Is first mover advantage still a relevant trade secret strategy?

One of the more tricky aspects in assessing the strategic advantages of relying on trade secret protection is the circumstance in which the party reasonably believes that the trade secret will eventually be reverse-engineered, but not before, say two years from the time that the product reaches the market. So the question then becomes: should I rely on that window of opportunity or seek some other way to protect my rights? The stock reply tends to be that, if the person believes that the likely period of secrecy of the technology provides him with a reasonable basis to establish first mover advantage, either e.g. by locking up superior distribution or manufacturing capabilities or building up strong brand recognition, reliance on trade secrets to protect the technology is a reasonable approach. That is how we have tended to present the issue in a stripped-down fashion when addressing it in management education.

Against this backdrop, I was unnerved a bit this week in listening to the words of the manager of a venture capital fund, financed by the Bloomberg group and dedicated to making smallish investments in a large number of companies at their very outset. Unlike most other VC operations, this fund bets that it can identify winning companies from certain indicia that precede any real operations by the companies. In that connection, the interviewee baldly stated that the fund did not seek companies with a reasonable likelihood of first mover advantage, but rather “best mover advantage”. In supporting his position, reference was made to the interview comments made by the President of Stanford University, who stated that almost anyone who comes up with a technology will find himself in short order with a number of competitors who have, in effect, copied the technology. The question then becomes who can best parlay this technology into a successful business plan.

Given this, do I need to revise my view about whether reliance on trade secrets is a valid strategy if it can reasonably offer one first mover advantage? Upon reflection, I don’t think so. Pearson Education, here, describes the advantages and challenges of first-mover advantage as follows:

If the business is first into a market, so the thinking goes, it can establish what the military thinkers would call 'defensible ground'. First, it can capture market share much more easily without having to worry about rivals trying to capture the same customers. Second, when the rivals do come along – as they inevitably will – the first-mover and its management team will have advantages in the ensuing competition, such as familiar products, brand loyalty, the best retail outlets, up-and-running distribution systems, and so on. By beating rivals into the market, the first-mover can consolidate its position and compete more effectively, not only defending its previously acquired share but even continuing to expand.

Stated otherwise, “a company's only sustainable competitive advantage may be its ability to learn faster than its competitors.”

Based on these observations, it seems that the notion of meaningful first mover advantage has built in it a time function. Yes, there can be such an advantage, but only if there is sufficient time to allow the person to achieve a critical mass of the factors described above. But with the availability and potentially instantaneous dissemination of information, has the compression of this function reached a stage where it is simply not feasible for this critical mass of factors to take root? That seems to be behind the observation from the Bloomberg-related venture capitalist that what is relevant is no longer the “first mover”, but the “best mover”; there is simply not enough time for the first mover to secure the advantage that efficient exploitation of the time function would previously allow.

My response to that is that it may be true, but only if there are no real barriers to entry or another factors that can slow down the otherwise relentless compression of time. Trade secrets provide one such factor. By slowing down the dissemination of the knowledge and technology to third parties, it potentially enables the person to seek and develop the various aspects of first mover advantage that may confer upon him a meaningful competitive advantage. As such, I still feel comfortable advising that trade secret protection is a reasonable measure to achieve first mover advantage, unless the time function for maintaining secrecy is unusually and severely compressed.

Monetizing Online Contents: Is It a Qualitative or a Quantitative Matter?

I admit--I am a podcast freak. Every night I dutifully download from iTunes to my iPod the most current podcast broadcasts from a pre-selected list of sites. I then spend the better part of an hour in the morning (in conjunction with my morning walk), and a similar amount of time on the bus ride home, listening to these broadcasts. At the top of my list are the economic and business-focused podcasts offered by Bloomberg Radio, orchestrated by the dynamic force of its primary interviewer. While most of these podcasts are shortened from the full-length version of the original radio broadcast, sufficient content and elegant editing made the offerings a perfect fit for my morning and evening listening habits.

However, those days may be coming to an end. Starting at the beginning of this week, Bloomberg seems to be offering one of two choices. Either subscribe to a so-called "premium" service, which entitles the listener to access to the original, full-length broadcasts in exchange for a yearly fee, or be satisfied with only a series of short snippets, a mere fraction of not only the length of the original broadcast but the typical length of the edited item prior to the introduction of the premium service as well. (The "premium" service also promises a number of additional contents, presumably available only to podcast subscribers.)

In so doing, Bloomberg appears to betting that it has found a winning formula for that most elusive of challenges--how to monetize contents available online. Bloomberg is seeking to so by changing the behaviour of its listeners, whereby it is attempting to induce people to pay for contents that were previously available free of charge. While I can sympathize with Bloomberg's desire to find new sources of income, particularly in the online space, nevertheless, permit me to voice my reservations about this scheme.

My reservations do not derive so much from the prospect of being asked to now pay for online contents (I would prefer not to pay, but I am prepared to do so if I believe that I will receive a commensurate benefit.) Rather my puzzlement centres on the why Bloomberg believes it can attract me to sign up for contents which, in the aggregate, are less attractive for my personal use than were the contents prior to the change.

