The Roadmap onStandard Essential Patents for a European Digitalised Economy from the European Commission’s DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs
(DG Growth) sets out how it believes increasing
transparency on standard-essential patents and its other objectives with SEPs and
FRAND licensing might be achieved.
A study report commissioned by DG Growth
in support of this initiative on Transparency, Predictability and
Efficiency of SSO-based Standardization and SEP Licensing (the CRA report) proposes, among various other
recommendations, that declared patents and patent applications should be centrally
assessed by standard-setting organizations or by the European Patent Office to
determine whether they are actually
essential to standards including those developed by ETSI for 3G, 4G and 5G.
A path to price regulation
This intervention is unwarranted and results
would be unreliable. It would introduce various inaccuracies with significant
subjectivity, biases and would be very costly in any attempt to do such a
massive job thoroughly. Parties should be entitled to use, internally and in
bilateral or multilateral agreement and in litigation with others, whatever
patent-evaluation techniques they wish. That is entirely different to a particular
“patent-counting” methodology and assessor being imposed.
DG Growth also headlined in its Roadmap
that it would like to make SEP values and FRAND royalties clearer to
prospective implementers. If it prescribes the creation of a centralized SEP
assessment database, as described above, this inevitably will also lead to it
being used to determine a patent owner’s share of SEPs and FRAND royalties.
This is problematic due to the inaccuracies described and it would also
troublingly lead to the setting of prices on a company-by-company basis, which
is not and should not be the role of the European Commission or instruments it
controls.
Justice Birss
concludes in Unwired
Planet vs. Huawei that “in assessing a FRAND rate
counting patents is inevitable”. The parties in the case did indeed use that among
other valuation methods, but their respective patent counts differed very
widely – for example, by a factor of five for the total number of LTE SEPs. However,
the judicial process enables the court to figure out where the biases and
inaccuracies lie in case-specific circumstances and make sense of differences
in opinion.
Intervention with centralised essentiality
assessments would be a blunt instrument that would be subject to political and
other adverse influences. The regime would lack the flexibility to adapt that
exists in the marketplace among companies acting independently and that occurs among
parties in litigation with due process in the courts.
An impossible Holy Grail
The implicit assumption that objective and
accurate determinations of portfolio essentiality, patent strength and value
can be made with extensive assessments of numerous patents, or with in-depth
evaluations of relatively small samples of these, is deeply flawed. Evaluating
standard-essentiality is a fact-intensive, complex and highly subjective task, as
is assessing patent validity and patent value. Only a court of law can make
definitive determinations on these issues.
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Disagreement on LTE Essential Patent
Determinations: Regression shows extremely weak correlation between two studies’ results (R2=0.0008) |
Expanding my analysis to include many more publicly
available studies since then also reveals very wide disparities. For instance,
LG’s share of LTE patents judged essential by various assessors range from 2.9
percent to 23 percent – a factor of eight. Huawei’s
share of judged-essential LTE patents range from 0.6 percent to 10 percent – a factor of seventeen. Nokia’s share of
judged-essential LTE patents range from 2.3 percent to 54 percent – a factor of 23.
A Few Among Many Wide
Variations in Shares of Judged-Essential LTE Patents Among Patent-Counting
Studies
Lowest Estimate
|
Highest Estimate
|
Disparity
|
|
Huawei
|
2.9%
|
23%
|
8x
|
LG
|
0.6%
|
17%
|
17x
|
Nokia
|
2.3%
|
54%
|
23x
|
Portfolio-wide assessments are necessarily
shallow due to the large number of patents and work required per patent. They
are therefore inherently imprecise. There is no precision or certainty in
determinations absent the impossibility of in-depth patent-by-patent court
determinations for entire portfolios of thousands of patent families.
Invalid extrapolations
Conducting in-depth assessments on relatively
small samples of patents does not fix this shortcoming. The proportion of SEPs
in portfolios cannot be projected from random samples of patents with the
precision of predicting the results of coin tossing. Patent selections (e.g.
those applicable to devices rather than networks, or which patents in a patent family)
and essentiality determinations are with significant personal judgement, bias
and uncertainty. Consensus is that patent values are highly skewed. Many
patents are worth little or worthless because they would likely be found
invalid or not infringed by a court. As shown in Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation v. Cisco,
with one patent licensing at around one dollar per unit in comparison to very
little for most WiFi patents, some patents are worth hundreds of times more
than the average SEP in a standard. This is all probabilistic.
