Members of the Five Eyes recently provided a brief overview of the threat of technology theft concerning China on the U.S. 60 Minutes show. The interview includes brief mention of academic security as well as election influence. The interview can be found, here.
"Where money issues meet IP rights". This weblog looks at financial issues for intellectual property rights: securitisation and collateral, IP valuation for acquisition and balance sheet purposes, tax and R&D breaks, film and product finance, calculating quantum of damages--anything that happens where IP meets money.
Friday, 27 October 2023
Wednesday, 18 October 2023
IP Valuation for Investment - Free Webinar 25th October 2023, 15:00BST
IP Valuation for Investment
Attracting investment is vital for sustaining and growing
innovative businesses. Intellectual property is often crucial in attracting
capital, and so proper valuation and management of IP is essential to the success
of the business. This panel discussion considers the best way to approach using
IP valuation to attract investment, drawing on the diverse and extensive
experiences of our excellent panelists.
About the Speakers
Olivia Tsai, Assistant General Counsel & Head of IP at Cruise
Olivia
Tsai is Assistant General Counsel and Head of IP at Cruise, a position she has
held for the last six years. In this role, Olivia draws on her extensive
experience in intellectual property and a background in electrical engineering.
Cruise is a $30 billion autonomous all electric vehicle company in founded in
2013 and based in San Fransisco, and its driverless cars can also be found in
Austin and Phoenix.
Cara Wessel Wells, Founder & CEO of EmGenisys
Cara Wessels Wells, PhD is the
founder and CEO of EmGenisys. Based in Texas, Cara has a background in Animal
Sciences and Reproductive Physiology. EmGenisys provides comprehensive health
evaluations of embryos using machine learning models to non-invasively analyze
changes and improve pregnancy rates by up to 20% in both livestock species and
clinical human IVF. Cara brings an invaluable startup perspective to this
discussion.
Tracy W. Druce, Partner at Novak Druce Carroll
Tracy Druce has 25 years of
experience in intellectual property and is a founding partner at Novak Druce
Carroll LLP. Tracy counsels companies of all sizes on intellectual property
creation, management and exploitation, and these companies are frequently in
industries where the technology is fast moving. Tracy works to establish
monetizable intellectual property portfolios through a thorough understanding
of the relevant market and close collaboration with his clients. Tracy will
chair this webinar.
Dr. Roya Ghafele, Managing Director at OxFirst
Dr. Roya Ghafele is the founder and
Managing Director of OxFirst, an award-winning law and economics consultancy.
Much of its work is with tech companies as well as advising on public
policymaking in the area of technology transfer. Dr. Ghafele is a visiting
Professor at Brunel University, London as well as being an accredited expert
witness to courts in England and Wales. Prior to founding OxFirst, Dr. Ghafele
held an Assistant Professorship with the University of Edinburgh, a
Departmental Lectureship with Oxford University and a Research Fellowship with
the Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley. She also
worked for the OECD and WIPO as an economist.
Register
in advance for this webinar:
https://oxfirst.com/ip-valuation-for-investment/
Attention, please sign up with your professional email
account. We don’t accept registrations from personal email addresses.
Participation is limited at 100 participants. We reserve the right to eliminate
participants. By joining the webinar you agree to our Privacy Policy and to receive forthcoming information on our webinars,
newsletters and events. The views in this talk are the speaker’s own and do not
represent those of the organizers, its employees or consultants.
Thursday, 5 October 2023
UK Rejoins Horizon Europe - Implications for patent value
Earlier this month, Prime
Minister Rishi Sunak announced that the UK will associate to Horizon Europe
and the Copernicus Earth observation programme. This association and future
membership is good news for British innovators who can once more now lead
collaborations with their European colleagues and obtain the necessary funding
to make the next generation of scientific breakthroughs.
Horizon Europe is the ninth European Union (EU) framework
programme funding research, technological development and innovation and runs
between 2021 and 2027. Although a product of the EU, Horizon also includes several
members outside of the Union: Israel, New Zealand and Ukraine also participate.
Copernicus is an Earth observation programme managed by the European Commission
(EC).
Researchers in the UK are now able to apply for grants and
bid to lead projects under the Horizon programme. Almost €100 billion is available under the
programme over its lifetime, and under the previous framework – Horizon 2020 – UK
researchers received about 14% of the available grants.
The UK has a particularly strong research sector, and that
will only be further supported through renewed access to the Horizon programme.
Private sector research and development (R&D) is worth £43 billion to the
UK each year and many companies spin out of UK universities each year on the
back of a great innovation; Oxford alone has generated 205
spinouts since 2011.
As UK R&D resumes its cooperation with European partners
in a leadership role, careful attention should be paid to intellectual property
(IP) from the outset. Translating the innovations of the lab to the marketplace
where their life-changing effect can be felt requires well-informed IP strategy
and an acute awareness of how IP functions as an economic asset.
