Showing posts with label aau. Show all posts
Showing posts with label aau. Show all posts

Monday, 22 June 2020

U.S. Universities and Foreign Researchers: Guidance from the AAU and APLU


The Association of American Universities (AAU) and Association of Public and Land Grant Universities (APLU) has released a document entitled, “University Actions to Address Concerns about Security Threats and Undue Foreign Government Influence on Campus.”  The document is a response to increased concerns in the United States concerning intellectual property theft by foreign students, researchers and professors.  The document focuses on how U.S. universities can exercise additional care in vetting visitors and guests as well as ensure that data and intellectual property is adequately protected.  The document is an attempt to achieve those goals and assuage some that adequate measures are being taken.  The prospect of universities in the United States completely losing technical expertise as well as tuition dollars is not an attractive option.  The Trump Administration is rumored to release an executive order severely limiting certain visas and the Optional Practical Training program soon [UPDATE: Here is the Executive Order.  Apparently, it doesn't touch the Optional Practical Training Program].  Here are some provisions on visitors to campus, intellectual property and export controls: 


PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND USE OF TECHNOLOGY CONTROL PLANS

• Development and use of faculty disclosure requirements for intellectual property (IP) protection. Institutions routinely require faculty disclosure of intellectual property with commercialization potential, with the intent of ensuring that such IP is secured by quickly applying for the appropriate patent protection. Institutions also protect and restrict access to specific information on university invention disclosures, patent applications, and license agreements.

• Use of Technology Control Plans (TCPs) and non-disclosure agreements. Institutions regularly establish TCPs and other risk-mitigation initiatives to ensure the security of research and protection of intellectual property and to maintain compliance with federal regulations, laws, and contract directives. In instances where proprietary research is being conducted, institutions regularly make use of non-disclosure agreements.

. . .

INTERNATIONAL VISITORS TO CAMPUS

• Development and use of requirements for vetting and securely hosting foreign visitors while on campus. Institutions have developed policies requiring faculty to alert university officials, often through their export control, research compliance, or international affairs offices, when they plan to have foreign visitors come to visit campus and/or tour their laboratories. The hosting faculty member may be required to fill out a brief questionnaire and/or form for each visitor. Some institutions use software solutions such as Visual Compliance or Amber Road, which search numerous continually updated restricted parties lists, to screen for restricted or denied parties. Other institutions have implemented measures for securely hosting and escorting foreign visitors and avoiding unauthorized information gathering. Some institutions are also now choosing to screen all visiting foreign scholars, which previously may have been limited to scholars in visa categories requiring screening under export control regulations.

• Implementation of visitation control plans and visiting scholar handbooks. Some institutions and departments have created plans to detail specific measures the host will take to prevent unauthorized access to export-controlled data and areas where export-controlled research is performed. Submitted plans often include a list of visitors, who they meet with, the duration and campus location of their visit, and the purpose of their visit. Institutions have also provided detailed handbooks with guidance on how to successfully invite and host a visiting student researcher or a visiting scholar on campus including details on how visitors should be onboarded.

• Development of resource documents on foreign engagements and visitors to campus. The Academic Security and Counter Exploitation Working Group (ASCE) produced a paper, “Steps and Considerations for Effective Foreign Visitor Review Process in an Academic Environment.” The paper suggests a checklist for foreign visitor review processes including: determining the level of risk proposed by the visitor, reviewing the visitors background and reason for visit, preparing an official university invitation, managing the onboarding process and oversight while visitor is on campus, and completing the departure process for the foreign visitor. ASCE also includes a list of suggested interview questions that institutions could use for foreign visitors. COGR produced a “Framework for Review of Global Engagements in Academic Research” to provide an underlying structure to support an institution’s analysis of global research engagements, assess potential risks, and develop strategies for mitigation. The U15 Group of Canadian Research Universities also developed a paper, “Mitigating Economic and/or Geopolitical Risks in Sensitive Research Projects: A Tool for University Researchers,” to assist with identifying and mitigating risks with research collaborations and projects, and provides a checklist for building a strong project team, assessing non-academic partners, and reviewing use of research findings.

