To be clear, if a copyright holder ignores or neglects our unequivocal
holding that it must consider fair use before sending a takedown notification,
it is liable for damages under § 512(f). If, however, a copyright holder forms
a subjective good faith belief the allegedly infringing material does
not constitute fair use, we are in no position to dispute the copyright
holder’s belief even if we would have reached the opposite conclusion. A
copyright holder who pays lip service to the consideration of fair use by
claiming it formed a good faith belief when there is evidence to the contrary
is still subject to § 512(f) liability. . . .
In order to comply with the strictures of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v),
a copyright holder’s consideration of fair use need not be searching or
intensive. We follow Rossi’s guidance that formation of a subjective
good faith belief does not require investigation of the allegedly infringing
content. See 391 F.3d at 1003, 1005. We are mindful of the pressing crush
of voluminous infringing content that copyright holders face in a digital age.
But that does not excuse a failure to comply with the procedures outlined by
Congress.
The Ninth Circuit went on to later hold that “willful
blindness doctrine may be used to determine whether a copyright holder
“knowingly materially misrepresent[ed]” that it held a “good faith belief” the offending
activity was not a fair use.” Notably, the
Ninth Circuit briefly touched on the usage of software to discover potentially
infringing content, but expressly declined to address the important issue:
We note, without passing judgment, that the implementation of
computer algorithms appears to be a valid and good faith middle ground for
processing a plethora of content while still meeting the DMCA’s requirements to
somehow consider fair use. Cf. Hotfile, 2013 WL 6336286, at *47 (“The
Court . . . is unaware of any decision to date that actually addressed the need
for human review, and the statute does not specify how belief of infringement
may be formed or what knowledge may be chargeable to the notifying entity.”).
For example, consideration of fair use may be sufficient if copyright holders
utilize computer programs that automatically identify for takedown
notifications content where: “(1) the video track matches the video track of a copyrighted
work submitted by a content owner;
(2) the audio track matches the audio track of that same copyrighted
work; and (3) nearly the entirety . . . is comprised of a single copyrighted
work.” . . . Copyright holders could then employ individuals like Johnson to
review the minimal remaining content a computer program does not cull. . . .
During oral argument Universal explained that service providers now use screening
algorithms. However, we need not definitively decide the issue here because
Universal did not proffer any evidence that—at the time it sent the takedown
notification to Lenz—it used a computer program to identify potentially infringing
content.
The value of copyrights (and trademarks) rely upon cost-effective enforcement for sure. And, the issue of automated processing of analysis of trademark and copyright infringement is an important one. Notably, the U.S. does not have an analogous
statutory take-down procedure for trademarks as well. However, websites are known to follow the
basic procedures of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act when trademark owners
allege trademark infringement based on third party posting of content on a
website. Trademark owners would be wise
to consider whether to follow the Lenz case before issuing a trademark take-down
notice.
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