In a previous article, we discussed how IP can be utilised
throughout a company’s lifecycle to raise capital (which you can read there here) but at each phase proper valuation of a company’s IP
is crucial. Raising capital through IP is likely to be most important for
startups and spinouts, where other assets might be limited and a financial
injection is required to bring the latest breakthrough to the market. OxFirst has
previously assisted a young Software as a Service (SaaS) access over £25
million in funding through a patent valuation. This patent valuation enabled
the company’s value proposition to be effectively communicated to investors, persuading
them to invest.
Outside of raising capital, proper management of IP is also vital
for effective commercialisation of IP. Patent filings have grown at roughly 10%
year on year, but evidence shows that only a fraction of that IP can be linked
to commercial activity. Bridging the gap between law and economics, is important for developing an effective IP strategy that will support
business growth and ensure proper IP utilisation.
A first important step is knowing where you stand: innovative
companies benefit from understanding the patent landscape in which they find
themselves. Patent landscape reports combine IP data with a comprehensive
market understanding to generate actionable insights. These reports can assist
in identifying potential partners and competitors, as well as broader trends
within the landscape that can inform how the company should most effectively manage
its IP.
Once opportunities have been identified, the next step for decisionmakers is to consider how their IP assets might be most effectively commercialised. One approach is licensing, and IP valuation are an important instrument to support companies commercialise their IP assets in this way. Selling IP might also be an attractive option, and IP valuations helped determine the patent prize in a patent sale.
Knowing what and how IP can be most effectively
commercialised is fundamental to a successful IP strategy, and it is only by
understanding in detail the economic implications of IP management approaches
that this can be realised. Whether it is raising capital, commercialisation
through licensing, IP sales or IP intelligence, bringing economic evaluation to the management of IP and achieving
success for innovators.
Wednesday, 4 October 2023
ITA-NIST-USPTO Collaboration Requests Comments on Standards
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has
recently announced a collaboration with the International Trade Administration
(ITA) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) on
standards in intellectual property (IP) and is
requesting comments. It develops on the National
Standards Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies released in May
this year. That strategy called for a strengthening of US engagement in
standards for such technologies, which includes communication and networking,
semiconductors, artificial intelligence/machine learning, clean energy and
quantum technologies.
This request invites respondents to answer 12 questions
concerning a range of issues including fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
(FRAND) licensing practices, licensing rates and negotiations of them, the
merits of a database of FRAND licensing rates (judicially determined or voluntarily
publicised), and dispute resolution processes including alternative dispute
resolution. The request is therefore wide-ranging, as expected with such an
early stage of policy formation, but must be read in light of – and perhaps as
a response to – the recent proposal
by the European commission on the regulation of standard essential patents
(SEPs) (which I have already covered and you can read about here
and here).
The US has developed fairly substantial guidance on methods
for FRAND valuation through the Courts, but at present there is no government
position. This collaboration could take a number of forms, one of which may be
a centrally determined valuation approach for FRAND licensing, similar to that
likely under the EC’s SEP proposal. Should this be the direction taken by the
ITA-NIST-USPTO, a range of FRAND valuation approaches are open to them.
We profile three of these: the top-down, comparable
licenses, and incremental ex-ante approaches, but it is worth noting that many
approaches exist. These three have been selected to illustrate the range of
factors which may need to be considered when establishing FRAND royalty rates
and why economic expertise is vital when establishing the value of SEPs and
commensurate FRAND rates.
The top-down approach
The top-down
approach determines a FRAND royalty rate for the standard as a whole and then
distributes that value among the various patents that read on the standard. The
method then seeks to split the cumulative royalty rate among all SEPs deemed
essential to the standard. This approach conventionally begins with calculating
the total aggregate royalty burden for all patents reading on a particular
standard. As such, it
caps the total royalty burden a licensee may have to pay. In such a scenario,
the number of entities holding and asserting SEPs becomes irrelevant as the
maximum royalty burden has been determined in advance.
The comparable licenses approach
The
comparable license approach aims to determine a FRAND royalty rate with
reference to extant, similarly situated licensing transactions. As a method,
its approach to identify the worth of a licensing rate with reference to other
known rates is quite intuitive. When identifying comparable licenses,
particular attention must be paid to how one establishes comparability and what
one qualifies as a comparable licensing rate. The courts are just one
repository of the guidance. From an economic perspective, it is important the
comparable license is transparent and can be read as a whole; the licensing
package needs to be understood as a whole, and not just the licensing rate.
Careful econometric analysis is therefore employed to derive a FRAND licensing
rate from the licenses deemed comparable.
The incremental
ex-ante approach
The
incremental ex ante approach is concerned with differentiating the value that
the patents bring to the product, as compared to the value that the patents
derive from the act of setting a standard, which naturally imparts a value onto
the SEP. This approach allows a determination of what a willing licensor and
licensee would have paid for the patent(s) before it was recognized as being
essential to a standard. Since royalties are often determined after the
standard setting process is concluded, the patent holder’s bargaining position
at the time of royalty negotiation (ex-post) can be very different from what it
would have been before the standard was set and when alternatives were still
available (ex-ante). This is what this approach seeks to encapsulate.
It is also worthwhile
noting that elements of different approaches may be combined according to the
circumstances of each case, and establishing FRAND licensing rates with a high
degree of confidence often requires utilisation of more than one
approach. For this reason, economic expertise in the valuation of SEPs for
FRAND licensing is essential.