The Australian Group of 8 has also produced “Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the Australian University Sector” to help manage and engage with risk to deepen resilience against foreign interference in the university sector.

EXPORT CONTROL COMPLIANCE

• Use and strengthening of policies and programs to ensure full compliance with federal export control requirements. Institutions have in place clear, visible, and comprehensive policies regarding whether and how they will undertake export-controlled research activities. This includes applying for export control licenses when required and creating TCPs to protect technology from unauthorized access when export-controlled technologies are involved and/or classified work is being conducted.

• Employing university staff with specific export control compliance expertise. Most AAU and APLU institutions have one or more staff members with specific responsibility for ensuring compliance with export controls. Many of these individuals belong to the Association of University Export Control Officers (AUECO), a national association of more than 270 university export control officers, whose mission is aimed at exchanging information and sharing knowledge and effective university policies and procedures to advance university compliance with U.S. export, import, and trade sanctions laws and regulations. Institutions conducting classified research also have specially trained Facility Security Officers (FSOs), who oversee security specific to this research.

There are also provisions on data control.  The document can be found here.

Saturday, 21 March 2020

Is it Time to Increase Funding to Universities for Research and Development in the United States?


In a document released by the Association of American Universities (AAU), Mary Sue Coleman, president of the organization, discusses Vannevar Bush’s report, “Science, the Endless Frontier” in a short essay titled, "Celebrating the Government-University Partnership's 75th Anniversary."  Notably, in light of the report, she explains how issues with respect to climate change and Covid-19 only highlight why government should continue to invest in university research.  Unfortunately, the Trump Administration continues to push for less funding for research and development at universities in terms of real dollars.  One of the Democratic presidential candidates who consistently appeared to support university research and development was Tom Steyer.  If former Vice President Biden is elected, hopefully he will consider Tom Steyer for a position in Biden's administration.  If President Trump is reelected, I hope he reconsiders his position regarding funding university research and development.  The AAU document provides, in part: 


. . . 

Famously titled “Science, the Endless Frontier,” the influential report had been requested the previous year by then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom Bush served as chief scientific adviser. As World War II increasingly appeared winnable – in no small part due to the scientific research enterprise that Bush’s office led – Roosevelt was looking to the future. He asked the MIT-trained Bush to file a report addressing four questions:

1. “What can be done, consistent with military security, and with the prior approval of the military authorities, to make known to the world as soon as possible the contributions which have been made during our war effort to scientific knowledge?”

2. “With particular reference to the war of science against disease, what can be done now to organize a program for continuing in the future the work which has been done in medicine and related sciences?”

3. “What can the Government do now and in the future to aid research activities by public and private organizations?”

4. “Can an effective program be proposed for discovering and developing scientific talent in American youth so that the continuing future of scientific research in this country may be assured on a level comparable to what has been done during the war?”

Bush took this brief set of questions and delivered an expansive report with recommendations that have informed U.S. science policy ever since. Calling basic scientific research “the pacemaker of technological progress,” Bush recommended a significant and ongoing partnership between the federal government and universities to conduct research to benefit the nation.

Bush’s report noted that government support for basic research could continue to bolster not only the nation’s security, but also its economic prosperity. “New products and new processes do not appear full-grown,” he wrote. “They are founded on new principles and new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly developed by research in the purest realms of science!”

Bush’s recommendations led to the creation of the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health and other federal agencies. These agencies conducted and funded the research that sent humans to the Moon, gave us the Internet and smartphones, ended polio and a host of other diseases, and made HIV infection manageable -- more akin to diabetes than a death sentence.

I recently participated in a National Academies of Sciences-sponsored symposium exploring the legacy of this important report and forecasting the future of the government-university partnership. As Vannevar Bush realized 75 years ago, wartime is not the only time for the government to invest in the science that makes us safer and more prosperous. Leading scientists, government officials, and academic researchers at the symposium agreed that – as emerging threats like the COVID-19 virus and the climate crisis make clear – the United States should double down on investments in the government-university research partnership. In fact, in a 2018 article I wrote for Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning, I describe in detail how we must continue pressing toward that “Endless Frontier.” Our prosperous and healthy future absolutely depends on vigorously pursuing this journey.