revenues. The report also found that 93 percent of the patent licensing agreements held by Litigation PAEs resulted from litigation, while for Portfolio PAEs that figure was 29 percent. 

The study found that the royalties typically yielded by Litigation PAE licenses were less than the lower bounds of early stage litigation costs. This data is consistent with nuisance litigation, in which defendant companies decide to settle based on the cost of litigation rather than the likelihood of their infringement.

Interestingly, the report relies on the AIPLA economic survey on patent litigation costs to conclude that the majority of Litigation PAE litigation is nuisance litigation.  That merits additional scrutiny, I think.  The Study also includes reforms to address nuisance infringement litigation: 

  

“The FTC recognizes that infringement litigation plays an important role in protecting patent rights, and that a robust judicial system promotes respect for the patent laws. Nuisance infringement litigation, however, can tax judicial resources and divert attention away from productive business behavior,” the report states. With this balance in mind, the FTC proposes reforms to: 

• Address the imbalances between the cost of litigation discovery for PAE plaintiffs and defendants;

• provide the courts and defendants with more information about the plaintiffs that have filed infringement lawsuits;

• streamline multiple cases brought against defendants on the same theories of infringement; and

• provide sufficient notice of these infringement theories as courts continue to develop heightened pleading requirements for patent cases.

Notably, the Study also reviewed " types of patents held by PAEs, and found that 88 percent were in the information and communications technology sectors; more than 75 percent of those patents were software-related patents." Interestingly, some Study PAEs frequently targeted a small number of firms in the "Computer and Electronic Manufacturing" sectors.  Further, the Study "also looked at whether PAEs were able to make money by mass-mailing so-called “demand letters”; however, the FTC observed an “absence of large demand letter campaigns for low-revenue licenses among the Study PAEs.”  This results in the Study stating that reforms concerning demand letters "on its own" would make little difference. 

Notably, the Study includes an review of the wireless chipset sector in particular: 

[T]he report also looked at the wireless chipset sector, examining how reported PAE assertion behavior compared to certain manufacturers and non-practicing entities (NPEs) (who primarily seek to develop and transfer technology ). For this study, the FTC obtained non-public data from eight manufacturers and five NPEs, for the same timeframe using its 6(b) authority. 

The wireless case study found that Litigation PAEs and manufacturers behaved differently. Within the study, Litigation PAEs brought far more infringement lawsuits involving wireless patents—nearly two-and-a-half times as many as manufacturers, NPEs, and Portfolio PAEs combined. Litigation PAE licenses involved simple lump-sum payments with few restrictions, if any, whereas the reported manufacturer licenses frequently included field-of-use restrictions, cross-licenses, and complicated payment terms.

Importantly, the Study does not draw conclusions concerning the merits of PAE activity in monetizing inventions for inventors and innovators: 

Study PAEs had diverse and heterogeneous data-keeping practices. As a result, the FTC does not report how much revenue PAEs shared with others, including independent inventors, or the costs of assertion activity. The FTC sought to evaluate the role of PAE activity in promoting patent monetization for inventors and innovation as part of its study. Towards that end, the FTC requested that Responding PAEs provide detailed data describing how they shared licensing revenue with outside parties and their costs of patent assertion. Responding PAEs used different methods to maintain information describing their revenue sharing and costs, however, which prevented any meaningful comparison of the degree of revenue sharing by PAEs or their assertion costs. For example, some Responding PAEs viewed payments to outside counsel as a cost of patent assertion, but others viewed such payments as revenue sharing (counsel often received a fixed proportion of licensing royalties). Moreover, the majority of Responding PAEs did not maintain information on assertion costs, and only a few Responding PAEs provided such data at either the Affiliate level or assertion campaign level. For these reasons, we did not analyze either the proportion of licensing revenue that they shared with outside parties, or the costs of patent assertion. Due to this limited data, this report does not address the efficiency of PAE business models. [emphasis added].