Thursday, 28 September 2023
European policies for competition and growth in ICT through regulation of Big Tech, network operators and standard-essential technology licensing
Big Tech companies have profited greatly from dominant market positions while riding largely for free over the top of fixed and mobile telecom networks and devices. The entire Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) ecosystem is enabled by a variety of interoperability technologies including 5G cellular, WiFi and HEVC/H.265 video compression that are openly available in published standards and embedded in components and end-products. How much, if anything, should beneficiaries pay for the capabilities upon which their standard-based implementations are built?
There are great expectations that technology and market developments will provide yet more stellar economic growth and improved consumer welfare in ICT with new innovations in Artificial Intelligence (AI), the metaverse (e.g. Augmented Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR)) and the Internet of Things (IoT). This is a high stakes game with some players having fared rather better than others as computing, communications, applications and Internet-based services have advanced over the last couple of decades. Big Tech companies continue growing handsomely to command a large and ever-increasing proportion of total ecosystem revenues, as I have noted here before.
European policies to regulate ICT markets in various ways that will redistribute rewards and costs are being formulated following various public consultations and extensive lobbying. Regulation is unquestionably required in data protection, child protection and cyber security, as it is in health and safety. Measures to preserve national security are also required, but excessive restrictions there can be a dubious pretext for over-reach with anti-competitive protectionism. Regulating competition in other ways is also questionable and should only be contemplated where there is clear evidence of market failure or harm to consumers. Reformers should also tread carefully to ensure that remedies don’t do more harm than good through unintended consequences.
Three proposed interventions to guide the invisible hand
In unregulated or lightly regulated markets, competition and growth can develop most dynamically among different players, technologies and business models. Nevertheless, significant interventions are being pursued in ICT where there have been many successes with enormous and widespread market growth and benefit to consumers. A firm’s market dominance, abnormally high growth and profits might or might not result from anticompetitive abuse. Making a determination on that — one way or the other — requires extensive investigations and ties up lots of limited public agency resources. We should be wary of those accused of such abuse when they seek to distract regulators from that contention by claiming it is those in other markets who are causing market failure or harm to competition.
Two major EU interventions have been conceived to reign-in the dominance of Big Tech companies over others with whom they compete or depend. A third intervention—with the pretext of protecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) from abusive patent licensing—will perversely have the opposite effect. It bolsters Big Tech and major industrial firms such as car manufacturers against the major value generators in the ICT ecosystem that create the standardized technologies that everyone benefits from using.
Gatekeepers and other Core Platform Service competitors
America’s Big Tech companies—Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta and Microsoft—are deemed to be so big and powerful that they have been identified as “gatekeepers” by the European Commission under its Digital Markets Act, as has China’s ByteDance. Gatekeeper designations reflect positions in search, browsers, operating systems and video sharing among other Core Platform Services. The success of these companies is illustrated by those American companies’ combined market value increasing by a half to $9 trillion this year. Prospective regulation could limit the extent to which they own and how they offer and operate complementary services, such as in bundling. Similarly, in the US, Alphabet is being sued by the Department of Justice for abusing its dominant position in search to distort the market, for example, by making Google the default on most smartphones and browsers.
It remains to be seen whether regulating gatekeepers will foster more competition, innovation or economic value overall versus other Core Platform Service providers. Figuring out what kinds of structures and behaviors are anti-competitive is difficult in markets where prices are zero for consumers who pay in-kind by being targeted for advertising and who like the simplicity of bundled and integrated offerings. What’s not to like about also getting free deliveries when one subscribes to Amazon Prime Video? A recent article in the Economist heralds Garmin in fitness trackers, Dropbox in cloud storage and Mercado-Libre in Latin American e-commerce as examples of companies that have succeeded in growing revenues in competition with the Big Tech firms. Market failure and harm is difficult to prove because counterfactuals—in the but for world— cannot be observed. Attempts to block acquisitions by Big Tech companies, manipulate their offerings or even break them up will surely be met with extensive and vigorous legal challenges.
Network cost sharing
Telco industry groups GSMA and European Telecommunications Network Operators’ Association (ETNO) have demanded that companies such as those above they depict as Large Traffic Generators (LTGs), and that are sometimes called Large Traffic Originators (LTOs), should pay their “fair share” of the costs to provide broadband Internet access. The sender-pays principle is based on a long-standing grievance of large telecom operators that Big Tech companies generate the majority of traffic and reap most of the benefits of the Internet economy while not chipping in with the costs. The European Parliament concurred in a June 2023 resolution:
“that the economic sustainability of telecom networks is essential to achieving the 2030 Digital Compass connectivity targets and high-performance connectivity for all citizens within the EU without jeopardizing competition rules; urges the commission to address and mitigate persistent asymmetries in bargaining power as set out by the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade; calls for the establishment of a policy framework where large traffic generators contribute fairly to the adequate funding of telecom networks without prejudice to net neutrality.”
Most network traffic is video and this proportion continues to increase. Alphabet’s YouTube, Amazon’s Prime Video and ByteDance’s TikTok among others are evidently major originators of network traffic.
