Cellular technology companies with substantial device
businesses — including Huawei and Samsung today, and Nokia until it sold its
handset business in 2014 — generate no more than modest net licensing revenues,
despite the significant Standard-Essential Patent (SEP) portfolio sizes they
have declared. Crucially, they must also cross license their manufactures
against infringement of other companies’ patents. Companies without significant device
businesses, including Qualcomm and InterDigital, have no such overriding need
to barter their intellectual property. Instead, their businesses are focused on
licensing cellular and smartphone patents for cash, upon which their technology
developments crucially depend.
SEP licensors do the costly technology developments that
make new generations of standards including 3G, 4G and 5G openly available to
all OEMs: however, since 2011, if not earlier, none of the former has received,
in licensing revenues, even as much as an average of $4.50 per phone or a few
percent of global wholesale handset sales revenues, for example, totalling $398
billion in 2018. Aggregate royalties paid to all licensors have averaged less
than five percent. In contrast, Apple has taken up to 43 percent revenue share
with its iPhone sales and other smartphone leaders Samsung and Huawei are also
currently in double digits.
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Leaders' technology licensing and OEMs' total handset sales revenues in cellular
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FRAND rates and net payments in cash
Some licensors
legitimately generate rather more licensing income than others. Net royalty
rates charged, and cash payments received, by the same licensor may vary
substantially from licensee to licensee without violating Fair Reasonable and
Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) licensing obligations.
The question of what levels of royalty rates should be
deemed FRAND for licensing SEPs in cellular technologies has loomed large in
commentary on the recent
US Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) v. Qualcomm antitrust trial in the Northern District of
California. Witness Huawei claimed 80% to 90% of its SEP royalty payments are
made to Qualcomm.
Apple
previously claimed Qualcomm charged it at least five times more in payments
than all other cellular patent licensors combined. That was until Apple
unilaterally withheld all such payments a couple of years ago. Notwithstanding
the April 2019
settlement
of all litigation between Qualcomm and Apple and with resumption of
licensing payments to Qualcomm, including a one-off
payment of between $4.5 billion to $4.7 Billion, the court’s decision in
the above case is imminent.
It should be expected that some companies net much higher
licensing rates and generate much more licensing income than most others. It
should not be considered untoward or a violation of FRAND or antitrust
requirements. FRAND rates negotiated
bilaterally or multilaterally, let alone licensing payments made after netting off parties’ charges, may vary
substantially from case to case due to different business models, patent
holdings cross-licensed, payment timing and disparate trade flows of products licensed,
manufactured and sold among SEP licensees. Substantial differences in net rates
and payments can therefore be quite legitimate due to various quid pro quos, as
well as differences in patent portfolio sizes and strengths.
Major OEMs would
rather limit rates to minimize out-payments than maximize royalties received
Companies with predominantly downstream business models as device OEMs, that implement numerous SEP technologies, tend to benefit from generally low royalty rates, even if they have substantial patent holdings themselves.
Many device OEMs have, accordingly,
tended to advocate licensing regimes that cram down royalty charges by capping
aggregate royalty rates. As I have explained in my publications for more
than a decade,
SEP
owners with large device businesses prefer to limit rates, even though that
limits them to generating only modest licensing fees, because low rates also
minimise their royalty out-payments on those devices.
Market leaders in cellular handsets, including Nokia 12
years ago, Apple, Huawei and Samsung today, invariably have much larger market
shares in featurephone or smartphone sales than they have shares of SEPs
reading on the cellular standards. They are therefore far more financially
exposed as licensees than they stand to gain as licensors — particularly in
negotiating licensing agreements with other SEP owners that have no downstream
device business in need of licensing. Even though some of the above companies
are also major patent owners, their royalty incomes were or are modest in
comparison to licensors without downstream operations producing or selling
devices.
Patent pools
Patent pools provide notable evidence of this downstream
effect with their rates tending to be much lower than bilaterally negotiated
rates. Patent pools are typically dominated by leading implementers of the
applicable standard and that may also own many SEPs reading on that standard.
For example, MPEG LA lists Apple, HP, Panasonic, Samsung, Sharp, Sony, Toshiba
and ZTE among its
many
licensors for the very popular AVC/H.264 video standard employed in
smartphones and TVs. Its maximum rate is around $0.20 per unit sold including
smartphones, PCs and TVs.
Royalty-free joint licensing, very similar to pooling in
many ways but without the need to check patent essentiality or collect and
distribute royalties, is an extreme case of this downstream effect. The
Bluetooth Special Interest Group allows its members royalty-free implementation
of this popular standard so long as they also commit to license their patents
on that basis.
Some joint licensing arrangements, also very similar to
pools, are not dominated by the applicable standard’s implementers. Major SEP
licensors in Avanci are companies that do not manufacture automotive products
including Ericsson, InterDigital, Nokia and Qualcomm. It was telling, and quite
self-serving, that the Huawei speaker at the recent
TILEC
recent conference on patent pools asserted that Avanci’s cellular-SEP
licensing charges [of $3 to $15 per car] are too high.
Patent pool benchmarks were, at first, presented by TCL in
its FRAND licensing rate litigation versus Ericsson in the Central District of
California. But the dynamics of patent pools were totally inapplicable to this
dispute about bilateral rates. Patent pool licensing rates were never even
considered by the Court because these, following my expert rebuttal report, did
not even make it into direct testimony at trial.
Proportional
allocations
SEP owners with major downstream operations commonly also
contrive for apportionment so that, for example, owners of only few SEPs can
command no more than very low rates. This action was, among other reasons, to
counter some
OEMs
with small patent portfolios punching way above their weight in cross-licensing
negotiations with large SEP holders who were also seeking freedom to
operate with low patent infringement risk as major device OEMs. For example,
Nokia had a $50 billion handset business in its heyday approaching and
including 2008. The threat of litigation from small patent holders against such
a large amount of trade made it impossible to achieve anywhere near Qualcomm’s
rates when Nokia sought to license them for use of Nokia’s SEP technology. In
contrast, Qualcomm exited the handset business many years earlier around the
turn of the millennium.
If it ain’t broke
don’t price fix it
Antitrust authorities, including the FTC, should not be
price setters. Instead of adjusting established royalty rates—underpinned by
hundreds of licenses and billions of dollars in payments over many years—applicable
questions for these organizations are: is the market competitive, efficient and
maximizing consumer welfare? Copious evidence shows that it is: with relentless
market
entry and disruption to incumbents, ever-improving
quality and declining prices. The unintended consequences of price regulation would harmfully disincentivise new-technology investments in standard-essential technologies that could be exploited by the entire ecosystem of suppliers and consumers at very low incremental costs in comparison to product and service prices.
FRAND
rates and payments differ with variations in other licensing terms and trading
volumes
FRAND licensing must accommodate a wide variety of factors.
Rates and payments can vary substantially among different pairs of licensors
and licensees – even for the same patent portfolios — because other contractual
terms and trade flows for licensing vary so much (i.e. how many handsets
manufactured and at what prices sold by each party). But that does not mean
that anything goes. The words fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory still
have meaning— it is just that the detail with various offsets and other factors
is devilish and can account for major differences in apparent royalty rates and
actual payments – particularly between licensors that are predominantly that,
and those that are largely major implementors and patent licensees as device
OEMs.