And, what impact will Alice have?  The Study notes that "it did not collect enough information regarding patent assertion after the Alice decision" to "directly measure" Alice's impact, but: 

In addition, because more than 75% of the patents in the FTC’s sample likely include software-related claims, and because the FTC estimates that Study PAEs held more than 75% of all U.S. patents held by PAEs at the end of 2013, any change in PAE behavior with respect to software patents that results from Alice will likely have a significant impact on both the overall volume of PAE assertion and the types of technologies that PAEs assert.

Study PAEs generated about $4 billion in licensing revenue.  And, the Study noted, "Fewer Than 1% of Study Patents Were Identified as Encumbered by a FRAND Commitment to a SSO."  [Hat tip to Professor Dennis Crouch's Patently Obvious Blog.]

Google's License on Transfer Network: A Good Way to Avoid Patent Trolls?

Google, along with a number of other companies, started the License On Transfer (LOT) Network on July 9, 2014.  The general purpose of the program is to reduce the risk of being sued by a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) for network participants.  The danger present for all market participants is that an operating company with patent assets may fall on hard times and have to sell their patents to a PAE or may just choose to do so.  The LOT Network protects its members from suit from patents acquired by PAEs from their members.  Essentially, all parties agree that if one of the patents potentially subject to the license (the network members' patent portfolios) is transferred to a PAE then the license is effective as to that patent.  This means that the members of the LOT Network are basically immune from an infringement suit under that patent from the PAE once the transfer to a PAE occurs.  The agreement is carefully drafted to exclude “triggering events” from including transfers to non-PAE’s. The agreement can be found, here.  According to a presentation concerning the program, the members of the group have been insulated from at least one transfer of a subject patent to a Japanese PAE. 

There are currently 325,000 patent assets, including 99,000 US patents subject to the LOT Network.  The current membership of 47 companies includes: 3D Robotics, Inc., AddShoppers, Inc., Asana, Be Labs, Binatone Electronics, Breezy Print, CAN Telematics, Canon, Cinfo Contenidos Informativos Personalizados SL, Civis Analytics, Cloudability, Corvado, Cyclica, Dropbox, Edyt, Emaldo Techonolgies, Enplug, EPHE Corp., Ford Motor Company, GitHub, Google, Great Wave Tech, HLCA Media, Indri, Inductive Automation, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Kairos AR Inc., Khan Academy, Marine Traffic, Mazda Motor Corp., Naehas, Newegg, Pandora Media, Pure Storage, Red Hat, Ring Partner, Rocket Matter, SAASPASS, Sabai Technology, SAP SE, SAS Institute, SilverEdge, Sipree, SolarCity, Theralytics, Uber Technologies, and the Wikipedia Foundation.  This appears to be a particularly attractive option for companies without a lot of patents that may be sued by PAEs.  To join, you only need to pay a reasonable fee based on your companies’ annual revenue.  I suppose one downside is that the value of your patent may be less given that a potential PAE buyer will have fewer entities to sue.  Are there any other downsides? 

Who are the “Good” “Trolls”? Or, How to Monetize Well?

This blog, in the past, has discussed the merits of so-called “patent trolls” or patent assertion entities (PAEs), here, here and here.  For sure, some PAEs or "trolls" provide a helpful service for firms, universities and some inventors without the wherewithal to enforce their patents.  And, defining exactly what is a “troll” may be a difficult task.  But, are all PAEs and “trolls” the same?  Are there good PAEs and “trolls”, and bad PAEs and “trolls”?  How do you tell the difference?  Joe Beyers and Wayne P. Sobon (both of Inventergy) recently published an article on Corporate Counsel titled, “Do’s and Don’ts of Corporate Patent Monetization.”  The article helpfully explains why patent owners should beware the bad “trolls” or PAEs and should partner with the good “trolls” or PAEs.  Why should they be concerned?  The authors wisely state that protection of the brand is paramount.  Association with a “bad” PAE or “troll” could reflect negatively upon the patent owner.  The authors provide a list of criteria for choosing a “licensing partner”.  Here are the “Don’ts”:

1. DON’T choose a licensor with a reputation for acquiring poor-quality patents and quickly suing.

2. DON’T select a licensor with a history of settling claims for a lot less than the cost of litigation (i.e., “nuisance fees”).