There is a clear need to keep increasing network capacity to accommodate data traffic growth. According Ericsson’s Mobility Reports, mobile network traffic has doubled every couple of years over the last decade or so. Fixed network traffic has also surged in multiples over recent years. A WIK-Consult study for the Commission found that €174-200 billion is needed to achieve Europe’s 2030 Connectivity Targets, including 5G coverage of all populated areas and gigabit-speed fiber. As reported by Compass Lexecon, ETNO estimates previous investments of €36-40 billion per year, of which roughly half are traffic related and could have been saved absent the largest content providers’ traffic. According to HSBC, the average return on invested capital for major listed European telcos fell from around 8% in 2012 to around 5% in 2020, with many not achieving their cost of capital.
There is disagreement about those investment figures. Opposing interests argue that the correct figures show there is no investment gap, and so subsidization by tech would result in excess profits for big telcos. However, the validity of the sub-par return on invested capital figure above does not appear to have been challenged. Big Tech companies have much higher rates of return.
A Compass Lexecon research paper concludes there is market failure. Its economic analysis shows that, where data usage is unlimited for a fixed price per month, there will be under-investment in access networks. Network operators do not have the incentive to maximize investment where incremental traffic generates no additional revenue. While LTOs invest in infrastructure such as content delivery networks, they have no incentive to increase their own costs by investing in access networks to the benefit their direct competitors. Perversely, Europe’s Open Internet Regulation (i.e. net neutrality requirements) only exacerbates this shortcoming because it prohibits allowing a traffic generator to make payments to prioritize or improve its services versus competitors’.
Incremental capacity investments need to generate incremental revenues to provide a return on such investments. There is a very clear and direct causal relationship between the amount of traffic generated and the network capacity required to carry it. For example, 1 Gbps connections that can reliably carry 1 Tbytes per month will be required as video streaming almost entirely displaces multichannel terrestrial, satellite and cable distribution, eventually. The Big Tech firms can afford to contribute because they derive incremental revenues as the traffic they originate (e.g. as requested by customers) or generate themselves (e.g. advertising) increases. If charges on them are even-handed versus their direct competitors they will all benefit, as will end users and the network operators. There is precedent elsewhere for cost sharing. In Korea, SKBroadband and SKTelecom have ended their dispute with Netflix and instead forged a partnership in which Netflix service is purchased in a subscription that presumably enables some of the network operator’s costs to be covered.
Transparency and predictability in SEP licensing
While the Commission’s own studies have found no market failure in Standard-Essential Patent (SEP) licensing, proposed legislation requires licensors to register their patents and have some of them checked for essentiality. Proposals also include the setting of aggregate royalties, and mandatory but non-binding conciliation in the determination of Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) royalty rates.
Purported objectives for “improving the SEP licensing system” include providing transparency and predictability—for example, to SMEs with little or no expertise in licensing. However, licensors claim the associated costs and delays will weaken their positions and devalue their SEPs.
Some MNOs lobbied to lower royalties as handset costs increased with the introduction of 3G and then 4G in the 2000s. Mobile phones were significantly morphing from mere voice and text devices to smartphones back then. Today’s Big Tech companies showed little interest in mobile SEP licensing until the introduction of the iPhone in 2007 and of Android in 2008. Many Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) subsequently entered the smartphone market without ownership of SEPs.
Comments favoring the Commission’s proposals to regulate royalty rates and licensing are significantly by Apple, automotive manufacturers and trade groups representing implementers and in some cases funded by the above. The current Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU is also a fan. The proposed new ministry of patent counting that will also be responsible for setting royalty rates will be at the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) in Alicante. Major SEP owners and licensors are largely against the proposals. Among the 78 responses to the Commission’s request for feedback on its proposed SEP legislation, the only response from a network operator was from Japan’s NTT DoCoMo, which is also an SEP owner. It also notes that “Regulation imposes excessive tasks and costs on SEP holders, even though it is unclear whether SEP holders will receive a fair and adequate return for their efforts.” It seems Europe’s network operators are prioritizing their more pressing concerns about network costs, as indicated above, over getting involved too deeply in the public debate on SEP licensing.
Europe has enormous existing assets and potential in development and exploitation of new ICT including 5G Advanced, 6G, IoT and AI. For example, Ericsson and Nokia are global leaders in innovation and standards development for communications and video compression technologies. This needs to be nurtured not undermined. They have each invested around one billion dollars in R&D annually over many years. SEP licensing growth to support further innovation in standards should be fostered not attenuated by regulation. Licensing growth with bilateral and multilateral programs to increase licensing in verticals will encourage development of valuable standard-essential technologies that focus on those verticals. For example, SEP licensing in cars by Avanci has encouraged development of C-V2X technologies in 4G and 5G. Licensing charges at a maximum of $20 for 4G and $32 for 5G per car are small in comparison to the existential threat posed to incumbent OEMs by them being marginalized in provision of value-added ICT services by Big Tech platforms or by being entirely displaced by new-entrant OEMs in Electric Vehicles (EVs), with alternative distribution and customer relationship models, such as Tesla and BYD.