In other words, determining overall essentiality
across thousands of patent families and among many patent owners with standards
such as 4G LTE is so subjective and potentially unreliable that any assessor’s
count of the number of SEPs owned by a given company is questionable. The
corresponding patent strength or patent value that might be subsequently
derived, in absolute terms or in relation to other patent owners, is even more
contestable.
Conflicting demands, bureaucratic competence and
impartiality
Authorities should only make assessments
and publish figures that are reliable and can be measured reproducibly – such as “weights and measures” and in official
statistics such as demographic figures and the
national accounts– which SEP counts are not.
Patent attributes should be assessed as they currently are in the marketplace
as the market and its participants see fit, with owners’ disclosures and various
third-party assessors of SEPs. Parties
should also be able to consider other factors and make different assessments based
on, for example, their own technical analysis of declared patents. Market
forces can determine and change which standard-essential technology factors and
assessments suit the market best, while bureaucracies struggle to get it right
and can be very resistant to needed change. Where disputes arise, the courts
can make determinations with due consideration of industry practices.
Implementers of SEP-based technologies
have the legitimate concern that it can be difficult to determine exactly which
patents they are infringing, from whom they must seek licenses and how much in
FRAND royalties they should pay. In response, ETSI’s IPR policy requires that patent
owners provide information on patents and patent applications that they believe
might be essential or might become essential to standards such as 3G WCDMA and
4G LTE. ETSI does not police or audit what is submitted to its IPR database. Disclosure
requirements might reasonably be increased to include more information on how
patent claims map to the standards, but judging this for essentiality or
commercial value is not a job for a standards development organisation or the
patent office. Antitrust restrictions preclude SDOs from getting involved in
valuing patents and setting licensing terms including FRAND royalty charges.
Disclosure tactics
Patent disclosures to SDOs including ETSI were
purposely intended to be conservatively-large, including patents which might be
or could become essential to standards, but the goalposts are being moved. ETSI’s
IPR policy helps ensure that the maximum number of patents will be identified
and will be available for licensing under FRAND terms. However, it also tends
to result in significant over-disclosure so that patent owners can avoid
penalties, such as compulsory, royalty-free licensing if they do not disclose a
patent that ends up becoming essential as the patent is prosecuted and as the
standard changes in its development. With so much attention on SEP counts and
use of these as a proxy for portfolio patent strength and value, some companies
seek to maximize the number of patents they declare to justify a relatively
high royalty.
Inaccuracies, biases in determinations and
company disclosure tactics, as above, are why it would be unwise for SEP
determinations, SEP counts and any other counts that are used to determine
patent and portfolio values to be imposed on the market.
The wisdom of King Solomon’s (data) Mines
Any EC-prescribed centralized SEP
assessment database tool would inevitably result in parties becoming, at least
somewhat, obliged or pressured to use it to “split the baby” in determining
patent owners’ shares of SEPs and FRAND royalties in licensing. Established and
emerging practices would be eroded or marginalized including:
·
Use of comparable license benchmarks from
hundreds of executed licenses and billions of dollars in royalty payments over
many years,
·
In-depth bilateral discussions on patent
claims and how they map to the standards, and
·
The counting of approved
contributions to the standards.
Patent counting usefully complements these
other SEP evaluation methods in licensing negotiations, but this technique
should not be the bureaucratic means of setting prices on a company-by-company
basis that would emerge from stipulating patent counting and emphasizing it over
other valuation methods. Centrally imposed assessments would likely become
increasing dysfunctional and corrupting as the system, its administrators and its
operators are gamed or courted for political and commercial gain. Government
agencies would do better to keep clear and let licensing parties and third parties
in face of market forces decide for themselves which facts, figures and studies
they would like to use in licensing deliberations and in litigation.
My entire article, here, supports my
conclusions by showing methodically how very inconsistent determinations of LTE
essentiality and patent strength are among all the different third-party
evaluators. It shows that such methods are particularly unreliable in valuing
patent portfolios.
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