3. DON’T work with a licensor that sends widespread demand letters to multiple companies with little or no evidence that its patents are being infringed.

4. DON’T use a licensor that’s been the subject of any state actions or consent decrees, or has been forced to pay an opposing party’s attorneys’ fees.

5. DON’T partner with a licensor that operates behind hidden shell companies or otherwise has a reputation for abusive patent assertion behavior.

Here are the Do’s:

1. DO select a licensor that has made a public commitment to transparency and ethical business practices—and then speak with its licensees to confirm that this commitment is genuine in deed as well as word.

2. DO work with a licensor that seeks licenses only from appropriate companies (rather than startups or small retail businesses), and that comes to negotiations with substantive claim charts and other evidence of use.

3. DO choose a licensor that selects, owns and manages high-quality patent assets developed by global operating companies with reputations for innovation, like you.

4. DO use a licensor that takes active steps and commits material resources to ensure the quality of its patents, and vets them prior to licensing.

5. DO ensure that members of the licensor’s executive team have product or service company experience, and understand the needs and concerns of companies like yours regarding patent value creation.

This brings me to my next question.  Well readers, who are the “good” “PAEs” or “trolls”?  Please name them.  

I suppose maybe there are no “trolls”--just naughty behavior. 

A Sensible Approach to the "Patent Troll" Debate in the US

Professor Timothy Holbrook of Emory University Law School has written a very sensible Op-ed titled, "Not all patent trolls are demons," that is published by CNN, here, in light of the "shotgun approach" to fixing the "Patent Troll" issue by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), Congress, and the US courts.  Indeed, on February 20, 2014, the White House announced three new executive actions: 1) crowd sourcing prior art with the USPTO; 2) more robust technical training at the USPTO; and 3) pro bono and pro se assistance coordinated through the USPTO.  (Although I do think all three of these actions are wise.)  Professor Holbrook states:

What is lost in this mudslinging is that much of what PAEs do is laudable — paying inventors. Patents don't grow on trees. Someone came up with the invention and incurred considerable expense to obtain the patent. Many inventors can't bring their invention to market themselves, however, so selling the patent may be the only way for them to make money. By buying these patents, PAEs compensate inventors, one of patent law's objectives.  

Patents give their owners the right to seek compensation for unauthorized uses of the invention, so there is nothing wrong with a PAE enforcing a valid patent.

The key word, though, is valid. Problems arise when PAEs sue on improperly issued patents, ones that never should have gotten out of the US Patent and Trademark Office.

For example, many patents on software and business methods -- areas where PAEs often operate -- are not sufficiently different from earlier technology to justify the patent, or are too vague to discern what they legitimately cover. Even though companies can knock these patents out in court, most parties settle. But, if they aren't legitimate patents, why do parties settle? Simple: to avoid the expense.

According to a 2013 American Intellectual Property Law Association survey, median litigation costs are $3.3 million when $10 million to $25 million is at stake. Discovery -- the process of looking for evidence relevant to the case --is responsible for much of the expense. Defendants must wade through voluminous records and e-mails to find anything relevant to the case. For a case worth $10 million to $25 million, the survey estimates that the median cost through discovery in defending a PAE suit is $1.5 million.

A PAE doesn't face these expenses. Discovery is easy for it because all it has is the patent. Plus, its lawyers usually take these cases on contingency, taking a percentage of whatever money they bring in, so there are no upfront attorney costs. When manufacturing companies face these costs, many simply settle, leaving the invalid patent in place.

But these are not troll problems; they are litigation and patent quality issues. Scapegoating trolls risks disrupting the useful compensatory purpose they serve and may cause unintended consequences in non-troll litigation.

Professor Holbrook is not supportive of some of the legislative proposals; however, he does seem to think the President’s recent executive actions are solid.  Do you agree?