Harms, litigation and cures
It is abundantly clear that Big Tech platforms are commanding the lion’s share of any economic surplus in consumer ICT markets. Network operators, standard-essential technology developers and many implementers are much less profitable or rated far more modestly for expected growth.
While I doubt examples of growth by Garmin, Dropbox and Mercardo-Libre will be sufficient to placate the European authorities, market failure and harm to other Core Platform Services providers will be difficult to prove. Vigorous legal challenges to any proposed interventions are inevitable.
Elsewhere, intervention is warranted in dysfunctional markets where some companies are flourishing while others upon whom they depend are unable to make the investment and returns required to provide what consumers want and need. Society will benefit socially and economically from ubiquitous fixed and mobile gigabit per second and gigabyte per month broadband.
However, the EU’s proposed regulation in SEPs will diminish SEP licensing costs to the detriment of the licensors who invest in developing the standard-essential technologies that are openly employed by numerous others. No good will come from biting off the hands that feed the entire ecosystem with new and useful standard-based technologies. There is no sign of harm from the SEP licensing business model. On the contrary, this has substantially enabled the very success that America’s Big Tech companies and the predominantly Asian smartphone OEMs have enjoyed from cellular and video standards with an increasingly mobile-first approach in the provision of many ICT services. In most cases these companies contribute little to the cellular and video technology standards development processes. In technology standards development it is a relatively small number of companies that own and license the vast majority of patents declared standard essential, in comparison to the many more firms that implement them.
This article was originally published by RCR Wireless on 27th September 2023.
Saturday, 23 September 2023
U.S. Strategy for Standards for Critical and Emerging Tech
In May of 2023, the White House published a document titled, “United States Government National Standards Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies.” The Executive Summary states:
Strength in standards development has been instrumental to
the United States’ global technological leadership. Standards development
underpins economic prosperity across the country and fortifies U.S. leadership
in the industries of the future at the same time. Bolstering U.S. engagement in
standards for critical and emerging technology (CET) spaces will strengthen
U.S. economic and national security. The U.S. Government has long engaged in
these standards development processes through an approach built on transparency,
private sector and public sector leadership, and stakeholder engagement—a
process that reflects the United States’ commitment to free and fair market
competition in which the best technologies come to market. Government support
for scientific research and development (R&D), an open investment climate,
and the rule of law have also been critical for U.S. standards leadership.
America’s workers, economy, and society have benefited significantly as a
result, as have those of like-minded nations alongside which the United States
has collaborated to forge technological progress.
Today, however, the United States faces challenges to its
longstanding standards leadership, and to the core principles of international
standard-setting that, together with like-minded partners, we have upheld for
decades. Strategic competitors are actively seeking to influence international
standards development, particularly for CET, to advance their
military-industrial policies and autocratic objectives, including blocking the
free flow of information and slowing innovation in other countries, by tilting
what should be a neutral playing field to their own advantage.
The United States must renew our commitment to the
rules-based and private sector-led approach to standards development, and
complement the innovative power of the private sector with strategic government
and economic policies, public engagements, and investments in CET. By
supporting our unrivaled innovation ecosystem and related international
standards development as part of a modern industrial strategy, we can ensure
that CET are developed and deployed in ways that benefit not only the United
States but all who seek to promote and advance technological progress.
Strengthening the U.S. approach to standards development will lead to standards
that are technologically sound, earn people’s trust, reflect our values, and
help U.S. industry compete on a level playing field.
This strategy outlines how the U.S. Government will
strengthen U.S. leadership and competitiveness in international standards
development, and ensure that the “rules of the road” for CET standards embrace
transparency, openness, impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and
relevance, coherence, and broad participation.
An Excellent Draft Article: "Valuing Social Data"
Professors Amanda Parsons and Salome Viljoen have published a draft on SSRN titled, “Valuing Social Data.” The draft is excellent, provides numerous insights and includes a very nice literature review.
Here is the abstract:
Social data production is a unique form of value creation
that characterizes informational capitalism. Social data production also
presents critical challenges for the various legal regimes that are
encountering it. This Article provides legal scholars and policymakers with the
tools to comprehend this new form of value creation through two descriptive
contributions. First, it presents a theoretical account of social data, a mode
of production which is cultivated and exploited for two distinct (albeit related)
forms of value: prediction value and exchange value. Second, it creates and
defends a taxonomy of three “scripts” that companies follow to build up and
leverage prediction value and describes the normative and legal ramifications
of these scripts.
The Article then applies these descriptive contributions to demonstrate how
legal regimes are failing to effectively regulate social data value creation.
Through the examples of tax law and data privacy law, it demonstrates these
struggles in both legal regimes that have historically regulated value
creation, like tax law, and legal regimes that have been newly tasked with
regulating value creation by informational capitalism, like privacy and data
protection law.
The Article argues that separately analyzing data’s prediction value and its
exchange value may be helpful to understanding the challenges the law faces in
governing social data production and the political economy surrounding such
production. This improved understanding will equip legal scholars to better
confront the harms of law’s failures in the face of informational capitalism,
reduce legal arbitrage by powerful actors, and facilitate opportunities to
maximize the beneficial potential of social data value.