Think about it: the attraction of the contents in the old regime were not simply that they were available for free, but that they were edited in such a way that made them a perfect fit to my morning and evening schedules. In other words, I was drawn to the podcasts precisely because they were a shortened form of the original radio broadcasts. Recalling the old saying, "I did not have enough time to write you a short letter so I wrote you a long one", it was the editing function that turned these contents into a desirable user experience. Without wishing to sound trite, the fact that "less was more" was crucial.

Where Did That User Experience Go?

The new premium podcast service has turned the user experience of these broadcasts on its head. In so doing, has taken the position that monetizing contents online, by moving from a free to a subscription model, is a quantitative, rather than a qualitative, matter. Speaking for myself, I don't get the commercial logic.

After all, if I want to listen to the full-length broadcast (which, crucially, I do not), I can do so for free by listening to the original radio broadcasts. No special effort is required by Bloomberg to enable me to do store and listen to these broadcasts on my MP3 player. As I noted, the value-added experience under the previous arrangement lay in the editing of the contents. I would have thought, therefore, that Bloomberg's challenge would be to convince me to begin to pay for this user experience.It may come as a surprise, but I so much valued this user experience that I would have been willing to pay for it, even if had been previously offered for free. But I was never given this opportunity.

Instead, Bloomberg is trying to convince me to sign up simply because they offer me more contents that were previously available. If before, "less was more", as a qualitative matter, the current offer is that "more is less", as a quantitative matter. I assume that Bloomberg has done its marketing homework and that it is convinced that it will commercially succeed in this move. If so, it will may mark a major turning point in the monetizing of online contents. Perhaps--but not for me, I suspect.

Bloomberg v The New York Times: Who Will Provide the Contents?

While academics (particularly the U.S. kind) continue to engage in the "high protection/low protection" struggle for the Ivory Tower soul-of-copyright theory, a quite a different struggle is taking place at the level of journalism and the contents they they provide to the public. There, the matter is, quite simply, one of business survival. "Who shall live and who shall die", in the words of the liturgy.

An interesting angle on this struggle was described in the Sunday, November 15 edition of nytimes.com (and summarized on the New York Times podcast--"Weekend Business"). Entitled "At Bloomberg, Modest Strategy to Rule the World", the piece by Stephanie Clifford and Julie Creswell chronicles the efforts of Bloomberg L.P. to become quite simply, in the words of Andrew Lack of the company, to become "the world's most influential news organization."

Heady aspirations indeed. From its beginnings in 1981 through to its place as the leading purveyor of financial information via the eponymous "Bloomberg terminal", this highly profitable company has branched out into tv and radio, and also the print media (as well as seeing its founder--Michael Bloomberg--recently elected for a third term as mayor of New York City). In particular, their recent acquisition of the venerable magazine Business Week signals an intention to expand their audience and readership as well as to try and resuscitate the declining, if still iconic, publication.

I have to admit: I am a podcast addict of Bloomberg programmes; I find the formula of interviews across a wide spectrum of business and related topics to be an attractive way to remain current on significant issues. I also listen to several daily New York Times podcasts. As well, since 1981, I have been a subscriber of Business Week. This means that there is a kind of personal engagement in these contents that drew my special attention to the New York Times piece.

And so the speculation: In light of their efforts, how does Bloomberg stack up with the paragon of old media, the New York Times? Strictly speaking, the two are not precisely rivals, since one could argue that Bloomberg is primarily a business-related enterprise, while the New York Times is a full-content newspaper. That said, a senior Bloomberg official referred to The Economist as the model for a revamped Business Week. If so, the comparison seems more direct and more compelling. So here are my thoughts.

1. The case in favour of Bloomberg seems to be based on the premise that Bloomberg has the crucial advantage--ready cash. While the New York Times, and the print media more generally, struggle cash-wise, Bloomberg seemingly can throw oodles of the stuff at achieving its publishing dreams. One proof of this is reported hiring binge of journalists by Bloomberg, while the New York Times has been reducing its staff.

Will Cash Be King in the World of Journalism?

2. On the other hand, the New York Times is first and foremost a journalistic enterprise, primarily in print form, and more hesitatingly in the online environment. It excels in content, albeit frequently with an noticeable editorial slant. Never a great money-maker even in the best of times, it is struggling to stay afloat in the current economic climate.

3. The upshot is that Bloomberg is betting that being able to make use of the ample cash being thrown off from its content business will provide the basis for establishing an equally dominant position in the world of journalistic contents. That remains to be seen: Money will certainly help, but it is hardly a guarantee of ultimate success. As the phrase goes, "one way to make a small fortune is to spend a large fortune."

4. As for the New York Times, quality content may or may not be enough to succeed commercially in an increasingly online world, where "free" is the reader's expectation, if not the norm. The ability of the New York Times to monetize its content in a world where advertising plays a smaller and smaller role can only be described as challenging.

5. And so a thought: If Bloomberg has the cash, but uncertain capabilities in contents, while the New York Times is exactly in the opposite position, why not have Bloomberg simply acquire the New York Times? This is what another media giant-Rupert Murdoch--has done with his purchase of the Wall Street Journal. "Nonsense", you might say, and that is fair enough. But if so, what alternative suggestions do you have for Bloomberg and the New York Times? After all, quality journalism that is commercially robust is in everyone's interest.