Wednesday, 30 August 2023
California Institute of Regenerative Medicine Issues Grants
The California Institute of Regenerative Medicine recently announced several grants to fund clinical stage research. Importantly, CIRM has many different requirements than those offered under the Bayh-Dole Act. The Press Release states:
South San Francisco, CA – The California
Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM), the world’s largest institution
dedicated to regenerative medicine, today awarded $50.1 million to fund
clinical-stage research projects aimed at advancing stem cell and gene therapy
treatments for a variety conditions ranging from neurodegenerative diseases and
blood cancers to HIV/AIDS.
The awards will support six projects in the Agency’s clinical
program which provides funding for eligible stem cell and gene
therapy-based projects through any stage of clinical trial activity.
The awards include: [Aspera Biomedicines, AcuraStem, Regenerative
Path Technologies and the City of Hope].
Among the awards is a $12.4 million grant to support
Regenerative Patch Technologies LLC in a Phase 2b clinical trial to evaluate
the safety and efficacy of a retinal pigmented epithelial (RPE) implant. The
implant will be evaluated in patients with geographic atrophy, a late-stage
form of age-related macular degeneration (AMD), a common condition that can
lead to vision loss in older adults.
The RPE is an important cell layer that supports the retina
and plays a critical role in maintaining vision. In geographic atrophy, RPE
cells break down over time, leading to impaired vision and a loss of
independence.
The stem cell-based implant aims to promote the survival and
function of the retina, protecting the eye from disease progression and
potentially improving vision.
“This award supplies critical funding to support a Phase 2b
clinical trial to achieve our goal of improving vision in patients with
geographic atrophy”, said Jane Lebkowski, PhD, President of Regenerative Patch
Technologies. “We want to thank CIRM for their support of this program.”
Geographic atrophy affects more than 8 million people
worldwide and an estimated 1 million people in the United States. There are
currently no approved therapies that are effective in improving vision in
patients with geographic atrophy.
“CIRM is proud to continue to fund this groundbreaking stem
cell therapy that has the potential to improve outcomes for the millions of
people suffering from geographic atrophy,” said Maria T. Millan, M.D.,
President and CEO of CIRM. “This investment is follow-on funding to CIRM’s
previous support to develop this therapy. It reflects our commitment to
advancing cutting-edge science and underscores our dedication to addressing the
unmet medical needs of those affected by degenerative diseases.”
This month’s clinical awards include two preclinical projects
and four clinical-stage projects. That brings the number of CIRM-funded
clinical trials to 95. For more information on CIRM’s clinical stage program,
please visit our Funding
Opportunities page.
U.S. Copyright Notice of Inquiry Regarding AI and Copyright
The U.S. Copyright Office released today a notice of inquiry concerning AI and copyright. The Press Release states:
Today, the U.S. Copyright Office issued a notice
of inquiry (NOI) in the Federal Register on copyright
and artificial intelligence (AI). The Office is undertaking a study of the
copyright law and policy issues raised by generative AI and is assessing
whether legislative or regulatory steps are warranted. The Office will use the
record it assembles to advise Congress; inform its regulatory work; and offer
information and resources to the public, courts, and other government entities
considering these issues.
The NOI seeks factual information and views on a number of
copyright issues raised by recent advances in generative AI. These issues
include the use of copyrighted works to train AI models, the appropriate levels
of transparency and disclosure with respect to the use of copyrighted works,
the legal status of AI-generated outputs, and the appropriate treatment of
AI-generated outputs that mimic personal attributes of human artists.
The NOI is an integral next step for the Office’s AI initiative, which was launched in
early 2023. So far this year, the Office has held four public listening
sessions and two webinars. This NOI builds on the feedback and questions the
Office has received so far and seeks public input from the broadest audience to
date in the initiative.
“We launched this initiative at the beginning of the year to
focus on the increasingly complex issues raised by generative AI. This NOI and
the public comments we will receive represent a critical next step,” said Shira
Perlmutter, Register of Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office.
“We look forward to continuing to examine these issues of vital importance to
the evolution of technology and the future of human creativity.”
Initial written comments are due by 11:59 p.m. eastern time
on Wednesday, October 18, 2023. Reply comments are due by 11:59 p.m. eastern
time on Wednesday, November 15, 2023. Instructions for submitting comments are
available on the Office’s website.
Commenters may choose which and how many questions to respond to in the NOI.
The NOI includes the following
questions:
General Questions
The Office has several general questions about generative
AI in addition to the specific topics listed below. Commenters are encouraged
to raise any positions or views that are not elicited by the more detailed
questions further below.
1. As described above, generative AI systems have the ability
to produce material that would be copyrightable if it were created by a human
author. What are your views on the potential benefits and risks of this
technology? How is the use of this technology currently affecting or likely to
affect creators, copyright owners, technology developers, researchers, and the
public?
2. Does the increasing use or distribution of AI-generated
material raise any unique issues for your sector or industry as compared to
other copyright stakeholders?
3. Please identify any papers or studies that you believe are
relevant to this Notice. These may address, for example, the economic effects
of generative AI on the creative industries or how different licensing regimes
do or could operate to remunerate copyright owners and/or creators for the use
of their works in training AI models. The Office requests that commenters
provide a hyperlink to the identified papers.
4. Are there any statutory or regulatory approaches that have
been adopted or are under consideration in other countries that relate to
copyright and AI that should be considered or avoided in the United States? How
important a factor is international consistency in this area across borders?
5. Is new legislation warranted to address copyright or
related issues with generative AI? If so, what should it entail? Specific
proposals and legislative text are not necessary, but the Office welcomes any
proposals or text for review.
Training
If your comment applies only to a specific subset of AI
technologies, please make that clear.
6. What kinds of copyright-protected training materials are
used to train AI models, and how are those materials collected and curated?
6.1. How or where do developers of AI models acquire the
materials or datasets that their models are trained on? To what extent is
training material first collected by third-party entities (such as academic
researchers or private companies)?
6.2. To what extent are copyrighted works licensed from
copyright owners for use as training materials? To your knowledge, what
licensing models are currently being offered and used?
6.3. To what extent is non-copyrighted material (such as
public domain works) used for AI training? Alternatively, to what extent is
training material created or commissioned by developers of AI models?
6.4. Are some or all training materials retained by
developers of AI models after training is complete, and for what purpose(s)?
Please describe any relevant storage and retention practices.
7. To the extent that it informs your views, please briefly
describe your personal knowledge of the process by which AI models are trained.
The Office is particularly interested in:
7.1. How are training materials used and/or reproduced when
training an AI model? Please include your understanding of the nature and
duration of any reproduction of works that occur during the training process,
as well as your views on the extent to which these activities implicate the exclusive
rights of copyright owners.
7.2. How are inferences gained from the training process
stored or represented within an AI model?
7.3. Is it possible for an AI model to “unlearn” inferences
it gained from training on a particular piece of training material? If so, is
it economically feasible? In addition to retraining a model, are there other
ways to “unlearn” inferences from training?
7.4. Absent access to the underlying dataset, is it possible
to identify whether an AI model was trained on a particular piece of training
material?
8. Under what circumstances would the unauthorized use of
copyrighted works to train AI models constitute fair use? Please discuss any
case law you believe relevant to this question.
8.1. In light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Google
v. Oracle America and Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith,
how should the “purpose and character” of the use of copyrighted works to
train an AI model be evaluated? What is the relevant use to be analyzed? Do
different stages of training, such as pre-training and fine-tuning, raise
different considerations under the first fair use factor?
8.2. How should the analysis apply to entities that collect
and distribute copyrighted material for training but may not themselves engage
in the training?
8.3. The use of copyrighted materials in a training dataset
or to train generative AI models may be done for noncommercial or research
purposes. How should the fair use analysis apply if AI models or datasets are
later adapted for use of a commercial nature? Does it make a difference if
funding for these noncommercial or research uses is provided by for-profit
developers of AI systems?
8.4. What quantity of training materials do developers of
generative AI models use for training? Does the volume of material used to
train an AI model affect the fair use analysis? If so, how?
8.5. Under the fourth factor of the fair use analysis, how
should the effect on the potential market for or value of a copyrighted work
used to train an AI model be measured? Should the inquiry be
whether the outputs of the AI system incorporating the model compete with a
particular copyrighted work, the body of works of the same author, or the
market for that general class of works?
9. Should copyright owners have to affirmatively consent (opt
in) to the use of their works for training materials, or should they be
provided with the means to object (opt out)?
9.1. Should consent of the copyright owner be required for
all uses of copyrighted works to train AI models or only commercial uses?
9.2. If an “opt out” approach were adopted, how would that
process work for a copyright owner who objected to the use of their works for
training? Are there technical tools that might facilitate this process, such as
a technical flag or metadata indicating that an automated service should not
collect and store a work for AI training uses?
9.3. What legal, technical, or practical obstacles are there
to establishing or using such a process? Given the volume of works used in
training, is it feasible to get consent in advance from copyright owners?
9.4. If an objection is not honored, what remedies should be
available? Are existing remedies for infringement appropriate or should there
be a separate cause of action?
9.5. In cases where the human creator does not own the
copyright—for example, because they have assigned it or because the work was
made for hire—should they have a right to object to an AI model being trained
on their work? If so, how would such a system work?
10. If copyright owners' consent is required to train
generative AI models, how can or should licenses be obtained?
10.1. Is direct voluntary licensing feasible in some or all
creative sectors?
10.2. Is a voluntary collective licensing scheme a feasible
or desirable approach? Are there existing collective management
organizations that are well-suited to provide those licenses, and are there
legal or other impediments that would prevent those organizations from
performing this role? Should Congress consider statutory or other changes, such
as an antitrust exception, to facilitate negotiation of collective licenses?
10.3. Should Congress consider establishing a compulsory
licensing regime? If so, what should such a regime look like? What
activities should the license cover, what works would be subject to the
license, and would copyright owners have the ability to opt out? How should
royalty rates and terms be set, allocated, reported and distributed?
10.4. Is an extended collective licensing scheme a
feasible or desirable approach?
10.5. Should licensing regimes vary based on the type of work
at issue?
11. What legal, technical or practical issues might there be
with respect to obtaining appropriate licenses for training? Who, if anyone,
should be responsible for securing them (for example when the curator of a
training dataset, the developer who trains an AI model, and the company employing
that model in an AI system are different entities and may have different
commercial or noncommercial roles)?
12. Is it possible or feasible to identify the degree to
which a particular work contributes to a particular output from a generative AI
system? Please explain.
13. What would be the economic impacts of a licensing
requirement on the development and adoption of generative AI systems?
14. Please describe any other factors you believe are
relevant with respect to potential copyright liability for training AI models.
Transparency & Recordkeeping
15. In order to allow copyright owners to determine whether
their works have been used, should developers of AI models be required to
collect, retain, and disclose records regarding the materials used to train
their models? Should creators of training datasets have a similar obligation?
15.1. What level of specificity should be required?
15.2. To whom should disclosures be made?
15.3. What obligations, if any, should be placed on
developers of AI systems that incorporate models from third parties?
15.4. What would be the cost or other impact of such a
recordkeeping system for developers of AI models or systems, creators,
consumers, or other relevant parties?
16. What obligations, if any, should there be to notify
copyright owners that their works have been used to train an AI model?
17. Outside of copyright law, are there existing U.S. laws
that could require developers of AI models or systems to retain or disclose
records about the materials they used for training?
Generative AI Outputs
If your comment applies only to a particular subset of
generative AI technologies, please make that clear.
Copyrightability
18. Under copyright law, are there circumstances when a human
using a generative AI system should be considered the “author” of material
produced by the system? If so, what factors are relevant to that determination?
For example, is selecting what material an AI model is trained on and/or
providing an iterative series of text commands or prompts sufficient to claim
authorship of the resulting output?
19. Are any revisions to the Copyright Act necessary to
clarify the human authorship requirement or to provide additional standards to
determine when content including AI-generated material is subject to copyright
protection?
20. Is legal protection for AI-generated material desirable
as a policy matter? Is legal protection for AI-generated material necessary to
encourage development of generative AI technologies and systems? Does existing
copyright protection for computer code that operates a generative AI system
provide sufficient incentives?
20.1. If you believe protection is desirable, should it be a
form of copyright or a separate sui generis right? If the latter, in
what respects should protection for AI-generated material differ from
copyright?
21. Does the Copyright Clause in the U.S. Constitution permit
copyright protection for AI-generated material? Would such protection “promote
the progress of science and useful arts”? If so, how?
Infringement
22. Can AI-generated outputs implicate the exclusive rights
of preexisting copyrighted works, such as the right of reproduction or the
derivative work right? If so, in what circumstances?
23. Is the substantial similarity test adequate to address
claims of infringement based on outputs from a generative AI system, or is some
other standard appropriate or necessary?
24. How can copyright owners prove the element of copying
(such as by demonstrating access to a copyrighted work) if the developer of the
AI model does not maintain or make available records of what training material
it used? Are existing civil discovery rules sufficient to address this
situation?
25. If AI-generated material is found to infringe a
copyrighted work, who should be directly or secondarily liable—the developer of
a generative AI model, the developer of the system incorporating that model,
end users of the system, or other parties?
25.1. Do “open-source” AI models raise unique considerations
with respect to infringement based on their outputs?
26. If a generative AI system is trained on copyrighted works
containing copyright management information, how does 17 U.S.C.
1202(b) apply to the treatment of that information in outputs of the
system?
27. Please describe any other issues that you believe
policymakers should consider with respect to potential copyright liability
based on AI-generated output.
Labeling or Identification
28. Should the law require AI-generated material to be
labeled or otherwise publicly identified as being generated by AI? If so, in
what context should the requirement apply and how should it work?
28.1. Who should be responsible for identifying a work as
AI-generated?
28.2. Are there technical or practical barriers to labeling
or identification requirements?
28.3. If a notification or labeling requirement is adopted,
what should be the consequences of the failure to label a particular work or
the removal of a label?
29. What tools exist or are in development to identify
AI-generated material, including by standard-setting bodies? How accurate are
these tools? What are their limitations?
Additional Questions About Issues Related to Copyright
30. What legal rights, if any, currently apply to
AI-generated material that features the name or likeness, including vocal
likeness, of a particular person?
31. Should Congress establish a new federal right, similar to
state law rights of publicity, that would apply to AI-generated material? If
so, should it preempt state laws or set a ceiling or floor for state law
protections? What should be the contours of such a right?
32. Are there or should there be protections against an AI
system generating outputs that imitate the artistic style of a human creator
(such as an AI system producing visual works “in the style of” a specific
artist)? Who should be eligible for such protection? What form should it take?
33. With respect to sound recordings, how does section 114(b)
of the Copyright Act relate to state law, such as state right of publicity
laws? Does this issue require legislative attention in the context
of generative AI?
34. Please identify any issues not mentioned above that the
Copyright Office should consider in conducting this study.
It will be very interesting to see
the responses. I wonder if AI was used
to help generate the questions. I am
sure someone will submit AI generated responses to the questions. I do wonder about moral rights [fn. 38 in the
document].
